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/Section 1: Chapter 1
TOPIC AND METHOD
Choice of the Topic
The writer was assigned as a reporter to cover the Sydney hearings 
of 2 related inquiries in 1973 and 1974, for A.B.C. News - the Senate 
Standing Committee on Education, Science and the Arts, inquiring into 
broadcasting, and the McLean inquiry into FM radio, which was a conse­
quence of it. That was actually the beginning of the project reported 
on here, an examination of the inauguration of FM broadcasting, and the 
inevitable political processes which had to be started and negotiated, 
to bring that about.
At the time the 2 inquiries were being held, it seemed clear that 
Australia was to see a range of innovations in broadcasting, including, 
prominent on the list, both public radio and FM. Such a change was 
evidently popular at the time, as there was some excitement in the 
community over a prospective opening of the air-waves. Talk in the 
daily press and elsewhere mixed up the concepts of community broadcasting, 
FM, access, and alternative radio, but a certain level of interest was 
plain.
The idea of a change was attractive. It would mean presumably a 
wider diversity of choice, and some adventures in music programming, 
talks and public affairs, and other fields like community service or 
radio drama. It would be good for democratic life, giving more people 
the opportunity to learn how to work in the mass media, and providing 
more outlets for the exchange of opinions.
However it became apparent as well that the expansion of radio was 
not to be a smooth process, though it had occurred to me that it might 
well be, as the goals were quite uncomplicated and easily grasped and 
expressed; there were many examples available as to what could be done 
with small stations (new regional stations in the U.K.; public radio in 
America, and country commercial stations in Australia); the government
of the day was prepared to spend in order to launch reforms in many 
institutional fields, and an emerging movement could be seen, asking for 
the go-ahead to open new stations.
Yet a rigmarole of intrigue, inquiry, argument and obfuscation set 
in at many levels, all with the effect of holding up what one had been 
anticipating as a straightforward set of actions, initiated by the 
federal government.
It was curiosity about why this should be so, and how the entwined 
and exasperating set of processes worked themselves out, that provoked 
my first efforts ±o unravel them. These culminated in a research article 
written at the East West Centre in Hawaii, under a fellowship provided 
by that institution, early in 1976, on public radio. It reviewed the 
main events in the policy area, during the preceding 4 years, beginning 
with the report of the Broadcasting Control Board on FM, in 1972, and 
taking in the inquiries of Senator James McClelland, Sir Francis McLean, 
and the sequence of inquiries and reports that followed.
The picture became more clear, but it was plain that much of 
significance waited to be discovered, further below the surface, and 
further back in time.
A few of the particular features of broadcasting politics should 
be mentioned at this point. First, it is a hugely sensitive area, a 
fact one realises first of all by noting the response of politicians to 
any issue concerning the mass media, be it control of same, the rights 
of the media, or grievances against them. The debate in parliament 
over Labor Party amendments to the Broadcasting and Television Act in 
1974, which sought to redefine some of the regulatory powers of the 
Control Board, was a good example. It brought out displays of unreas­
onableness and fears for the future, mostly - given the circumstances - 
on the Opposition side, where it was thought the amendments being
3
proposed would undermine public freedoms.
The message of this, that the politics of broadcasting is 
emotional, an explosive area, could be seen to apply at all levels of 
debate, anywhere in the society. In particular, it applied where money 
was involved. Changes in broadcasting legislation or policy automatic- 
ally pose some kind of threat to settled interests, such as the commercial 
broadcasters of the early 1970s, who derived their prosperity, if not 
financial survival from the status quo. Commercial protection, provided 
by dint of the way the broadcasting system is organised, is a central 
factor in policy considerations. The protected parties in this case - 
the commercial broadcasters on the AM band - were highly active and 
influential parties, normally in a conservative role, in most instances 
when change was being attempted. The broadcasting field as a whole was 
clearly a hornets' nest, and the wary behaviour of the commercial radio 
interests was most indicative of the emotional character of the issues 
being dealt with.
Another important feature of the radio debate of the 1970s was the 
engineering question. The nature of commercial protectionism had been 
to restrict the number of participants in radio through a parsimonious 
licensing policy. A corner-stone of this had been that in strictly 
material terms, station frequencies were a scarce commodity. The frequency 
band was effectively taken up. When moves began to "pluralise" 
broadcasting, it followed that there would have to be more stations.
The assumption that frequencies were unavailable was challenged and 
overturned, but not without major controversy, conducted, significantly, 
in terms of a debate about engineering matters. Laymen wanting to talk 
about diversifying programs on Australian radio, and getting more 
people involved in broadcasting, had to learn about radio engineering.
The most important and best-known issue that came up in this
rca te g o ry  was th a t o f  the c le a r in g  o f  the ra d io  s e c to r  o f  the VHF band, 
most o f  which had been d esign ated  in  A u s tra lia  f o r  oth er u ses , m ostly  
t e l e v i s io n ,  in  the la te  1950s and e a r ly  1960s. As in  a l l  th in g s  in  the 
mass media f i e l d ,  i t  seemed th a t en g in eerin g  q u estion s  cou ld  n ot be 
ju s t  turned over t o  the e x p e rts , t o  f in d  answers to  con cern s th a t r e a l ly  
were fundam entally s o c ia l  or c u ltu r a l  on es . To ach ieve o n e 's  ends, i t  
seemed th a t one had t o  be in v o lv ed  in  a l l  s e c t o r s ,  a t a l l  l e v e ls ,  a l l  
the tim e. Some exact in sta n ces  o f  such heavy engagement, in  in d iv id u a l 
c a s e s , w i l l  be given  in  the fo l lo w in g  ch a p ters .
To cu t the s to ry  s h o r t , at th is  s ta g e , i t  might s u f f i c e  t o  say 
th a t wherever one sought t o  make in q u ir ie s  about change in  b roa d ca stin g  
m atters , one was im m ediately engaged in  an in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  some asp ect 
o f  the p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s . Too much was seen t o  be at stak e ; t o o  many 
p eop le  were v i t a l l y  in te r e s te d , in  d i f f e r e n t  ways, and wanted t o  be 
in v o lv ed ; the kinds o f  change being  attem pted were to o  n ove l t o  be l e f t  
in  th e  backwater o f  sedate p lan n in g , r e g u la t io n  by e x p e r ts , and gradual 
developm ent.
To make b e t te r  sense o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t iv i t y  record ed  through 
the p e r io d  under rev iew  -  t o  h elp  ex p la in  the fr e q u e n t ly  p e t ty  p ro c e s s e s  
o f  making p o l i c y  and im plem enting i t  -  a s e t  o f  t h e o r e t ic a l  t e x t s  was 
con su lted  in  search  o f  a con cep tu a l frame b u ild  or adapt. In terms 
o f  th is  the scrap s o f  in form a tion  and l in e s  o f  argument, i t  was th ou gh t, 
might be g a in fu l ly  matched and ju x ta p osed .
For th a t reason  the fo l lo w in g  ch apter -  S ection  1, Chapter 2 -  
c o n s is t s  o f  a rev iew  a r t i c l e  d e a lin g  w ith  g e n e r a lis a t io n s  on th e  kinds 
o f  is su es  encountered in  t h is  p a r t ic u la r  problem  area o f  p o l i t i c s .  I t  
s e t t l e s  on a system s model d ev ised  by S a lisb u ry , qu otin g  e x te n s iv e ly  
from the exp la n ation  o f  i t  by i t s  author, who g iv e s  i t  as h is  c o n t r ib ­
u t io n  t o  " ty p o lo g is in g  and m od ellin g  games" in  p o l i t i c a l  s c ie n c e .
To foreshadow that, the model is seen to be toery apt in certain 
main aspects. It gives a place to "system resources", primarily 
material factors outside of the political system, like the current 
explosion in the development of broadcasting technology, which determine 
the volume of work going into the system. It has a clear place as well 
for the reconciliation of changing events in the demand patterns of the 
political system (as increasing pressure for public broadcasting outlets 
to be provided, under the new Labor government of 1973), with factors in 
the decisional system (as resistance to such pressure from planners 
committed to other goals and used to coping with entirely different sets 
of demands).
When research done specifically for this study was started in 1980, 
the focus for it had shifted from public broadcasting to FM. In part, 
the reason was that so much debate was on technical issues - the clearing 
of the band, then a new generation of disputes over frequency allocations 
and transmitter power for the FM stations - that it was exacting and 
appropriate to use such a "technical" definition for the field of study. 
While debate over FM is unquestionably political debate, the physical 
environment has imposed undisputed borders. Frequency modulation 
broadcasting, materially speaking, is that and nothing else - which 
must be helpful for anybody working in an otherwise diffuse and 
unsettled field of study.
Further to that, public radio as an area of interest began to 
settle down after the end of 1977, when the sector was recognised in 
legislation. A certain amount of valuable material had been written by 
that time, by some of the main actors in the battle to have the public 
system established, and that was available for use in this study.
However, elsewhere under the banner of "FM" there were new developments, 
in the A.B.C. and in the commercial sector, where serious issues were 
in contention, among competing forces in government and in the
7broadcasting industry. It appeared to me it would re-invigorate the line 
of inquiry begun in 1973, to broaden it out, and take in a related field 
of study, where, it seemed, the same manner of political contest as 
before was in the process of still being fought. (To make that plain, 
the main battle referred to in that instance was the move by Mr A. A. Staley 
as Minister to bring "outsiders" into commercial broadcasting, instead of 
the existing operators, who had been expecting to get FM.)
As the thesis topic would indicate, the initial goal of writing 
descriptively, on the composition, structure and function of the new 
broadcasting system as it emerged, has been elbowed to one side by the 
over-riding political considerations entailed in that process. It is 
unclear exactly how much priority is attached to this particular area of 
broadcasting policy by the major political contenders. Looking at items 
for the attention of Ministers, for instance, Senator D. McClelland would 
have listed his points system for regulation of television, ahead of FM.
In 1982 Minister Ian Sinclair accords high priority to the issue of 
supplementary FM broadcasting licences, but has weightier preoccupations, 
not least in his roles as Leader of the House and Deputy Leader of his 
party. It is unambiguously so, however, that "FM" is most widely 
recognised as a substantial item on the agenda for attention, contest 
and debate inside the arena of national politics. The description of the 
stations broadcasting in FM is considered accordingly in this study, as 
among the outcomes of political activity, again in the terms of the 
political systems model borrowed from Salisbury, and outlined in
Chapter 2.
$Method and Outline
The thesis is in 6 sections
The Introductory section deals with the topic, objectives and 
method of approach. Section 2, on "System Resources", has 2 chapters. 
Chapter 1 is historical. It describes the processes of material growth 
in the economy and the advance of electronic technology, and shows these 
factors imposing pressure on the political system, as resources 
determining the volume of work for the system to cope with. Chapter 2 
is a case study, elaborating the principle of these external system 
resources operating as a major determinant of what took place throughout 
the system. The case in point is an issue that has blown up in Sydney 
since 1980, concerning use of the frequency spectrum by television 
stations and FM radio, which have been in conflict over it. Put crudely, 
the FM stations want more transmitter power, but the television stations 
say they should not be given it, as they are creating interference with 
television reception already, and any change upward would be for the 
worse. A strictly material issue has gone for resolution into the 
general realm of broadcasting politics.
Section 3 provides an historical treatment of the development of 
FM broadcasting. There are 6 chapters, each dealing independently with 
events and processes within a manageable period for review. As Ministers 
responsible for broadcasting are major players in every situation, the 
periods considered are those under the oversight of the successive 
Ministers. Hence, Chapter 1 covers the period prior to the election of 
the Whitlam government in December 1972; Chapter 2 refers to the period 
during which Senator Douglas McClelland was Minister; Chapter 3, the 
period under Dr Moss Cass; Chapter 4, Mr Eric Robinson; Chapter 5,
Mr Tony Staley, and Chapter 6, Mr Ian Sinclair. It is emphasised that
these chapters deal with media policy-making, and the FM system generally
9They are not written as small histories of the individual Ministries as 
such, and the personality, style and attainments of the individual 
politicians are not a consideration except where they have a particular 
bearing on the topic - the advent of the FM broadcasting system. The 
chapters overlap in places and there is cross-referencing. They are not 
written as a continuous history.
The roots of the issues dealt with in that section go back well 
u/ho,+ ha**- 4e*n seen as on obvious
beyond /\ starting point, the recommendation of the Broadcasting
Control Board, in 1972, that broadcasting be extended to FM. Certain key 
issues such as the introduction of television in the 1950s, which 
dramatically affected the history of FM radio, are dealt with at length. 
Accordingly the historical scope for this study encompasses the period 
from the end of the Second World War, in 1945, till the end of 1981, with 
some issues extending, in their effects, into 1982.
On the assumption that the preceding sections will have adequately 
explained the working of the political system, in the matter of FM radio, 
Section 4 discusses the radio stations as outputs of the system so 
explained. There are 4 chapters, as follows: Chapter 1 - ABC-FM. A 
programming dilemma, organisation^ issues to be dealt with by the A.B.C., 
and problems with resources, and the relations of the A.B.C. with 
government. Chapter 2 - 2JJJ-FM. A programming dilemma of a different 
kind. The experiment with 2JJ/2JJJ as a novel form of organisational 
structure. Certain problems peculiar to the station to do with its 
transmitter/reception handicaps, and its position in relation to the 
political system. Chapter 3 - Commercial FM. The political contest 
leading to the ensconcement of independent operators on the FM band.
Their programming choices and performances as innovators. Chapter 4 - 
Public Radio. Most public broadcasters are on FM. They cannot be dealt
with individually, because of their number and diversity, though
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re fe ren ce  is  made to  the way the s ta tion s  can be ca tegorised . Audience 
responses, programming, and f in a n c ia l d i f f i c u l t i e s  are reviewed.
Section 5 sets  out conclusions, and r e fe r s  back to  2 issues mentioned 
above, and elsewhere in the argument, commercial p rotection ism  in  the 
Austra lian  broadcasting system, and the importance o f engineering 
considerations - most im portantly the on-going campaign fo r  c lea r in g  o f 
the VHF band fo r  FM rad io . The section  a lso  recogn ises certa in  o f the 
p r in c ip a l p o l i t i c a l  questions d ea lt  w ith  in the main body o f the th es is , 
and makes some estim ates o f prospects fo r  the fu tu re . Section 6 is  a 
re fe ren ce  section  d e ta il in g  the f u l l  range o f sources used.
The method fo llow ed  in gathering m ateria l fo r  the study has been 
determined by the very  contemporary to p ic  and the recency o f the events 
in question .
Reading began w ith  th e o re t ic a l te x ts , te x ts  on broadcasting issues 
g en e ra lly , and the l i t e r a tu r e  on Austra lian  broadcasting. Documents 
include a substantia l l i s t  o f published reports  from governmental 
in q u ir ie s  o f d i f fe r e n t  d esc r ip tion s , beginning with parliam entary in q u ir ie s  
in the 1940s and extending to  reports  o f the Broadcasting Tribunal on 
lic en ce  renewal hearings fo r  the FM sta tion s  in  1981. Other documents 
were made a va ila b le  by s ta tio n s , p r in c ip a lly  th e ir  prom otional brochures, 
program notes and reports  on audience research. P os ition  papers and 
research reports  were made a va ila b le  by the Federation o f Radio Broad­
casters , the Public Broadcasting Association  and the A.B.C. Some 
in tern a l documents from 2JJ/2JJJ-FM were a va ila b le  fo r  th is  p ro je c t ,  as 
fo r  other work done by researchers ou tside o f the organ isation .
A rev iew  o f newspaper a r t ic le s  covering a period  o f in tense 
a c t iv i t y  on FM, 1976-1980 in c lu s iv e , was undertaken at the beginning o f 
the present p ro je c t ,  e s s e n t ia lly  to c la r i f y  the h is to r ic a l  stages and
//
gain a general perspective of the political debate on FM, over time.
More than 1000 articles were perused and noted, many being small frag­
ments giving for instance a date for an important event. Many were long 
feature articles, however, dealing seriously with events as they unfolded, 
and disclosing a volume of essential information. A group of perhaps 10 
journalists have been following the process and writing authoritatively 
on it since before 1975, and their work has been invaluable in drawing 
together the strands of activity. Their names appear in the list of 
selected, longer articles given in the reference section.
The final source area has been a set of interviews with 3 3  of the 
principal actors in the process under review. The interviews ran from 
30 minutes to an hour and a half, being on average 45 minutes in 
duration. Most of the subjects agreed to the interviews being recorded 
and have been quoted, sometimes extensively, verbatim. A few of the 
interviews used were conducted in connection with earlier research, but 
the great majority were specifically arranged in connection with this 
undertaking, following the completion of reading in Winter 1981. Of 
the persons approached, none declined to be interviewed, though in 2 
cases we could not find a suitable time to meet, due to travels, illness 
and similar obstacles. Five interviews were conducted in Melbourne 
during a visit made by the writer in October 1981. Dr G. Evans from the 
office of Senator J. Button was interviewed by telephone, Sydney to 
Canberra, and Mr Ted Seymour, Program Director of 4MMM-FM by telephone, 
Sydney to Brisbane. Mr Chris Symons, formerly Director of ABC-FM, now 
of Mylor S.A., corresponded with the writer - a correspondence that 
included a long letter from Mr Symons, commenting on several points and 
corroborating most of the statements contained in the chapter on the 
A.B.C. network. Mr George Chapman, Managing Director of 6N0W-FM was 
interviewed on behalf of the writer by a colleague in Perth, Mr John
Clements. Five interviews broadcast on 2JJ/2JJJ-FM, or on the A.B.C. 
networks, were drawn from A.B.C. archives. The remainder were made 
face-to-face, by the writer, in Sydney. In all cases the interviewees 
were frank, co-operative and extremely generous with their time. The 
interviews are listed in the reference section, with the exception of 
some that were done with persons in public employment, who want to 
remain un-named.
nSection I: Chapter 2
TYPOLOGISING AND MODELLING GAMES
The events and processes dealt with in this project are mostly
political, in the sense that they are matters of public policy. They 
are of the "early days" of FM broadcasting in Australia, and occur 
during a period in which the rights and wrongs of having such a system, 
its possibilities, and the ways and means of getting it going, were all 
open to discussion and contest. They were the material for political 
intercourse - for the exercise of power in recognised directions.
Those observations must undoubtedly raise a demand for definitions 
of the terms used, and for "parameters" to be stated, within which the 
discussion of events and processes can be placed and understood. "What 
is power?" for instance, and "What is policy?"
I have referred to a set of widely used texts to try to anticipate 
and meet such demands, and to provide a useful framework for setting out 
the information, and relating the findings to one another, so that they 
may develop towards some coherent end - a statement of the way things 
worked out in that area of broadcasting, how and why, during the period 
in question.
To use other words, Allison1 sees such tasks as showing "What
2
happened; why did it happen, and what will happen next". Salisbury
says it is telling "What makes a difference, to whom", and Dahl, as
3
quoted by Lowi, discussing power, asks "Power for what?"
Much of the present research undertaking has caused me to inquire 
into decision making in unpublicised areas, within the Australian public
1 G.T. Allison, Essence of Decision; Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
Boston, Little Brown, 1971.
2 R.H. Salisbury, "The Analysis of Public Policy: A Search for Theories 
and Roles" in A. Ranney (ed.), Political Science and Public Policy, 
Chicago, Markham, 1968.
3 T.J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and 
Political Theory" in World Politics - Quarterly Journal of Inter­
national Relations, vol. 16, Oct. 1963-July 1964. Centre for 
International Studies, Princeton University, pp.677-715.
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service, the cabinet, or the offices of the various lobbies concerning 
themselves with the control and operation of the broadcasting system - 
hence the need to conduct interviews with persons holding key positions 
in the relevant organisations.
Accordingly, it is attractive to begin the review of literature
with an "incrementalist" interpretation, that of Lindblom, who says,
"Complex decision making is not synoptic but is fragmented, disjointed
and incremental". In systems perceived as disjointed in this way, he
says central co-ordination is rejected in favour of the concept of
Mutual Adjustment. Actors and decision makers can be relied on to sort
things out in an enlightened free-for-all, the better if not impeded by
regulation. Co-ordination occurs, by way of this principle, as
follows: "A set of interdependent decisions is co-ordinated if each
decision is adjusted to the others in such a way that for each adjusted
decision, the adjustment is thought to be better than no adjustment in
4
the eyes of at least one decision maker".
The theory is indebted to "English pluralist thought" and the
"concept of the State as a co-ordinating apparatus for competing
associations, with no moral or legal priority of its own", and also to
an American conception that constitutional checks and balances "do not
5
promote efficiency, but preclude the use of arbitrary power". As the 
working model for a political apparatus minus central controls, it 
concentrates on the power of the separate actors, who rely on a wide 
variety of "influences" - "persuasion; authority, not limited to its use
in authoritarian prescription; appeals to conventions; votes, and
6
wealth". Those with authority can succeed in delegating it, and can
4 C.E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision-making through 
mutual adjustment, New York, Macmillan (Free Press), 1965, p.23.
5 Ibid., pp.11-23.
6 Ibid., p.99.
"invest wisely" by being seen to use their authority with large effect, 
thus helping to ensure a respectful and acquiescent response next time 
they act.
Lindblom's hypothesised Partisan Mutual Adjustment system would be
subject to "reallocation of weights", "striking against the participants
most able to resist the reallocation", so the system might be "remedied 
7
when defective".
However it's acknowledged in the text that "improved mutual adjust 
ment is hardly recognised as a systematic alternative". At best, "real
g
world systems are mixed" and the principal relevance of the theory put
forward, in the present case at least, is to provide a context for
describing and explaining acts and decisions under review. In Lindblom'
terms, the "ubiquitous processes" of mutual adjustment are helpful to
9
decision making and policy making - and helpful to analysis.
To show how this might be: on the relationship between regulatory
agencies and decision makers (the example given is central co-ordination
of investment decisions), a process of co-optation is suggested:
Central co-ordination of investment decisions, for example, 
through central bank manipulation of interest rates is 
obviously responsive to, influenced by, and controlled by 
the strength and direction of desires to invest. For that 
matter the central controls can best be understood as a 
set of controls designed to grapple with investment 
decisions, and clearly one never grapples with anything 
without being influenced or controlled by it.(10)
Co-optation is a theme that appears often in the literature, and
which occurs as much in the narrative of broadcasting administration as
in other fields.
Similarly, in Lowi, the relationships of interest groups and
7 Ibid., p.300.
8 Ibid., p.102.
9 Ibid., p.293.
10 Ibid., p.103.
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government agencies are examined in other settings, as when the "official 
instead of the group becomes the petitioner". An example is used of a 
telephone call from the White House to an official of the American 
Steelworkers' Union, at the time of the steel seizure of 1952, "to ascertain 
what would happen if the Taft Hartley Act were invoked at the same time 
the mills were seized. The union official called back in an hour to 
report that regardless of what the union ordered, there would probably be 
a rank and file walkout, so the idea was abandoned". It is a state of 
affairs in which "private group consent is needed in advance of official 
decision". ^
The mutual adjustment concept finds its parallel in other theor­
etical statements, all of which encourage one to perceive and describe 
the full range of political choice and actions, in terms of a 
decentralised pluralism.
12
Schattschneider, quoted in Lowi, based relationships among 
participants on "mutual non-interference" among uncommon interests, in a 
decentralised and multi-centred political arena".
Rigby, on bureaucratic politics, formulates the assumptions of 
this pluralism as:
(a) Plurality of goals within and between (bureaucratic) 
structures; (b) Less than complete unanimity among the 
individuals and groups concerned as to the hierarchy of 
goals and the ideal mix of goal achievement, and (c)
Efforts by individuals and groups to promote outcomes 
harmonising as closely as possible with their preferred 
hierarchy and mix of goals. (13)
The latter point, in Rigby, takes his argument into a related set 
of considerations which will find a place in the later sections of this 
work, the "power aspects of bureaucracy". He observes that the political
11 Op.cit., Lowi, p.13.
12 Ibid., p.680.
13 T.H. Rigby, "Bureaucratic Politics" in R.N. Spann and G.R. Curnow (eds), 
Public Policy and Administration in Australia: A Reader, Sydney, Wiley, 
1975, p.196.
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system and status structure existing alongside of formal organisational 
structures is frequently regarded as not legitimate, or "extraneous and 
pathological". The same attitude is remarked on by Allison in Essence 
of Decision, on the place of memoirs and anecdotes in foreign policy 
analysis: "Internal politics is messy; moreover, according to prevailing 
doctrine, politicking lacks intellectual substance...Thus, memoirs
14typically handle the details of such bargaining with a velvet glove".
Allison's three models of political analysis show that an
incremental approach can be put to use in different contexts, in a
systematic way. They are applied by use of his extensive research into
the events of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.
Model 1, the Rational Actor model, deals with the "standard,
rational calculus" of decision making, where "rationality refers to
consistent value-maximising choice, within specified constraints". A
definition of policy is implied:
Decision presupposes a decider and a choice among 
alternatives with reference to some goal. Policy means 
the realisation in a number of particular instances of 
some agents' objectives. These concepts identify 
phenomena as actions performed by purposeful agents...
(and involve the) everyday assumption that what human 
beings do is at least intendedly rational.(15)
Henry Kissinger is cited as the protagonist of this classic
approach, complaining that in practice he found that members of his
"American foreign policy community" were wanting in information and
other abilities needed to read events according to plan. The model is
described as principally useful in cases where data is lacking, and it
becomes necessary to infer. For example, evidence can be put together
to infer what Soviet authorities "must have believed" when they took
certain actions for the placement of missiles. To use it to the optimum
14 Ibid., p.15.
15 Ibid., p.55.
would require "God-like prescience".
Other deficiencies of this approach are pointed out as well. Its
fundamental assumptions, emphasising "goals", "purposes", "decisions" and
17"choices" are put m  question. Model 2, the Organisational Process 
model, is represented as something more sophisticated, abandoning the 
concepts of "acts" and "choices" for a sturdier measure, "outputs" of 
large organisations functioning according to standard patterns of 
behaviour. Large organisations within the government each have primary 
responsibility for particular tasks of government; they have quasi­
independence in handling these problems; through their actions, govern­
ment behaviour relevant to any important problem reflects the independent 
output of several organisations, partially co-ordinated by government 
leaders, and, to achieve this co-ordination the government, in the form 
of its constituent organisations, follows standard operating procedures 
(S.O.P's).
To illustrate the assessment of various "outputs", by way of this 
model, Allison refers to the disposition of Soviet missiles in a pattern 
on the ground that made them vulnerable to detection and attack.
Evidence was produced that they were installed according to the S.O.P's 
of the military arm always responsible for such installations - 
notwithstanding the requirement of State policy for secrecy and stealth.
The third alternative refers us to the arena of bureaucratic 
politics, but on a massive scale, and with the highest importance 
ascribed to it as the main avenue for getting things to happen. Model 3, 
the Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics model, focuses on the political
16 Ibid., p.71.
17 See also Georgiou's attack on "goals". P. Georgiou, "The Goal 
Paradigm and Notes Towards a Counter Paradigm", in Administrative 
Science Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 3, 1973, Cornell University, Ithaca, 
New York, pp.291-310.
interplay among government organisations, and rejects choice and output
both: "What happens is characterised as a resultant of various bargaining 
, „ 18games among players".
In this game situation there is no unitary actor
but rather as many actors as players - players who focus 
not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse 
intra-national problems as well; players who act in terms 
of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather 
according to various conceptions of national, organis­
ational and personal goals; players who make governmental 
decisions not by a single, rational choice, but by the 
pulling and hauling that is politics.(19)
No questioning of the legitimacy of these proceedings, whether
they should be seen as "extraneous and pathological", can be allowed to
overcome the weight of evidence that the pattern of "resultants" issue
from a contest of linked organisations. Morally speaking, "men differ
about what should be done, and responsible men are forced to fight for
20what they are convinced is right".
Evidence in support of Model 3, from Allison, includes the detailing 
of a tribal dispute between the Air Force and C.I.A. over who should 
operate the U2 missions over Cuba - a dispute that had an essential 
effect on the development of the missile crisis, because it delayed 
flights over the Western end of the island, where missile sites were 
under construction. Similarly, American officials becoming aware that 
offensive weapons were probably being placed in Cuba, are shown to have 
been leaking this information to opposition Congressmen, so as to 
circumvent Administration guidelines, committing the government to less 
alarmist assumptions, drawn from earlier intelligence information.
In this section, Allison draws from Neustadt (whose "sharp focus
21
attempts to elucidate policy as the result of Presidential politics").
18 Cp.cit., Allison, p.146.
19 Ibid., p.144.
20 Ibid., p.58.
21 Ibid., p.149.
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He puts forward a concept of power, as a determinant of each player's
impact on results. It is seen as an "elusive blend of at least three
elements: bargaining advantages, skill and will in using bargaining
advantages, and other players' perceptions of the first two ingredients".
This is not far from the idea of power centred on the individual,
as described by Lindblom, who is recognised in Allison as having
"explored the character of bargaining, and expounded the virtues of
incremental muddling as opposed to comprehensive choice as the mode of
policy making". Among Lindblom's "contrasts with the characteristics of
the rational model" is the proposition that "by proceeding incrementally
and comparing the results of each new policy with the old, actors reduce
23
or eliminate reliance on theory".
While Allison concludes that available evidence is "insufficient
to permit confident judgment between these hypotheses", the thread of
"incremental muddling" runs throughout. Decisions, even at the highest
level, are rarely written on a clean slate. Government leaders sit atop
a "constellation of loosely allied organisations"; there is sequential
attention to goals, and the decisions of government leaders will
normally trigger organisational routines, which are fixed, and lead to
action along recognised channels. "Government leaders can trim the
edges of this output and can exercise some choice in combining outputs...
but the basic decisions have all too often been previously made."
Leaders' attempts to force organisations to act contrary to existing
24goals lead to "complications".
Dye, expounding on this incrementalist view, represents the 
formulation and attainment of policies as an accumulation of commitments,
22 Ibid., p.168.
23 Ibid., p.54.
24 Ibid., p.113.
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to which new initiatives are added, and represents the progression as a 
histogram:
,25
Figure 1
In this scheme, "policy makers accept the legitimacy of previous
policies because of their uncertainty about the consequences of completely
new or different policies. It is safe to stick with known programs when
the consequences of new programs cannot be predicted. Under conditions
of uncertainty, policy makers continue past policies whether or not they
26
have proven effective".
In the context of the Australian public service, Crisp sees that
Ministers, as policy makers, can find themselves in much the same position:
Over time an established Department will build up a corpus 
of established policy (i.e.established by law to some extent 
and established by departmental function and usage for the 
rest), backed by a corpus of established predispositions as 
regards possible developments or modification. Together, 
these are functions known as the 'departmental line'...
Ministers are co-opted or their ideas subsumed, or accepted 
(grafted on) as embellishments.(27)
Dye sums up on this with the observation that
agreement cones easier... when the items in dispute are only 
increases or decreases in budgets, or modifications to
25 T.R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, (3rd edition), Englewood 
Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1978, Fig. 2-6, p.33.
26 Loc.cit.
27 L.F. Crisp, "Politics and the Commonwealth Public Service" in 
R.N. Spann and G.R. Curnow (eds), op.cit, pp.186-7.
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existing programs. Conflict is heightened when decision­
making focuses on major policy shifts involving great 
gains or loses, or 'all or nothing', 'yes or no' policy 
decisions. Because the political tension involved in 
getting new programs or policies passed every year would 
be very great, past policy victories are continued into 
future years...(28)
The impression created from most of the above is that a sequential 
treatment of different policy issues, or episodes, as they develop, offers 
the best and most realistic hope for correct analysis. Policy makers 
are seen to be making limited gains, in a competitive situation, adding 
their achievements to a corpus of recognised, largely immutable policy 
and procedure. Where there are systems, they are not contrived, but 
function through custom and local initiatives. The means to find out 
what happens, and place it in a context of similar activities, is to 
monitor policy outcomes - the outputs or resultants of bargaining and 
initiative.
In the account that follows in the later sections, restricted, 
incremental change, as the outcome of involved processes, will become 
inevitably a major focus. Under the particular circumstances change is 
observable and perhaps best observable from the perspective of those 
trying to cause, moderate, or prevent it.
However there are objections to following this course alone. It is 
useful as well, to be able to look harder at the "complications" that
arise when policy makers want to surpass the usual role of adding to the
29 . .body of extant policy. These tend to bring or accompany instability,
28 Op.cit., Dye, p.34.
29 Where Ministers as policy makers are interested in change, the likely 
"complications" will highlight their relations with public servants. 
Crawford, looking at Ministers and Permanent Heads, explains that 
"strength" in Australian Ministers, and a long term in office, will 
be important determinants in how they fare in policy making. His own 
experiences in such relationships, in which "good working relations" 
were achieved, were principally with a "strong Minister over a 
decade". Sir John Crawford, "Relations between Civil Servants and 
Ministers in Policy Making" in R.N. Spann and G.R. Curnow (eds), 
op.cit., p.163.
or even a limited degree of "disequilibrium", as one informant is to 
describe the situation that existed for a time in the field of Australian 
media policy and administration.
Whether or not policies are made and enacted entirely piecemeal, 
through "pulling and hauling", it is useful in observing the procedure, 
to have a more comprehensive view. It takes the explanation further, for 
instance, if we can look beyond the interplay of characters and groupings 
involved in the game, and beyond the "standard operating procedures" of 
government, to try to judge the impact of,and upon, exterior influences.
Salisbury as an example, conceives of external "system resources" - 
value patterns, wealth, the patterns of settlement and so on - as 
determining the ultimate volume of outputs. Citing Dye and others, he 
sees it as now
confirmed and elaborated...that the principal variables with 
which we have traditionally been concerned, e.g. demand 
patterns reflected in party competition, do not 'explain' 
variations in the authoritative outputs of a policy. With 
Easton many political scientists have accepted outputs as the 
ultimate dependent variable to be accounted for. But now 
it appears that not only party competition and interest- 
group demand patterns, but such decisional-system character­
istics of apportionment make little difference to output.
What do matter are system resources.(30)
Dye assesses the value of a systems theory for political analysis 
in terms of the questions it poses: "What are the significant dimensions 
of the environment that generate demands upon the political system?", 
or "How do characteristics of the political system affect the content of 
public policy?" He offers a model in diagrammatic form:
30 Op.cit., Salisbury, p.163.
Figure 231
implies an identifiable set of institutions and activities 
in society that function to transform demands into author­
itative decisions requiring the support of the whole society.
The concept of 'system' also implies that elements of the 
system are inter-related, that the system can respond to 
forces in its environment, and that it will do so in order 
to preserve itself. Inputs are received...in the form of 
both demands and support. Demands occur when individuals 
or groups, in response to real or perceived environmental 
conditions, act to affect public policy. Support is 
rendered when individuals or groups accept the outcome of 
elections... and groups accept the outcome of elections... 
and generally conform to policy decisions. (32)
The notion of following a process through such a system is useful
if we can say more about the substantive policy moves going on within
that system. Lowi's review article "The Politics of Foreign Trade" in
World Politics, says that policies analysed can be shown to determine
the nature of the process itself. In his terms it helps to "look into
the little black box of political relationships among all the
influence seekers which the pluralists say contains the reality of
33influence, and the elitists say doesn't really exist..." It is an 
approach which goes further toward satisfying one of the requirements 
of a good model, as explained by Dye himself, that it should suggest 
hypotheses about the courses and consequences of public policy -
31 Op.cit., Dye, p.39.
32 Ibid., p.38.
33 Op.cit., Lowi, p.682.
hypotheses that can be tested against real-world data. "A concept that
merely describes public policy is not as useful as a concept that
34explains public policy."
The original publication reviewed by Lowi, dealing with American
tariff policy, provided substantive materials, the handling of which, he
thought, might produce useful theoretical generalisations. Not, however,
by means of the existing "broad gauged theories of politics", which are
35
"not related, perhaps not relatable, to observable cases".
Aspects of the subject material, he showed, could not be encompassed 
by the pressure group model that had been employed. There was "no one- 
for-one nexus between the policies at stake and interest group 
activation. Protectionists were more highly activated than anti­
protectionists ... The two 'sides' of the controversy never met in a
face-to-face conflict with a settlement by compromise...and most group
3 6
activity involved interaction with people on the same side."
His solution for such problems is to replace the descriptive,
subject-matter categories of the pluralists, with "functional" categories
of his own devising, with public policies to be placed in three main
groupings: distributive, regulative and re-distributive. These are meant
to correspond to "real" phenomena - as areas of policy or government
activity, they "constitute real areas of power. Each area tends to
develop its own characteristic political structure, political process,
elites and group relations".
The rationale for the scheme is set out as follows:
(1) The types of relationships to be found among people 
are determined by their expectations - by what they hope
34 Op.cit., Dye, p.40.
35 Op.cit., Lowi, p.687.
36 Ibid., pp.682-3.
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to achieve or get from relating to others. (2) In 
politics, expectations are determined by governmental 
outputs or policies. (3) Therefore, a political 
relationship is determined by the type of policy at 
stake, so that for every type of policy there is likely 
to be a distinctive type of political relationship.
If power is defined as a share in the making of policy, 
or authoritative allocation, then the political 
relationship in question is a power relationship or, 
over time, a power structure.(37)
The schema employed by Lowi relate to the present exercise in two 
ways. Firstly, as indicated above, the protection debate in America is 
used to explain how the model is applied. It is coincidental that 
commercial protectionism looms large as an issue in the long debate over 
the expansion of broadcasting, and will be dealt with at some length.
The second consideration is that Lowi's categories, distribution, 
regulation and re-distribution, are adapted by Salisbury in the devising 
of a systems model upon which the later sections of this argument will 
rely fairly heavily.
In showing how his typologies can be applied in practice, Lowi
makes two points to do with the settlement of issues. The first point
is that where decisions are at issue, and are not resolved through
compromise or the forming of coalitions, they will be referred for
resolution to an "institution of last resort", or, before it comes to
that, "command posts" in the system, such as those identified by
Schattschneider. In the example taken from Schattschneider's treatment
of tariff issues, the House Ways and Means Committee functioned in this
way, "not because (its) officials were above pressure groups, but
because the pattern of access led to supportive relations between pressure
38
groups and officials". Relationships of that kind, as has been shown 
above, may be common in the governmental process - and as political 
influences, resources and "weightings" change, the focus of power will 
37 Ibid., p.689.
38 Ibid., p.680.
shift from one centre to another.
An extended example is given of the importance of these points of 
last resort, and power centres, or nodes, which also serves to make the 
second point referred to, that policy issues can shift in their 
classification, as the character of the business to be settled goes 
through change.
The particular case study concerns the emergence of the "true 
nature of tariff" in the 1960s as a regulatory policy, after a long 
existence as a distributive feature of governmental activity - an 
activity concerned with handing out protection to separate supplicant 
industries. The process of change was signalled and enacted, when the 
Congress in effect took over control of tariff matters from the former 
committee "elite", the House Ways and Means Committee. In 1954, subse­
quent to long negotiations involving the relevant interest groups, a set 
of new propositions on tariffs was referred to the Congress for final 
settlement. Proposals for handling the matter in Congress, put forward 
by the Ways and Means Committee, were voted down in the House. This is 
interpreted as the appropriation of the deciding say, by Congress, and 
is explained as the defeat of a "last effort" to keep the tariff as a 
traditional instrument of distributive policies. "It was clear that
tariff decisions would (no longer) be made piecemeal...and tariff became
39
a regulatory policy in 1962."
The model worked out by Salisbuey in his article "Analysis of Public 
Policy", incorporates the typology of Lowi and has the virtues already 
mentioned, in that it is comprehensive, takes account of external 
"system resources" affecting what happens in the political system, and 
suggests how we might show what happens inside the "black box" of the 
system, through recording the production of policy "outputs". Further,
39 Ibid., pp.702-3.
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"policy content", he says, "must be assigned a crucial role, as a
40
component variable in the analysis of any political system".
His plan also allocates a place to goals and purposes, at least
as far as recognising intentions on the part of actors - citing the
definition of policy by Lasswell and Kaplan, as a "projected program of
41
goal values and practices". It proceeds from a definition of policy 
as "authoritative allocation of values for the whole society"; author­
itative and sanctioned decisions which deal with the "substance" of what 
government does, and are distinguished from the processes by which
decisions are made. "Policy here means the outcomes or outputs of
42governmental processes." A second view of policy is recognised, which
confines the usage of the term to "broad" or general questions, and does
not apply it to detailed choices within the wider policy framework.
"Substance" is emphasised throughout, in preference to spending "much
„ 43time investigating process factors of relatively minor importance .
In recommending categories, the article emphasises that the "point
is not to categorise every conceivable kind of policy, but to suggest
that categorisation is possible". Lowi's typology is adapted with the
addition of a "self-regulative" category - a set of policies which
"impose constraints upon a group, but are perceived only to increase,
44
not decrease, the beneficial options to the group".
40 Op.cit., Salisbury, p.151.
41 Loc.cit.
42 Ibid., p.152.
43 Ibid., Loc.cit.
44 Ibid., p.153.
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Figure 3
Figure 3, the Salisbury model, is a considerable advance on the
simple "systems model" from Dye, notably in the capacity it offers for
tracing the handling of issues in the area of demand patterns and the
decisional system - of the "political" system:
No doubt the political system constitutes a kind of 'black 
box' through which system resources are processed in order 
to result in policy decisions. But...except for its own 
sake, analysis of the black box will yield little of 
interest regarding outputs or policies.
This, I submit, is a devastating set of findings and 
cannot be dismissed as not meaning what it plainly says - 
that analysis of political systems will not explain policy 
decisions made by those systems. Moreover, there is another, 
quite different kind of argument which leads to the same 
conclusion. This is the argument of incrementalism, that 
nearly all the time policy will vary only marginally from 
what it has been...If this is so, there is little room for 
any other variables except for the odd case of significant 
or innovative departures from the norm...but in the United 
States these are pretty largely exceptions...
Both kinds of studies...conceive of policies mainly in 
terms of expenditures and employ nominal categories for 
classifying them. Does the contention hold when we conceive 
of policies along other lines? Much of the argument that 
follows is to the effect that (1) under an alternative con­
ceptualisation of policy outcomes, political-system variables 
again become of critical importance, though the continuing 
strength of the relationship between system-resources 
variation and the amount of policy output is conceded, and 
(2) it is absolutely essential, if we are to justify the 
relevance of examining political system characteristics, to 
incorporate substantive policy as an explicit part of the 
analytic model.
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On the adaptation of Lowi's formulation,
each of the four policy types - distributive, redistributive, 
regulatory and self-regulatory - may plausibly be linked 
theoretically with different interactions between political 
demand patterns and decisional-system patterns. Let us 
consider the diagram...
The model resembles other political system models in 
contemporary vogue, differing chiefly I think in the distinct­
ion made...between demand patterns and the decisional system.
What we have termed constitutional policy is represented by 
linkage D in the model, and the hypotheses we suggest 
relating constitutional policy to demand patterns and system 
resources are represented by linkages D' and D".
Now the argument of Dawson and Robinson and the others is 
essentially to the effect that linkage A' is primary for 
explaining policy output variation. Implicit in that argu­
ment is that demand patterns and decisional systems vary mainly 
as functions of system-resource variation, and that, rather 
than exerting any independent effect on the amount of policy 
outputs, they function essentially as mutual transmission 
mechanisms. My argument is that the interactions of demand 
patterns and the decisional system (linkages B and B') are 
systematically associated with different types of policy, 
though probably not with amounts. That is, while system 
resources may account for the amount of m«ney that is spent, 
the active political system continues to be decisive in 
determining the kind of policy, including the groups that 
benefit or suffer, the extent of conflict, the ability to 
innovate or adapt, and other questions discussed earlier...
Demand patterns refer to the patterns of groups and 
individuals - interest groups, parties and other political 
entrepreneurs - articulating demands and pressing them upon 
the decisional system...The decisional system itself is frag­
mented. There are multiple nodes or points of power within 
the system which opposing groups activated by redistributive 
policy demands might capture and thereby block the demands.
And so the group seeks self-regulation. In short, the type 
of policy which is demanded is a function of the degree of 
integration in both the demand pattern and the decisional 
system.(45)
The explication goes on to examine the occurence of different policy 
types in the decisional system, in relation to demands formed in the 
demand pattern area. It notes a growth of regulation, and, commensurately, 
of integrative mechanisms in such systems, in industrial societies.
While providing a vocabulary and terms of reference for the work 
that follows on broadcasting, the model is broad enough, or flexible 
enough, as well, to take account of the emphasis on "detailed choices"
45 Ibid., pp.163-5, 167-8.
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and localised issues it must involve. It was pointed out at the beginning 
of this chapter that the events under consideration are recent and that 
the information used is a mix obtained from contemporary official docu­
ments, press reports and the testimony of actors and observers, given in 
interviews. In sections it will seem an incremental approach is correct, 
as the limited decisions under study are seen to be attaching themselves 
to a corpus of policy, in stable conditions. Elsewhere, however, as 
when conditions within the black box are unstable, or at least in 
"disequilibrium", the moving parts of the system as represented by 
Salisbury, with its differentiated parts and sets of "linkages", is the 
better instrument for coping with the shifts and changes that occur.
Hopefully, it can be seen from the foregoing treatment of the 
literature that a set of possible definitions and guidelines for the 
study on hand has been investigated, and that the applicable contents of 
each source have been acknowledged and considered in relation to the 
others. In a sense, different sources have been meshed together, to be 
used and referred to in the arguments that follow. The review has 
worked through a number of possible lines of approach, building towards 
a conclusion that the Salisbury model is the most evidently applicable
overall.
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Section 2: Chapter 1
SYSTEM RESOURCES
The subject of money is a fitting starting point to this exercise. 
The costs of things and of services, the opportunity of making money, 
demands upon the government to spend it, and the balance between what 
people want and what they are ready, willing and able to pay for, are 
considerations that time and again decide the outcome of events.
This extremely simple view of system resources having their 
influence upon policy matters ordinarily would not be worth mentioning, 
but in the particular case of FM radio in Australia, in the particular 
era, 1945 to the end of 1981, extraordinary developments were taking 
place in the field of material resources, and were having an extraordin­
ary effect.
It took place that decisions made about FM radio, on the assumptions 
of their time, would have their effect magnified and distorted over a 
short period by the changes going on in the economy and society at large. 
It's one of the purposes of the whole thesis to show the effects of that 
process, but the first point, to do with post-war affluence as the setting 
for change, can be tackled immediately.
The onset of economic prosperity in Australia meant higher real 
wages, more leisure for many, a steadily growing population (hence 
market), heightened consumer expectations, and increased sales of 
consumer goods.
Co-incidental with this trend, developments in electronics since 
a little before the turn of the century had flowered in a short span of 
years before, during and after the second world war, with a set of 
important inventions. In the years between 1950 and 1956 or 1957, 
Australians were enabled to buy television; long playing, microgroove 
records; stereo sets for records or tapes; cinemascope at the pictures, 
and cheap transistor radios. A little over 15 years later they were to 
be offered colour television; tape cassettes; video cassettes and
cassette recorders, and a vast array of electronic products turned out 
cheaply through miniaturisation, including the products of video effects 
generators, and tiny radios playing high fidelity music in stereo, 
through headphones.'*'
It matters to the present argument - because of the short time 
span - that such a volume of these products came available, were wanted, 
and could be bought. It can be shown that in new fields at least, policy 
making will always take more time rather than less, and that a rush of 
new possibilities, in the material world, can threaten to sweep away a 
set of political arrangements and structures of government, before they 
are even properly built. As well, vast new possibilities in the pipeline 
increase the factor of the unexpected. Arrangements made and instit­
utionalised in these circumstances by policy makers can soon become
inappropriate, and have their shortcomings widely exposed, by dramatic
2
change in the environment of the system.
A core matter in policy making in Australian broadcasting has been 
the allocation of frequencies to radio and television stations. The way 
this was done is important here, in point of two closely connected 
decisions, or sets of decisions: the first was a decision of the late 
1950s not to go ahead with FM radio, and the second was the famous 
decision of 1960 to invade the "radio" section of the VHF band, in order 
to provide more frequencies for television.
These decisions were made on the assumptions of their time and
1 Information on equipment and dates from Mr G. Sergei, Electronics 
Curator, Museum of Applied Arts and Sciences, Sydney, 9.2.82.
2 The fundamental matters are considered also, among others, by Griffiths 
"In discussing citizen involvement in planning, operating and 
controlling radio, we need to ask several questions: questions about 
the desirability of a major investment of resources into expanding 
radio services, the assumption behind such an investment, the priority 
of such an investment and alternative possibilities for investment".
D. Griffiths, "Autocracy in the Airwaves", Centre for the Study of 
Educational Communication and Media, La Trobe University, Media Centre 
Papers, No. 4, Bundoora, Vic., 1976.
Hplace, but were overtaken by events outside of the immediate milieu of
broadcasting policy. By the late 1960s their effects were beginning
to cause trouble, as new assumptions were by then in play, the old
arrangements no longer coped with demands, much energy was beginning to
be spent on the problem within the political system, and the raw
materials for the present dissertation were taking shape.
3
The development of the FM system in the United States, in the
late 1930s, had caught the attention of the Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Broadcasting, which was responsible for 17 reports in the 
4period 1945-48, and which despatched its consultant, Allsop, to America,
. 5to investigate it.
From 1947, Australian engineers built FM radio transmitters for 
experimental stations in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Adelaide.
These were operated by the A.B.C. and played "serious" programs from 
the A.B.C. schedules, for 84 hours a week, until 1961.^
However, if the agenda of possibilities had caught the imagination 
of the general public at all, by the mid-1950s, the overwhelming interest 
was in television. This was as true of the station operators as it was 
of anybody else. Rushton recalls the urgent concern of the commercial 
operators of the time: "I think a lot of their earlier assertions, and 
you can't call them much more than that, were fallacious. There was a
3 A helpful technical explanation of the FM system is given in the 
A.B.C.B. report on FM broadcasting, 1972. Australian Broadcasting 
Control Board, Report on Frequency Modulation Broadcasting, Melbourne, 
1972, pp.6-7.
4 See M. Armstrong, Broadcasting Law and Policy in Australia, Sydney, 
Butterworths, 1982, p.37.
5 R.C. Allsop, an inventor himself (he held patents on a film sound 
device),met Edwin H. Armstrong, who is normally regarded as creator 
of the system, and was to become a vocal advocate of FM radio for 
many years.
6 See A.B.C.B., Report on FM, p.5.
chance of survival. But they were terrified of TV. 7
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Wilkinson attributes the eventual decision of the A.B.C.B. not to 
go ahead with FM, to the demands of commercial operators. It had not 
been difficult for them to force those demands. Organised public interest 
in broadcasting services was still 2 decades away when the decision was 
taken, in 1958. Proposals to be put to government were still being 
worked out in the closed milieu of broadcasting operators and public 
servants.
Wilkinson was a broadcasting engineer with the P.M.G. at the time 
of the inquiry, and recollects the position taken by the industry 
representatives:
The federation indicated to the half-completed inquiry by 
the A.B.C.B. that they were no longer interested in 
introducing FM. There wasn't much public interest, unlike 
back in the early 1970s. Debate on FM back in 1958-59 
didn't really enter the public domain at all. Discussions 
dragged on, and then at a famous re-convening of a 
hearing, the Director (9) gave this evidence to the Control 
Board, that they were no longer interested in the intro­
duction of FM. They said there seemed little value in 
continuing the hearings. They'd been talking about the 
methods that'd be used for licensing; to what extent there 
might be a commercial and a national service. But the 
issues were being talked about in a low-key way, without 
too much interest in the industry, much less in the 
public... (10)
While the policy of the previous Labor government had been to open 
FM for non-commercial broadcasting only, withdrawal of the commercial 
operators in 1958, in the time of M e n z i e s , h a d  the effect of a veto.
7 Mr J. Rushton, Deputy Federal Director, Federation of Australian Radio 
Broadcasters (F.A.R.B.). Formerly Head of Radio branch, Broadcasting 
and Film Division, Dept of the Media. Interview with the writer,
21.1.82.
8 Mr J. Wilkinson, Special Adviser, Dept of Communications. Associate 
Member, Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (A.B.T.). Formerly First 
Assistant Secretary (Radio Frequency Management), Dept of Communications. 
Engineer member on the Postal and Telecommunications Dept inquiry into 
Australian broadcasting, 1976 (Green Inquiry). Interview with the 
writer, 13.1.82.
9 Of F.A.C.B., later F.A.R.B.
10 Interview, 13.1.82.
11 R.G. Menzies, Liberal Prime Minister.
Australian broadcasting, it was made clear, had to be a dual system in 
all its forms, and as well, while radio might not have need of new 
frequencies, the new medium, television, did.
The problem with television frequencies was again, to an extent, 
a matter of scarce system resources in the purest sense, that in terms 
of the technology on hand, and the numbers and types of stations 
required, the system was running out of frequencies. But the broad 
policy aspects of this problem are woven into the fabric of it and are 
rather more significant than in the case of radio.
It had been decided at government level to build a system that
12would provide television for "96% of the population within 12 years".
Given this objective, the system built was cheap, in that it entailed 
the placement of high powered transmitters on hilltops around the 
country, and "throwing the signal as far as you could". In political 
terms it was popular, and "satisfied the Country Party influence in 
cabinet". Among the advocates of the thorough geographical coverage,
according to Wilkinson's account, were the Country Party leaders Pa<J$
13 14and McEwen, and the Liberal Postmaster General, Hulme.
However the system entailed some high costs, notably in building
roads and plant for the transmitter sites. More importantly, other
physical limitations were encountered. The pattern of station frequencies
that was developed, was similar in principle to the patchwork of
stations that had occurred earlier, in radio. A lot of ground had to be
covered, and as the population was small, the number of stations had to
12 Wilkinson, 13.2.82.
13 Sir Earle Pag$, , Sir John McEwan.
14 Sir Alan Hulme, Postmaster-General from 1964.
be minimised. These stations therefore needed to be on high power, 
and in each case, as a resu lt, the frequency could not be used again 
within a range of hundreds of kilometres. In this configuration, a 
large number of station frequencies, and therefore of te lev is ion  
channels, had to be found, to obviate inter-station interference.^^
In such circumstances i t  was convenient to go to that section of 
the VHF band which was set aside by international convention for radio, 
88-108 MHz, and appropriate its  span for te levis ion  channels 4 and 5, 
and part of channel 3. I t  was true a fter a l l ,  that in the context of 
radio planning in the la te  1950s, the "radio" band would never be 
required for its  standard, internationally designated use. The poss­
ib i l i t y  that existed, however, and came to be fu l f i l le d ,  was that times 
might change, and that the expedient solution of the 1950s and 1960s, 
involving some largesse with the physical resources of the airwaves, 
might then be found wanting.
There is substantial corroboration for the view of Wilkinson and
Rushton that FM radio could be put aside, and the "radio" section of
the band with i t ,  because te lev is ion  was generating the excitement in 
the community. Wright‘S  points out that use of the VHF band was already 
non-standard - in international usage - before channels 3, 4 and 5 were 
placed on 88-108 MHz.
The Post O ffice had impinged on one end of te levis ion . We 
already had fixed and mobile there. Then we were non­
standard with America on te lev is ion  band width. We went on 
the European standard, which has now proved to be b e tte r ...
Of course in those heady days when nobody was thinking of 
s a te llite s , Australia rea lly  d idn 't have to consider its  
neighbours at a l l .  We had a cosy arrangement with New 
Zealand...I think the fee lin g  was, a fter the abortive inquiry 
into FM, FM was a dead duck and nobody cared any more about 
it ...T h e  inquiry was very poorly attended. There were very
15 Always assuming the system would remain VHF only. See later
references to VHF te levis ion  in this Section, and Section 3, Ch. 1; and
16 Mr Myles F.E. Wright, formerly Chairman, A.B.C.B. Section S .
few representatives except radio people. They were all 
against it. We'd got TV and can't really go developing 
both. The Board seemed to lose interest in it until, I 
suppose it was when I came in in '67 we started talking 
about it...(17)
18
Oswin was General Manager of Channel 7 in Sydney, and says he
had perceived the development of the frequency band as a "Topsy-like
growth" and had thought it was
odd that in 1960 we'd run out of frequencies... I've got 
to say, we were conservative, and there was also some 
fairly heavy lobbying to keep the status quo. If you were 
a commercial broadcaster you did not want a whole lot more 
stations in your market if you could avoid it...In general 
terms there was no real thrust about FM. There were very 
few advocates for a general introduction of it. Yet there 
was a growing number of people beginning to believe there 
needed to be more diversification of ownership and control.(19)
That dawning of a pluralist mentality was not to mature in the
community until the television system was well in place, and the
novelty of it had worn off. Then thoughts would turn to other values,
and other options. As resources are the focus of this section,
references to what might be called policy or interest questions have
been minimised here, so matters might be discussed in terms of costs to
the community and terrain, and such things as widely held values and
goals - like the strong desire to have television in your house. The
central problem of the general use of the VHF band will be returned to
in Sections 3 and 5; to be dealt with in its other aspects, and more
thoroughly.
In this section 2 further points are to be made:
To deny any thoughts that "system resources" are anything less than 
an enormous consideration, it should be pointed out that the allocation 
of frequencies for television in the 1950s and 1960s has all the
17 Interview with the writer, 21.10.81.
18 Mr J. Oswin, Deputy Chairman, A.B.T. Formerly Permanent Head, Dept 
of the Media.
19 Interview with the writer, 14.1.82.
appearance of only the first step in a continuing process of large-scale
20expansion. Westerway anticipates further pressure for yet more
growth. "It's a society which is more and more hooked on information
of various kinds. Information and entertainment, and the more you give
the more they'll want. It isn't ended yet by any means. It's exploding
21all over as you know."
In case too much has been made of growing consumer spending, may
I refer to the big range of other economic functions now found in the
media basket, and the large amounts of money involved. In the legal
22field, another informant for this project, Armstrong, has described 
the situation in these terms:
Broadcasting law is a very active area, involving economic 
interests to whom the cost of litigation, prohibitive in 
many areas of administrative law, is scarcely noticeable... 
Broadcasting law is concerned with some of the most 
important areas of wealth and influence in Australia and 
the world at large. One need only refer to: the profits 
and scale of activity of TV undertakings, private and public; 
proposals for national communications satellites; cable TV; 
subscription TV; videotext services; inquiries into private 
undertaking of Telecom functions; and the whole range of 
applications of the new technology, like electronic shopping, 
cable security systems and tele-conferencing. What is now 
known as broadcasting law will soon be concerned with most 
aspects of the marshalling and transmission of information. 
Information is perhaps the most significant form of wealth 
in a post-industrial society.(23)
The second point also relates to the developing future. If the 
setting up of a "non-standard" VHF broadcasting band in Australia comes
20 Mr P. Westerway, First Assistant Secretary (Broadcasting Planning 
and Operations), Dept of Communications, Green Inquiry member, 1976.
21 Interview with the writer, 27.1.82.
22 Mr M.C. Armstrong, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of New South 
Wales.
23 M.C. Armstrong, "Judicial and Administrative Review of Decisions
Made Under the Broadcasting and Television Act, 1942 /
Aspects of Administrative and Planning Law, Lecture V; Committee 
for Postgraduate Studies in the Department of Law, University of 
Sydney, 1981, p.2.
to be seen as a highly expensive error, it might be assumed quite fairly 
that such errors are forever possible, and always likely to be putting 
a heavy drain on the wealth of the public.
A case in point may be the decision by Australia in the mid-1970s 
to persist with VHF television as its main service, after the intro­
duction of colour television, leaving UHF still in a very marginal role 
for some time to come. An opportunity to create more station frequencies 
at the same time - and terminate the country's unique problem with 
88-108 MHz - was plain to see. Sooner or later (as it happened, much 
sooner in Australian than in the European countries), nearly everybody 
would be changing over to a new television set. With this synchronised 
purchase of receivers, the chance presented itself to put the "mainstream 
services, like the metropolitan television stations, on UHF. Either the 
entire television broadcast system could go to UHF, with the change to 
colour, as in the United Kingdom, or national receiver standards could 
be amended to set the requirement that each set have both VHF and UHF 
capabilities.
In ordinary book-keeping terms the idea would provide more 
television channels easily, and by-pass the anticipated costs of 
"clearing" the VHF band of television, for FM radio. Yet, when more 
general policy and interest factors are taken into account, the problem 
becomes much more difficult. While the cost of new receivers was being 
met anyway, and that of new transmitters would not be insurmountable, 
the fear of abandonment by audiences had to put the station operators 
in an adverse frame of mind. Even if competing stations in any one 
market were to vacate VHF together, they could not be assured that the 
whole clientele would follow them to the new band - or that the pattern 
of audience preferences would stay the same, among the range of
stations.
It can be said nevertheless, as it was in Section 1, that 
apparently straightforward problems become complicated a number of times 
over, when they have to be settled through the pulling and hauling of 
politics at any level. In such a process, much that seems sensible is 
not done, and much that is lamentable will occur.
With the case in point, Wilkinson remarked that certain colour 
television sets produced overseas had been modified for the Australian 
market, by removal of their UHF capacity. Oswin says the situation with 
receivers in Australia has been made more complicated, with "extra 
channels and a funny dial; Channel 5A and a Channel 0", instead of less 
complicated - as it would have been with complete conversion to UHF.
But things in the real world are more complex than they appear on paper, 
and when faced with making the change, he says, "we didn't have the
„ 24courage .
That is an episode that might and might not come to be regarded 
in time, in the same critical light as earlier, controversial planning 
decisions of post-war decades. Some of those decisions, and the 
problems associated with them, will be reviewed in the following chapter 
where the maximum range of factors in the system - courage not excluded 
can be taken into account.
24 Interview, 14.1.82.
Section 2: Chapter 2
SYDNEY FREQUENCIES AND 
INTERFERENCE. IMPORTANCE OF
SYSTEM RESOURCES
Description of the Problem
Political activity has occurred at all levels over a composite 
problem which generated heat during 1980 and 1981, and which at the 
time of writing was far from resolved. It breaks down into these parts
- The question of what power is to be allocated, and what 
frequencies on the band, to FM radio stations.
- The incidence of interference with television reception, caused 
by FM radio signals.
- Complaints by television stations about this interference, and 
demands by them that the transmitter power of FM radio stations should 
not be augmented.
- Contradicting, incompatible claims by the radio stations on FM, 
that they need more transmitter power (claims which in the main have 
been made within the formal set of rights spelt out in the stations' 
licence documents).
- An effort to cope with these difficulties, initially, by the 
Department of Communications, by imposing a freeze on power increases 
for the FM broadcasters, effective from late 1980.
The spectacle of manoeuvring and debate over these issues, all at 
origin matters of physical resource, has highlighted features of the 
political system in operation. It has identified sensitive points in 
the decisional area, disclosing some information on the relationships 
between Communications Ministers and the bureaucracy, and it gives a 
few points of comparison between the working style of administrations, 
under Staley and Sinclair,'*' together with what might be inferred from 
these. As well, the activities of the respective interest groups are
1 Mr A.A. Staley, Minister for Post and Telecommunications, 1978-80.
Mr I. Sinclair, Communications Minister, 1980-
fairly well open to scrutiny as they make their demands upon the system 
and bid for the opportunities and resources they feel they need.
Up for grabs, in the demand area, is the capacity to maximise
audiences, or to reach the maximum potential audience to which each
broadcaster has a legitimate claim. In terms of Salisbury's typology of 
2 tfioyy-h only fd  4 ltAtiihe.c4
issues, this is# a matter of redistribution or a distribution
of resources affecting the public, as private citizens.
Interference with television reception on the one hand, and the 
chance of enhanced FM radio reception across the metropolis, are not seen 
to be matters of great scale. To the commercial television operators 
who have complained about interference, some marginal loss of viewers 
might be at stake. This can mean a considerable loss of revenue, over 
time, and the loss of future marketing opportunities perhaps, if the 
major chains are seen to be uninterested in preserving their dominance 
of the broadcasting scene. But that appears to be close to the limit of 
it.
Managers of the radio stations concerned all say many people have 
not been able to get their signals, but they too concede there is still 
room for attracting audiences, through program strategies, before 
reaching the physical ceiling imposed by their inadequate signal coverage 
of the Sydney area. They are far from being mortally constrained.
To be able to generalise in some way from what follows, it may 
help to consider the regulative character of what has been going on - 
the attempts of the government and bureaucracy to have things done only 
according to plan, where there was one, and to make everybody wait for 
a solution, as against the loud urgings of the stations - and also to 
judge the whole process as a matter of distribution among a limited 
population of broadcasting organisations, and their members and associates.
2 See Section 1, Ch. 2.
±7
A description of the problem in Sydney begins with the lay of the 
land, which has many gullies and low spots, but no natural salient, like 
Black Mountain in Canberra, where broadcasting aerials can be mounted. 
The result is that particularly with FM, which transmits by line of 
sight, there are quite large dead spots, or nulls, in the reception 
pattern for both television stations and radio. The "triangle" of tele­
vision towers at Gore Hill offers a partial solution, but there are too 
many new services for them all to be given space for an aerial on the 
towers, at a satisfactory height. As it happens, structural standards 
have been up-graded in recent years, further limiting the permitted use 
of the towers. Some interference among stations occurs within the 
"crash zone" around the Sydney triangle, but it is likely to be worse in 
cases where there is a transmitter operating outside the triangle area, 
and where that station's signal in its own zone is stronger than, say, a 
television signal emanating from another point. That has been the 
source of trouble with the public radio stations, which broadcast from 
locations South of the harbour.
The scene is aggravated further by the fact that television sets 
in use in Australia are not equipped with filters; devices to block 
interference from adjacent FM radio signals - simple devices which come 
as standard components of sets sold in Europe and America. And to 
complete the picture, planners have very few options for changing the 
locations of stations on the frequency band to form a new pattern of 
station frequencies, one which would impose less of a burden of discrim­
ination on cheap and vulnerable "typical" receiver sets in use all over 
Sydney. To simplify that statement, there are not enough spare 
frequencies to work with. You can't move the station signals away from 
one another.
Frequency allocations for the Sydney-Newcastle-Wollongong
conurbation were recognised as a central problem in McLean's inquiry in 
31974, which set out proposals for clearing the FM radio band. The
report of the inquiry made proposals in detail for the region, which
4
were modified in subsequent national frequency plans. The necessary 
clearing of non-radio users, however, has not been going ahead fast 
enough to save the situation in Sydney, where solutions to the interfer­
ence problem and the demands for more power, problems conflicting with 
each other as they do, have had to be sought through other means.
The coming together of all these difficult factors took place in 
1979 when the Minister, Staley, set off the process for licensing the 
2 commercial FM stations. At the same time he was approached by the 
public stations to permit them to up-grade to effective radiated power 
(e.r.p.) of 10 kw or above, so they could guarantee themselves something 
like full metropolitan cover. The A.B.C., which was to be allocated at 
least 2 wide coverage FM stations for Sydney, was asking for a transfer 
of 2JJ to FM, as one of those stations, with appropriate power of 50 kw.
From the Perspective of the Commercial Operators
Staley says that his policy was to pluralise radio and that he was 
prepared to intervene personally to help all the stations making these 
approaches achieve their ends - so long as those seemed to be reasonable. 
He was presented with technical arguments by his engineers, against any
3 F.C. McLean and C.C. Renwick, Independent Inquiry into Frequency 
Modulation Broadcasting - Report, Sydney, March 1974.
4 These plans are outlined in the document known as Report 43A, given 
by Wilkinson ois being the main planning guide currently in use. It 
follows h * ' which was widely known as the document which identified 
an additional 220 frequencies for radio stations in Australia.
Report 34 before that was an early adaptation by government engineers 
of the plan sketched out in more approximate terms by McLean. See 
A.B.C.B., Report Number 43: The Planning of Frequency Allocations for 
VHF Broadcasting in Australia, Melbourne, Nov. 1976.
expedient moves to grant the transmitter power sought, and this advice 
he challenged. The advice given was consistent with the kind of 
situation described in the foregoing, one in which problems of inter­
ference were likely if the situation were not rightly regulated, or at 
least closely watched. However, all was to depend on how likely that 
interference was, and how much of it was to be tolerated in practice.
In the case of the 2 commercial stations 2MMM-FM and 2DAY-FM, the 
Minister's immediate concern led him to take to the field, in the outer 
Western suburbs of Sydney, to see how the stations sounded on ordinary 
radios. This famous incident took place a few months before the launch 
of the stations in July 1980, and was in response to complaints by the 
licensees that their test transmissions were not getting to enough of 
the younger listeners concentrated in areas around the fringe. The 
response to this by departmental engineers had not been flexible. They'd 
stuck to the letter of the international specifications for such tests, 
which had an important shortcoming - they did not show how well the 
signal could be picked up by car radios and cheap transistors.
Staley noted that social purposes had to be given priority, and 
that he would have to be the judge of how well those were being served, 
by trying out the service.
That was just one of the most dramatic illustrations of 
my unpreparedness to accept what advice I happened to be 
given at a certain point. My own view is you've got to 
have intelligent generalists in charge of specialist 
departments or you'll get nothing done. You've got to 
knock technical heads together to see what falls out when 
you knock them...The engineers are properly cautious.
They can warn about this and that but as for policy 
development that's for the political forces. They must 
question, challenge, check, and they must be listened to 
very carefully, but just how much you charge them with is 
a very good question.(5)
5 Interview with the writer, 22.10.81.
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The Minister's Senior Private Secretary, Rowe reports that 2
engineers who made the trip "had a bit of imagination and could think
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about people, and then worry about engineering". The outcome was that 
while the Minister had it explained to him that the operating standards 
of the licences had been met, and that power increases on the particular 
frequencies would affect planning for adjacent regions, notably 
Bathurst, an engineering solution of sorts was worked out. It was agreed 
that 2DAY and 2MMM could use a directional aerial apparatus that trans-
g
mitted at 35 kw towards the outer suburbs, and at only 500 w along the 
Eastern fringe of the service area. It was held that on balance, the 
stations would effectively be broadcasting at 10 kw e.r.p., as specified 
in their licences.
Engineering opinion was uniform that low powered transmissions to 
the East would produce severe nulls in the difficult topography of the 
Northern beach suburbs. In the event the stations would claim soon 
after going to air that they needed more power to help overcome such 
problems, and their frustrations mounted when, after complaints that they 
were interfering with television reception, all government action on the 
matter was deferred indefinitely.
As a matter of record, it was the department's practice to use 
measuring standards set by the C.C.I.R., an organ of the International 
Telecommunications Union. These specified that the signal field strength 
should be above a certain level, in millivolts per metre, at 50% of test 
locations in the designated service area, when measured at a height of 
10 metres. The guidelines were set out as follows:
6 Mr Dick Rowe, Principal Private Secretary, 1978-80.
7 Interview with the writer, 23.12.81.
8 By some accounts they eventually broadcast at 50 kw, before being 
pulled back, by order of the Department.
Figure 1
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Type of area Field strength (mV/m)
Stereo Monaural
Rural 0.5 0.25
Urban 2 1
Large city 5 3
In this embarassed and rather dry account of the episode involving 
the Minister, one of the engineers connected with it recollects that 
Rowe's "thinking about people" did call for a concession, in the circum­
stances: measurements taken 10 metres from the ground might not relate 
to the needs of a clientele using unsophisticated radio sets close to 
the ground.
We'd ended up more or less showing to the Minister that 
something measured at 10 metres, and found satisfactory, may 
not guarantee a good signal at a lower height. He was not 
going to change the operating conditions unless he was him­
self convinced there was a problem with portables. He was 
convinced at the time there was a need for an increase in 
power in the West, to make sure it was covered...At a height 
of one metre the field strength may be somewhat lower, and 
there are many portables and car radios on the market. This 
is the main contention the FM stations had at the time. They 
said their knowledge should be based on the sets on the 
market, if they were to be economically viable and compete 
with the AM's - they must be comparable. Obviously higher 
power would be needed if you were going to have the same 
field strength lower down, a#
The outcome of the Cook's Tour, as it became known, produced a 
settlement but not a solution. The station operators and the Ministerial 
party were vindicated in their concern for "people" and did something 
to satisfy what they saw as the real need. Nothing would have happened 
if Staley had not resorted to extraordinary methods. On the other hand, 
the terms of the licence in each case were that the station was to be
9 A.B.C.B., Technical Standards for the Australian Frequency Modulation 
Sound Broadcasting Service, Melbourne, Advance Press, 1975, p.5.
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of medium coverage, and at 10 kw overall. This meant the "trade-off" 
between high power to the West, and lower power elsewhere, had to occur. 
Overall then, the engineering group might say that all along there was 
bound to be a deficiency in the audience reach of the station, at some 
point, as it was limited by its specifications overall, as a feature of 
the band. The result was that an unsatisfactory situation, in prog­
ramming terms, would continue indefinitely, or would have to be solved 
through an entirely new round of political agitation.
The anxieties of the commercial FM broadcasters have been 
compounded since, by the interference issue. F.A.C.T.S.10 had served 
an early warning of its concern about interference, in a 1976 policy 
statement,* 11 which demanded a "review of all frequency allocations... 
particularly those to FM radio stations", in part because of the 
possibility of interference. The problem had been anticipated in fact 
very widely, and it was agreed in the event, by all parties, that a 
significant level of interference was being reported to stations by Sydney 
viewers, or detected by other means.
At issue however is the response to the problem under the new 
Minister, Sinclair, who took over at the end of 1980, following Staley's 
retirement from politics. He walked into a situation in which the 
department, late in 1980, had obtained a moratorium on power up-gradings 
in Sydney FM - imposed so that the television reception issue could be
looked into, and a solution attempted. It had been put up initially as
. . 12a freeze of only 3 months duration, and was not publicised.
10 Federation of Australian Commercial Television Stations.
11 F.A.C.T.S., Broadcasting in Australia, 1976 (booklet).
12 The A.B.C. management, at Controller level, found out about the stop 
on 2JJJ-FM informally, from Telecom sources, early in the new year.
This is according to a report given by station Co-ordinator,
Mr Fred Peake, to a meeting of 2JJJ staff, 1.4.81, and recorded in 
minutes of that meeting.
The workload of the Communications Department had become a 
talking point within the industry well before that time, particularly 
in view of its parlous situation in regard to professional staff - an 
issue to be dealt with later. It was not a large surprise then that an 
open-ended delay was invoked, with no word forthcoming from the 
Minister's office or the department, as to when something would happen. 
It is noticeable however that the dual events, imposition of the ban 
and arrival of the new Minister, brought new tensions and a change in 
relationships, between those in the planning and policy roles, and the 
broadcasting operators.
The 2 commercial FM stations, far from upgrading to overcome their
problems with dead spots and fringe areas, had been required to make
13small reductions in power. This provoked Muir to begin a public
14campaign, on the claim that Packer - since Channel 9 was the main com­
plainant - was the architect of the delay, and aimed to harm the small
stations in their difficult early years. "Mr Packer has influence in
15the city", he was quoted as saying. The idea was floated in press 
articles that the 2 stations were being 6oftened up for the take-over of 
at least one of them, most likely by Channel 9.16
Behind the scenes the stations were pressing for a solution to 
interference such as a new notional receiver standard (a plan for the 
stations to pay $100,000 towards providing filters for home sets was 
dropped). The conflict with Channel 9 was represented in David and 
Goliath terms: "I can understand them not wanting us to set the pace and
13 Mr Rod Muir, General Manager, 2MMM-FM.
14 Mr Kerry Packer, Chairman of Australian Consolidated Press Ltd, and 
Director of TCN Channel 9.
15 Sue Brattle, "Packers 'Grudge' Aired", City Express, Sydney, 27.1.82, 
P-1.
16 For example, Judith Hoare, "Frequency Move Blocks Plans to Open 
Airwaves", Australian Financial Review, Sydney, 3.8.81, p.10; also 
Susan Molloy, "FM Stations See Threat in Power Clash with TV",
Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, 11.8.81, p.3.
show their executives there is a new horizon. They liked it the way it
was. I don't blame them as much as I blame the bureaucracy, and the
government of the day, for not being strong enough to stand up to them". 
18Sheedy reviewed the possible solutions. For a time it was 
suggested the 2 stations might change frequency, then discussions had 
moved on to the possible approval of a new set of operating conditions 
for them, and different antennae. Most emphasis however remained with 
the proposal for a new receiver standard, to apply to television sets 
going on the market. "The filter is a standard feature of TV sets 
marketed overseas. It won't be solved until the Minister here declares 
that that has to be done, as a standard feature." (Question) "Did you
ask him to do that?" "It's been discussed with him, but they're slow
. „19to move.
From the Perspective of the Public Broadcasters
The experience of the public stations under Minister Staley 
resembled that of the commercial stations. There was a proposal for up­
grading, some resistance was put up from within the department on 
technical grounds, and a way around was suggested by the Minister, in
this case incremental rises in power, to see if it would not turn out
20all right in practice:
I said just keep bumping it up. See what happens.
[LAUGHS] Incrementally, you know, and it wouldn't have 
happened but for my involvement in it. I don't blame.
Let me be fair. They are not politicians these people.
17 M u ir  , 21.12.81.
18 Mr Brendon Sheedy, General Manager, 2DAY-FM.
19 Interview with the writer, 21.12.81.
20 Quietly edging up the power in this way was not a new practice. Many 
of the informants have anecdotes of stations acting on their own to 
take extra power they'd been seeking for a long time. Normally they'd 
disclose the change, after time, as a fait accompli, and ask to have 
it made legitimate. Wright gives such an example, of a station at 
Dubbo.
They don't know what politics is about. They've got to 
shroud the whole thing in qualifications.(21)
In the event the up-gradings were successful, but were cut off
after the change of Ministers and the imposition of the freeze. An
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example of what happened was the experience of Jackson of 2SER-Fiyi, who
says that interference occurred in the crash zone around the station's
aerial, but not enough to require a reduction in power.
We've not disputed it's a problem. We have disputed the 
extent the department went to to prevent any experimentation 
by stations to see whether it's a real problem. We made 
this point to Staley and he agreed. Increase power incre­
mentally. That was the May 1980 agreement. We were on 1 kw 
so by July 1980 he'd approved it to go to 2; September to 
4(23), then Staley went, and since Sinclair came in the 
bureaucrats have fought back and we haven't been increased 
since that point. We just had one step to go...
They started telling us it was going to happen any day 
now...a matter of a vehicle not being available...Sinclair 
is a different kettle of fish from Staley. He sees very few 
people personally. We could get access to Staley but not 
Sinclair, We've been told the matter is under review...
You see we told Staley he was being snowed by his 
engineers, that his engineers were exaggerating the diffic­
ulty with broadcasting in Sydney. And Staley didn't 
exactly take our word for it. He said all right that's an 
argument let's try it out. Sinclair I think is back in the 
situation where engineers are saying no you can't do it in 
Sydney because it's going to create all sorts of horrific 
problems...I think Sinclair's taking the easy way out. He's 
taking the engineers' word for what it is. One must doubt 
the competence of the engineering advice available to 
Australian politicians.(24)
The public broadcaster 2MBS-FM carried out systematic tests for
interference using "typical sets" - ordinary television receivers -
25
which generally showed the problem to be slight. Law thought such
findings indicated that official standards were artificially high, and
21 Interview, 22.10.81.
22 Mr Keith Jackson, Manager 2SER-FM.
23 Circular polarisation. He gives the e.r.p. as 8 kw.
24 Interview with the writer, 14.10.81.
25 Mr Michael Law, Executive Director, P.B.A.A. (Public Broadcasting 
Association of Australia). Also a foundation member of the Music 
Broadcasting Society of N.S.W.
were abetting unnecessary delay.
One problem is that Sinclair has 3 roles; Leader of the 
House, Deputy Leader of the Country Party, and Minister 
for Communications, probably in that order of priority.
This portfolio needs a full-time Minister... Believe me 
this Minister does not understand his portfolio in the 
kind of detail necessary to do it properly. He'd be the 
first to admit it...
[Question] There's the interference issue in Sydney...
I suspect we've got the too-difficult syndrome operating 
here...understand for example that you do not plan for 
absolute, total and unqualified absence of interference.
It might be quite serious to some people in certain areas, 
so go and deal with it on the ground. There is nothing 
new in all this. The trouble is when something is 
buzzing in the Minister's ear, his reaction is to pull 
all the brakes on and this is what's happened I suspect...
He says stop, stop. Put it in the too-hard basket.(26)
A composite of responses from those in the engineering area, who
have been feeling somewhat maligned over the matters dealt with above:
- The commercial FM stations were given altered operating 
conditions after the closure of their Broadcasting Tribunal hearing, which 
set the standards. This was irregular.
- Field strength tests had shown that despite their reduced power, 
the extremities of the service area were being served quite well.
- While the stations were "already screaming after 6 months", 
about not being able to reach audiences, audience capture after a little 
over a full year turned out to be "not bad", by the McNair-Anderson 
figures.
- The problem with dead pockets was a geographical one that could 
not be overcome, on the whole, with more power - not short of 100-200 kw.
- The particular service problem in the Eastern half of the sector 
was in fact "of the station's own making", as they'd wanted the 
directional aerial arrays, orientated principally Westward.
- The public stations had been granted interim operating conditions
26 Interview with writer, 14.12.81.
and should not necessarily get their full entitlement of power, unless 
and until the transmitters were co-sited with the television transmitters.
- Being outside the triangle, they were creating a bigger crash 
zone than expected, in places where television signals were weak.
- They had sought to get more power than their licences allowed.
- Quite a lot of complaints of interference, by audience members, 
had been investigated. "Kerry Packer does have a problem with interfer­
ence. He does have a leg to stand on for a power play."
The A.B.C./2JJ/2JJJ-FM
Feelings of exasperation and distrust could be discerned as well 
at 2JJJ, where the view was that the A.B.C. had been given a severe run­
around, and more than a taste of unfair dealing. The process can be 
traced through the reports of management to staff, passed on by the 
station Co-ordinators and recorded in the minutes of staff meetings.
There was also a set of documents provided to staff. The episode shows 
the A.B.C. had poor access to information on technical planning matters, 
especially by comparison with the commercial stations, and at times, 
perhaps with the public broadcasters. While relationships between the 
Commission and its engineering authority, Telecom, appear to have been 
quite open and co-operative, the inability of the A.B.C. to run its own 
transmitters must be seen again as a severe handicap to it in serving 
the public.
The first phase of negotiation, planning and misinformation began 
with some juggling of frequencies at the department, as a result of which 
2JJ was offered 105.7 MHz, in February 1980. That allocation placed the 
station between the spots proposed for 2DAY and 2MMM, and immediately 
provoked opposition, most notably from the Chairman of the A.B.T.,
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Gyngell, who was reported as saying he had not been aware that 2JJ was 
moving to FM, when he'd conducted his licence hearings, and believed 
its placement between the 2 new stations would disrupt his "finely tuned 
planning". Gyngell had identified himself with the idea of the 2 
stations being located directly adjacent to each other as a block on the 
FM band. They would be jointly marketed as a band within a band, as 
"FM", to build audiences. A man of the spirit, Gyngell reportedly 
telexed Staley, urging new frequency allocations, and took part in a 
hostile exchange of correspondence in the press with the management of
His agitation bore fruit, as a range of new options was canvassed
among the interested parties. The department asked the A.B.C. if it
would like to have 2JJJ on 106.5 MHz instead of the frequency previously
offered. The P.B.A.A. was approached about a possible frequency change
for 2SER, or 2CBA-FM, which it opposed. In the event 2DAY and 2MMM were
given a pair of frequencies adjacent to each other, to one side of 2JJJ.
Gyngell also approved call-signs for the 2 stations, without
consulting the national call-signs committee, and to the great annoyance
of the public station 5MMM-FM, which made a protest. Following that
episode new guidelines were agreed on for the procedure of allocating 
29
call-signs.
Oswin recalls the frequencies incident as an action by a single 
member of the Tribunal. "It was not the Tribunal doing it. Frequency
27 Mr Bruce Gyngell held senior management positions in commercial 
television in Australia and the U.K., before his appointment to the 
A.B.T. in 1976. In 1979 he left that and in 1980 became a 
Consultant to the Special Broadcasting Service (S.B.S.).
28 Jefferson Penberthy, "Plan to Put A.B.C. Between Commercial Frequencies", 
Australian Financial Review, Sydney, 13.2,80.Thfcn correspondence c n  - t o  and
29 A.B.T., Annual Report, 1979-80, Canberra, A.G.P.S., 1981, p.34.
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allocation is nothing to do with the Tribunal." Other staff at the 
A.B.T. followed the line. It was an individual action. One said:
"It's part of Bruce's personality - setting up new things. He likes 
launches, celebrations. He went from here to get the S.B.S. going. He 
is good at things like that." The individual member was the Tribunal's 
Chairman however, and his irregular actions had 2 effects that we might 
call political: it suggested that a high level of priority was to be 
given to the needs of the commercial group, if necessary against the 
interests of the others, and through that, it reduced the chances of a 
smooth relationship among all parties, in the "setting up" period that 
followed.
At the A.B.C. the Controller of Radio One (CR1) found that he and
the organisation's Engineering Department had been given different dates
31
for the opening of 2JJJ on FM (3.5.80 and 1.6.80 respectively). It
was reported to 2JJ staff on 27.2.80 that full power of 50 kw would not
32
be available as anticipated, at the station's launch. Robinson said 
he'd been told that a stand-by transmitter would be available to put the 
station to air at 10 kw or 15 kw, in monaural, from 14.3.80. In the 
meantime a diplexing unit had been ordered so that the signal could be 
multiplexed from the ABC-FM transmitter, in stereo, at 50 kw, from a day 
in May or June. One reason given for the delay was that the Telecom 
installation team working on 2JJJ was needed first to install Channel O, 
which had been granted priority. In the next few months, plans for an 
early start were set back by the failure of an aerial under test, and by 
a continuing drought of information from the regulating authority.
If the process of delay and obfuscation can be seen as a case of
30
30 Interview, 14.1.82.
31 Report to staff of 2JJ. Minutes of the Staff Meeting of 13.2.80.
32 Mr Ted Robinson, Co-ordinator, 2JJ.
traditional bureaucratic muddling-through, it has to be looked on as
extreme of its type. Denial of information to Telecom, as the engineering
33authority, caused sufficient irritation for Sebire to complain formally
by letter to the Secretary of the Department on 2.4.80, on behalf of
his Chief General Manager. The letter, titled "Transfer of National
Station 2JJ to FM", needs to be quoted at some length. It should be
kept in mind that this engineer was the person directly responsible for
putting the service to air, and therefore needed the information sought.
The purpose of this memorandum is to seek your urgent 
advice and direction regarding the abovementioned project.
Telecom became aware early in 1979, and through its 
involvement in the National Broadcasting Service Planning 
Committee, of the proposal to transfer the 2JJ service from 
the AM broadcast band to FM. We were subsequently aware 
from discussions that late in 1979, the ABC, in consultation 
with the Department, sought and obtained Ministerial approval 
for the transfer.
Despite our reading of the decision in the press and 
continual inquiries to us from the ABC regarding our prop­
osals for execution of the work we have at no time received 
any positive direction from the Department of what is 
required of Telecom.
After consistently pressing your Broadcast Engineering 
Division in Melbourne for advice, our Secretary received a 
minute dated 14 December 1979 enclosing a "Statement of 
Operating Conditions" which had been "forwarded to the 
Secretary seeking Ministerial approval". This was subse­
quently followed by advice by TELEX that the operating 
frequency was changed to 105.7 MHz.
Because of our knowledge of the ABC's desire to have the 
transfer concluded at an early date (this was supported by 
the Department) and in an endeavour to be helpful, we 
placed the work in hand, completed the installation of the 
necessary plant in accordance with the "Statement of 
Operating Conditions" and subsequently advised both the 
Department and the ABC of our ability to cut-over 2JJ to FM 
on 14 March 1980. Since that date there has been formal 
silence from the Department.
We are aware from subsequently reading newspaper 
reports that there seems to be some conflict between pot­
ential commercial FM licensees and the Department in 
respect of technical operating conditions for commercial 
broadcasting services in Sydney. We also understand from 
discussions with your officers that this is leading to some 
considerations of "downgrading" the technical operating 
conditions for 2JJ-FM to ensure that it is non-competitive 
with the eventual Sydney commercial FM stations.
33 Mr Leo Sebire, Senior Telecom Engineer (Head of Broadcasting, 
Telecom, Melbourne).
Accordingly, we find ourselves in an embarrassing 
position. We have acted responsibly in establishing the 
2JJ-FM facilities in an expeditious manner and have not 
been advised of any need to modify or withdraw these 
facilities. There are serious engineering restrictions 
on what may be done at the Gore Hill Sydney transmitter 
site due to present overloading of the tower and the 
desire to establish UHF and Channel 0 television facilities 
for Ethnic TV on the same site at the earliest possible 
date. In consequence there is little flexibility 
available to modify the operating conditions or arrangements 
for 2JJ-FM and even minor changes of the technical plan 
are likely to result in considerable delays in re-engin­
eering and providing this service taking into account 
these constraints.
In the circumstances we would be grateful for your 
urgent advice regarding the Department's intentions 
regarding 2JJ-FM.
Management of 2JJJ continued to receive information on its situ­
ation only piecemeal, and at the higher levels the situation was as bad 
as anywhere else. The following is an extract from a letter by Norgard 
to Staley, dated 11.4.80. Three months before the opening of 2JJJ on 
FM, the A.B.C. was still trying to find out the station's technical 
operating conditions, and was worried about conflicting information on 
what those might be.
I have to say that the Commission is deeply concerned at 
conflicting statements concerning the power of the 2JJ FM 
transmission which have reached us on both a formal and 
informal basis - so much so that we believe we should defer 
the opening of the 2JJ FM service until its technical 
operating conditions, both in the interim and final phase, 
are defined and understood by all concerned.
We have known for some time that the conversion of 2JJ 
to FM would be in two phases - and that the first phase 
would be an interim service of reduced power, from a stand­
by aerial, pending the transfer of the transmission to the 
main FM aerial at the 500 feet level of the Gore Hill 
transmitter mast. However, it has always been our under­
standing that 2JJ's FM transmission ultimately would be of 
identical strength to the existing ABC-FM service - 50 kw 
effective radiated power. This was confirmed as recently 
as 13 March in a letter from Telecom's General Manager 
Customer Services to our Assistant General Manager (Radio).
What concerns us is that while Telecom appears not to 
have been in doubt that the second phase was to give 2JJ 
identical transmitter power to that of the existing ABC FM 
service (50 kw) - and has ordered the equipment necessary
34 Chairman of the A.B.C., 1976-1982.
to achieve this - we have received no confirmation of 
this from the P&T Department. Our concern has been 
heightened by advice given separately to senior members 
of our Program and Engineering divisions by senior 
engineers from both the P&T Department and Telecom that 
2JJ's effective radiated power in the first phase may 
be less than 10 kw - and that in the final phase it will 
be considerably less than 50 kw. This advice, received 
within the last few days, reached us at a sufficiently 
high level to suggest that it cannot be ignored.
I would be most grateful, therefore, if the Commission 
could be provided with 2JJ's precise technical operating 
conditions for both its initial and final phase. You 
will appreciate our considerable concern that the recept­
ion problems which have plagued the existing 2JJ AM service 
should not be repeated with its FM transmissions.
The station was informed by the Minister on 26.6.80 it would be
launching on FM on 11.7.80. 2DAY and 2MMM would launch the same day.
New plans had been put forward for up-grading 2JJJ's power from 10 kw,
to 20 kw or 35 kw, then 50 kw, but at the launch date the station was
using stand-by transmitter equipment, on 10 kw, and there it remained.
Early in 1980 it was reported to staff that the diplexing unit
of which Robinson had been informed a year before, in fact had not been
ordered. However, further up-grading was considered technically
possible nevertheless, but for one new development, which was the
central imposition of the general moratorium on all such gains by Sydney
stations.
One further exchange of correspondence was to put the cap on the
situation for some time:
35 36
Dukmanton to Lansdown , 4.6.81:
You will recall that the operating conditions determined 
for our Sydney station 2JJJ provided for an emission of 
35 kw ERP from the horizontally polarised antenna on the 
top of the ABN mast, with the capability of increase to 
50 kw when an improved feeder has been installed. We 
were advised by your Department that 35 kw operation 
would commence about February this year.
However, we understand that this station is still
35 Sir Talbot Duckmanton, General Manager, A.B.C.
36 Mr R. Lansdown, Secretary, Dept of Communications.
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operating on 10 kw ERP from the make-shift, vertically 
polarized antenna at about the 300ft level on the tower.
We further understand from your officers and those at 
Telecom, that there is no technical barrier to the use 
of the main antenna giving 35 kw ERP, but that the only 
impediment is an agreement that your Department has 
entered into with the commercial FM station operators.
The continued poor coverage of 2JJJ, particularly in 
the area around Campbelltown that formerly received an 
adequate MF coverage from 2JJ, is a direct result of the 
failure to move on to the main antenna, and is a cause 
for concern by the ABC.
It is our understanding that the agreement with the 
commercial operators involves a three month moratorium 
on power increases in the FM band to allow measures to 
eliminate interference to TV reception to be evaluated. 
However, it appears that the time of commencement of this 
three month period has not yet been set, and in the mean­
time no power increases are being allowed. It seems 
therefore that instead of a three month moratorium we 
have an indefinite embargo on our full power transmissions 
that has already gone on for several months and to which 
there is no end in sight.
I should be grateful if you would give urgent 
attention to correction of this unsatisfactory situation 
whereby the National station is restricted to less than 
one-third of its rated power apparently to accommodate 
commercial operators, whilst they enjoy their full rated 
power of 35 kw.
Lansdown to Duckmanton, in reply, 23.6.81:
The Minister is currently reviewing the impact of the 
FM sound broadcasting services on the domestic 
television reception in parts of the Sydney area.
Until his examination is complete and he has made a 
decision variation of the technical specifications of 
existing Sydney FM stations are being held in abeyance.
The Minister is aware that plans to vary the technical 
operating conditions for the ABC 2JJJ-FM service are 
pending subject to his decision.
General Observations
In the A.B.C., as in the other cases, it could be argued that the 
parties should not complain if in the end they received broadly what 
they wanted, or their aspirations were not so much denied, as only 
deferred. If the moratorium on the FM stations were to continue for 2 
years, it could still not be said that that was necessarily a scandal, 
as the circumstances, described at the beginning of this section, were
difficult. A change of Ministers is always likely to bring different 
practices as well. Seen with hindsight, a two-year freeze on activity 
in any bureaucratic process, over an important matter of policy imple­
mentation, might seem to be worth taking note of, but could not be seen 
as extraordinary in the history of organisations. It may all be just 
"in the nature of things".
Yet there are critical observations which should be made: first, 
there is the making of the problem. Geographical circumstances, and 
planning and engineering problems in Sydney were under control until the
move to establish 3 new stations on the FM band, and increase power all
37round. That factor in the situation impacted on the others. This is 
not an argument against opening the stations, but the question is asked, 
to what extent should this magnification of problems have been foreseen - 
or coped with more effectively if foreseen?
That point raises the second consideration, the set of changes that 
went on in the decisional area. Clearly the presence of Staley was the 
main factor, as his deliberate subordination of engineering to "social" 
concerns did much to upset the applecart, as he said, Other dichotomies 
can be recorded: engineers having their heads knocked together to see 
what falls out, versus engineers in charge, having their advice taken 
(their preconceptions respected). Senior public servants being made to 
rush, versus senior public servants being able to work out a timely plan.
A Minister fighting resistance at the operational level, versus a 
Minister "backing up" his officers and settling for very small but quite 
certain increments of growth.
The third set of concerns, covering the effects on demand patterns, 
are the most obvious. So much so that the question of appearance, of how 
things look to people, needs a few words of its own. The explanation of
37 Except for 2ABC, which opened on 50 kw.
developments given above has provided plenty of information on the 
emotional interplay - words like "frustrate" and "distrust" have been 
introduced and validated in their place. From the perspective of the 
client groups in this situation, specifically the broadcasters, the 
situation would seem to have changed much more radically than it might 
seem to the public servants. To the first group, the arrival of a more 
"detached" Minister, together with a rather mysterious freeze on 
expansion, means a loss of efficacy - a loss of power. To the public 
servant the machine can be seen to have been pulled down pending adjust­
ment, repair and extension - not a personal business. But the particular 
group of actors associated with the stations were diminished, in fact as 
well as in appearance, as they were no longer able to get priority for 
their wants. The entry of new actors or restoration of old ones 
(Mr Kerry Packer was ushered into the debate in such a role) had become 
more feasible. The "decisional system", became less accessible, had been 
reserving the options to itself, providing less, and preparing to 
regulate more.
As a further observation we can put forward the view that the 
substantive issues in this case are seen as having special importance in 
the society. Key matters to do with broadcasting are perceived, 
accurately or otherwise, as being very strategic to political power, and 
will be handled gingerly. The point was made in Section 2, Chapter 1, 
that frequency allocation is at the core of policy-making in this field, 
and it appears that ordinarily, scant initiative will be left to the 
broadcaster in managing it. After all, it might be said in many quarters, 
people who entertain millions and distribute messages among them, should 
not get all the say as to how it is all to be arranged. It might be as 
well to keep control of the vehicle itself out of their hands.
The broadcaster's end of the frequency allocation process is the
alist of station operating conditions, or the "specifications" handed out 
to his or her station. Armstrong calls them "matters of life and death 
to the licensee". In an essay on the broadcasters' legal hold on these 
rights, he says "the only express protections in the nature of natural 
justice are the requirements that the licensee must receive 14 days' 
notice of any proposed change in specification, and that the Minister 
must consider any representations made by the licensee before actually
38altering the specification..." After a treatment of the 2SM case of 1977, 
he comments: "The judicial concept of a national policy power, political 
in character and beyond the rules of natural justice, has not previously
39
been extended far beyond the areas of immigration and national security".
In the Australian situation the licensee is not to have too much firm 
ground to stand on in negotiations of the kind being looked at in this 
chapter.
From the Perspective of the Planners
To return to the initial discussion of problems of the environment, 
and to alter the perspective once more, we should consider actions that 
have been set in process, or put on the agenda by the government 
apparatus. What is the likely outcome?
Westerway has listed the problems, all in terms of their possible 
solutions: as the Sydney-Newcastle-Wollongong area is the highest use 
area, the provision of frequencies for 2ABC, 2JJJ and the commercial FM 
stations has taken the situation "well and truly beyond the point where 
we can really plan effectively to have no interference with the least 
efficient receiver". Filters will need to be used, and his department has
38 Legal action by station 2SM to try to block allocation of a frequency 
adjacent to its own, to a new competitor, 2WS.
39 Cp.cit, , Armstrong, "Judicial and Administrative Review of Decisions...", 
pp.28-30.
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been working on a national receiver specification for FM and television
receivers. It was having discussions with manufacturers about that, and
would be making more progress with it, if more immediate issues were not
competing for attention. "The trouble is every bushfire that comes up
means you push the long-term plan further under."
There is a political aspect of the debate about interference, which
helps to make it controversial.
It's susceptible to technical cures, but the problem is not 
technical, it's^political problem, and the political 
problem stems from the fact that no station wants to say to 
its viewers: We know you are getting interference but if you 
do these things, no matter whether it doesn't cost you any 
money at all, you can overcome the interference. They're 
worried that that will scare off some of their viewers...so 
you can understand their point of view.
Beyond that, the government has "investigated all the alternatives
you can think of, but there's no decision yet which way to go".
The most promising alternative, beyond a general up-grading of
receiver standards, would be to find a high, central location for the
station aerials. As there are problems with the tower at Gore Hill, it's
been thought that a second location, which could perhaps accommodate FM
radio and UHF television, should be set up.
But a second centre would have its penalties too.
The penalty is that you get your radio propagation from 2 
different directions, and the levels vary according to 
where you are in Sydney looking at it...The public broad­
casting stations are involved in this because they want to 
go up to their full operating conditions, and we're quite 
happy for them to do that, but you have to remember that 
their operating conditions say that power at a Gore Hill 
site, but don't say that power at any site you care to 
choose in Sydney...
[The A.B.C's] Gore Hill tower is theoretically over­
loaded... If we do a sort of shuffle with 2 sites it might 
be possible to get it back down to where it ought to be, 
to separate the FM from television and perhaps make some 
rational sorts of upgrading for 2JJJ to give it its full 
coverage. And for the commercial FM stations, so they 
don't have a big null in their pattern. They're right down 
on a commercial mast at present and having all sorts of
<z
trouble. We could invite the public broadcasters but it 
would obviously have to be a matter of negotiation what 
they paid for it...(40)
Wilkinson concurs that a second propagation centre, at a site such 
as the Centrepoint Tower in the city, presents itself as one of the main 
solutions, and suggests optimistically that improved receiver standards 
as well, will be achieved, with or without the application of a formal 
standard by government. "It'll grow out. The future generations of TV 
sets won't sell, couldn't pass the test, if they're vulnerable to 
interference from FM."
It was conversely by a similar process - the effect of market 
forces, or lack of them - that did much to create the present problem. 
"There's a lot of problems in Australia arising in the introduction of 
FM, due completely to the fact that television came to air without FM.
In most other countries FM transmissions were already on the air when 
TV signals started to be radiated, and TV sets included circuitry which 
overcame the interference. They're cheap things, and are done by the 
receiver manufacturers."^
That is a comment which refers us back to earlier observations, on 
the initial decision not to launch FM radio in Australia, when the 
opportunity first presented itself, and it serves also to introduce the 
issue of the long wait for FM, dealt with in the following chapter.
40 Interview, 27.1.82.
41 Interview, 13.1.82.
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It's been established"*" that FM radio did not go ahead in the 1950s
because existing broadcasters either did not want it (the commercial
operators), or did not, perhaps could not, push for it (in the case of 
2
the A.B.C.). There was a lack of organised public support for the idea, 
at a time when the onset of television was commanding the attention of 
all.
What needs to be added is that from that point, it seems to have
been considered that the d‘>i was well and truly cast. Not wanted, any
advent of FM would be precluded through structural arrangements to block
it, notably the use of the FM radio band for VHF television, and through
much verbal discouragement and dismissal of the idea.
Hulme is quoted often as ruling out FM over and again, during his
term as Postmaster General, 1964-72.
Much of the agitation of FM broadcasting comes from a 
relatively small group of high fidelity enthusiasts...
The only justification for introducing a new system of 
broadcasting in the Commonwealth is the inability to 
meet all present deficiencies by expansion of the 
services on the medium frequency band. The short­
comings now present are relatively few and would not in 
themselves warrant the introduction of FM broadcasting 
with its wide implications. (3)
The policy was therefore explicit: the existing system was suffic­
ient and good, and expansion would not be favoured. Within that 
framework the A.B.C.B. handled brabdcasting administration, focusing its
1 Section )., Chapterl .
2 The A.B.C. 's priority at the beginning of the 1950s was its interest 
in a second country service. Frequencies were sought from the Board 
but the scheme lapsed. See M.A. Armstrong, "The Broadcasting and 
Television Act, 1948-1976: A Case Study of the Australian Broadcasting 
Control Board", in R. Tomasic (ed.), Legislation and Society in 
Australia (Law in Society: no. 4), Sydney, Law Foundation of N.S.W. 
and George Allen and Unwin, 1979, p.132.
3 22.10.64. Quoted by A. Bear, "Public Broadcasting in Australia" in 
J.W. Warburton (ed.), Studies in Continuing Education, University of 
Adelaide, Dept of Continuing Education, 1.9.79.
energies in radio on small changes and giving most attention to fulfilling
high technical standards. "The Board survived by ensuring not to offend
4
the government or powerful interests."
The first effect of this firm policy of non-expansion, from the
perspective of FM listeners and FM broadcasters today, was that time was
lost. When the stations came to be set up from 1974, a backlog had to
be made up for in knowledge and expertise, and in public awareness of
the form. Staff at the first station, 2MBS, for instance, built their
5own test transmitters - learning the technology from the ground up.
Nothing had happened for nearly 20 years, while interest was building up, 
unsatisfied, in new possibilities for radio programming. It's approp­
riate here to point out once more that society and culture were not 
standing still.
In the period when FM was first being considered, the mid-1950s,
necoreisj
the wherewithall of modern FM systems - long-playing^stereo receivers; 
transistors; inexpensive transmitters available "off the shelf" - were 
known phenomena, but not generally dispersed or available within the 
country. Twenty years later it put no real tax on the imagination to 
argue for the creation of FM broadcasting - everything was on hand to 
receive it, and the question most often put was why had it not been 
started long ago.
It has been argued often that the reason had nothing to do with 
imagination, but rather was a matter of political control by the govern­
ment of the day (which found the existing mass media helpful to itself, 
most of the time, and adequate to meet most social needs and demands.^
4 Op.cit., Armstrong, Broadcasting Law and Policy..., p.39.
5 2MBS-FM. Untitled information paper, 1977.
6 Wright: "It was going along pleasantly and happily, and they were 
pleased with it." Interview, 21.10.81.
Why buy into problems you don't have to?), and of commercial protection 
in a small market economy.
However, it should help the argument to look at matters of 
imagination before going into those points. Radio programs are ultim­
ately the business at issue here, where broadcasting policy is under 
study, and programs of any type, on any station, have their elements of 
art and imagination. That is perhaps why FM was eventually able to 
overcome the obstacles, formidable as they were - because many people 
felt there was a need for it in the culture.
To indulge in the imagination, in the hope of showing how art (by 
a loose definition), through radio, may change the culture for the 
better - for general enrichment - let us fantasise as to what might have 
happened, if the commercial broadcasters had said, in 1958, that despite 
their trepidation about television, they were interested in going to FM.
It might have been that they were only interested in a small number of 
medium coverage stations, to operate in the major markets - while not 
objecting to the inauguration of A.B.C. or public stations. It is not 
fanciful to say that could have happened, as the A.B.C.B. investigation 
of the matter was well-advanced, with general participation of the 
parties, right up to its abrupt end. A consideration of what might have 
happened stands on firm foundations.
The conjecture that follows, to fill the vacuum of nearly 2 decades, 
is about the creation of certain hypothetical FM stations before 1960.
To keep to the solid foundation, this conjecture is informed by what did 
happen on the medium wave band and in the market place.
2MUS-FM (for music) was the first call-sign. The station was 
operated by a group like the M.B.S. which was founded in the early 1970s, 
but formed in the manner of the 3ZZ organisation of 1975, to run the
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station for the A.B.C. It produced a highly eclectic program, playing 
fine music for 24 hours a day. The station acted in response to a 
number of trends. It took advantage of the quality recordings being 
produced by 1960 by Deutschegrammophon and others, on the new microgroove 
discs. New releases were aired almost daily and stimulated interest 
among general listeners, as well as among the cognoscenti, who welcomed 
the guidance in augmenting their collections of "78's". Twenty-four 
hour broadcasting was fairly novel and a night owl movement hailed the 
new station. Bizarre investigative conversations and musical adventures 
were occurring in the small hours.
After a few years the withdrawal of much of the fine music content 
on the A.B.C's first network (1962) was seen to be compensated for by 
the new station. Australian musicians had an outlet for broadcasting of 
their works in high fidelity. An unexpected benefit was that A.B.C. 
personnel reported back to the major organisation on the benefits of a 
rolling program, as opposed to a system of "block programming", and this 
led to healthy experimentation. Studio talent who cut their teeth at 
2MUS were found to be useful recruits for the other stations - they were 
used to working independently, were knowledgeable about program material 
and relaxed at the microphone.
2JAZ became the outlet for the programmers and presenters who in 
fact gave us late night jazz through the decades on A.B.C. Radio 1 and 
3. For many years the A.B.C's first network program, with Arch McKirdy, 
was simulcast in Sydney on 2JAZ, for people who wanted it in stereo. 
Because of the spread of air-time available to it, 2JAZ played a more 
diverse program of jazz than the A.B.C. At the same time, in the early 
1950s, it drew in a big audience during the years that popular jazz was 
all the rage.
In later years the audiences fell off bit by bit, and the
non-profit corporation in charge of the station, low on sponsorships and 
a little in debt, handed it over to the A.B.C. after a decade of 
operations. The A.B.C. turned to live performances as a speciality and 
in time 2JAZ became renowned as the principal organiser of a major 
international jazz festival, held every 2 years at the Opera House. 
Government spending restraints had prevented a planned refurbishing of 
plant and equipment but by 1976, plans were in hand for building a 
network of stations based on 2JAZ. All agreed the expertise of so many 
years would give it a firm basis. New influences were in evidence in 
the programming by this time, including a spill-over of late-night 
programming from the adventures of the neighbouring youth station, 2JJJ. 
Synthesiser music and other new forms were commanding a place.
2BOB (for money) was the only Sydney commercial FM station of the 
1950s, with composite ownership by 4 companies with interests in AM 
radio. They were uniform on one point: the financial outlook must be 
assumed to be dicey and so audiences must be maximised at all costs. 
Observers at the time thought it must have been this anxiety over 
survival, a stimulant to creative work as powerful as love, which goaded 
the programmers on 2B0B to innovate as they did.
Unlike its competitors the station was free of the bonds of having 
an established place in the market place, with an accustomed and 
demanding audience. Perhaps for this reason it was the first to exper­
iment with talk-back radio, to its great profit. It also emphasised 
outside broadcasts, especially in sport, being remembered for the only 
commercial live coverage of Gretel1s win over Weatherly at Newport, R.I., 
and of the tied test in Brisbane. Record companies geared to producing 
single hit songs on 78 r.p.m. discs continued along that line with 
singles on 45, but there was also a market for the new long-playing
albums, on home radiograms. 2B0B took up the possibility of using this
album music, to develop a "middle of road" format, later taken up 
successfully on AM by 2CH and others. In its preoccupations and 
energetic way of working, the station was seen as crass, always more 
interested in broadcasting the lottery draw than any more serious event, 
but like the new commercial FM stations of the 1980s it had drawn a 
viable audience in a little over one year; was continuing to trade 
profitably, and it had become something of a favourite institution of 
the city.
2QED-FM (the call-sign taken from a distinguished American 
precedent), had one goal, to provide education, to which it gave a 
liberal definition. It was run as a public radio society on the model 
of the M.B.S., but received grants from a consortium of educational 
institutions, as in the case of 3RRR-FM. These had representatives on 
the board and guaranteed air-time for their teaching programs. (A lot 
of university departments, over the years, came to exploit radio for 
teaching their main courses, as well as for extension work, which became 
a major "business" for them.)
The station was accessible to all new talent, its main premise 
being a theme of the period, that Australian society was not offering 
sufficient outlets for the creative and intellectual talents of its 
people, especially the young. The dramatis personnae of the station was 
vast. It is not known who they all would have been. Many rose to fame 
(as in the case of Barry Humphreys, performer of undergraduate reviews 
on 2QED), but there were others who might have, had 2QED, along with 
other outlets for them, in fact been on hand. Aborigines made their 
own programs on the station and women were prominent among the presenters 
and management. The station was in many respects a precursor of some 
of the E. and S. class public stations that came later, but importantly 
its services began in 1959.
It may never have taken place, even with consensus in the 1950s 
that FM should go ahead. The stations may have all been forced to 
close through insolvency, as could still happen to a number of public 
stations in 1982. They may have undermined the profitability of certain 
commercial stations, though on the experience of the period 1974-82 
that would have been improbable. More likely, they may have been denied 
licences in favour of less enterprising, less interesting operations.
However the regrettable thing is that we will never know. We 
can only suppose that had such things been permitted, and attempted 
successfully, cultural benefits would have resulted. 2B0B was not 
"cultural" but as a free agent and wily competitor, tried out new ideas 
and caused its competitors to be less complacent. At its level, its 
energy would have caused some excitement in the community, and even 
some growth. The other examples are easier to appreciate as contributors 
to the social good, as they are closer to what now exists, after years 
of delay.
The next consideration is to do with the way broadcasting policy 
was handled during the period in question, under rules that precluded 
such activities as the birth of new FM stations. If that prospect 
produces in the reader any sense of being let down to look at things 
more seriously, some of the purpose of describing the hypothetical 
stations will have been met. The policy of the 1950s and 1960s may be 
judged by its fruit, if we can measure that not as something done, but 
the extent of something possible, but not attained - something which 
"might have been", carrying with it certain notions of pleasure and 
excitement. On the other hand the exercise may not have made its point, 
in which case the following examination of how things did occur, a 
subject not ephemeral at all, should still be of use.
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The section that follows draws on Armstrong, who has written 
exhaustively on broadcasting law and policy during the period, partic­
ularly on the subject of the A.B.C.B.; and on material obtained by the 
writer through an interview with Wright.
It begins with the observation that "one of the questions most
7
frequently asked about the Act is how to compel the Minister to call 
applications for licences. The short answer is that the law intrudes 
little in these matters. They are primarily political or policy 
matters...[and in practice] the discretionary powers of the Minister have 
long been used to protect existing licensees from competition. For
g
obvious reasons, this practice has rarely been admitted in public".
9
However, Cole was able to calculate in 1966 that by that time, nearly 
2000 applicants for new stations had been knocked back over a 30 year 
period; virtually no new stations had been licenced in major markets; 
the A.B.C. had been continually rebuffed over its moves to obtain a 
second country network, and there had been "the obstruction of FM broad­
casting for several decades". On the other hand the Board had overseen 
power increases for existing stations, to meet demographic changes.
Part of the rationale for this effective lock-out of new contenders 
was the consideration given to the prospective viability of applicants. 
Normally a cautious view was taken. In one case cited by Armstrong a 
Perth applicant who was refused was told "there would definitely be a 
diminution of the amount of revenue received per station, which would 
inevitably have a detrimental effect on the quality of programmes".
7 Broadcasting and Television Act, 1942 (B and TV Act).
8 Op.cit., Armstrong, Broadcasting Law and Policy..., p.120.
9 B. Cole, "What's Really Preventing the Expansion of Broadcasting 
Services?" in The Australian Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 3, September,
1966, pp.72-87.
10 Op.cit., Armstrong, Broadcasting Law and Policy..., p.121.
Similar responses are documented in other cases, in Sydney and Mel­
bourne, and the Director of F.A.R.B. is quoted as saying before the
Vincent Committee^"*" that finance, rather than shortage of frequencies,
, . . . 12 
was the reason for the number of stations being limited.
It was also commonly reported in the 1960s that frequency space
was taken up on the AM band, and this was given as another reason why
prospective broadcasters really need not apply. There was no room for
them. It is an arcane subject which initially baffled the public
broadcasters when they came on the scene in the mid-1970s. "The use of
the frequency band was a mystery which few could unravel", said the
13
first convener of the P.B.A. However most qualified observers had
found out by 1974 that creating new frequencies was in truth far from 
an insurmountable task, in strictly technical terms.
The answer lay in the use of modern equipment, reducing band width 
tolerances so that each station took up only 0.9 KHz on the dial, and 
getting local stations to broadcast on higher power, employing new 
directional serials. At the time of the McLean inquiry in 1974 there 
was a scramble to produce this information, with contributions from the 
Minister for the Media, his department, and a report from the A.B.C.B. 
Their announcements had the effect of undoing a myth. Among public 
radio groups and other supporters of change, it seemed to unveil a large 
deception. It may not have been that, but it had come to be seen over 
the years, that technical standards had been allowed to remain unnec­
essarily tight, or to put it another way, to become out of date. As well, 
the experts and the bureaucracy had been if not guarded, then reserved,
11 Senate Select Committee on the Encouragement of Australian Productions 
for Television. Sen. V. 5. Vincent, Chairman.
12 Op.cit., Armstrong, Broadcasting Law and Policy..., pp.120-121.
13 Dr P. Pockley, Secretary, Public Broadcasting Association, N.S.W. 
Interview with the writer, 23.12.75.
Vunforthcoming and too sparing with their information.
14
For example, the comment by Griffiths:
The Board did encourage the belief that there were no 
further AM frequencies available. Of course the Board 
could argue that they were not politically available 
and that this is different from being technically 
available and that they were not available because the 
government would not let them become available. The 
fact remains that when the Board makes such statements 
as 'there are only 108 channels available on the AM 
band' it is reasonable for people to assume that it 
is not technically possible to establish additional AM 
stations.(15)
One other reason is given for the recalcitrance of government and 
Board in providing new services - the high cost to government of
16
providing equipment, in particular of buying transmitters for the A.B.C. 
This and the other responses to demand - that the viability of existing 
stations was in danger, that frequencies could not be made available, 
and that providing extra power for established stations would satisfy 
many a requirement for change - put together made a formula for system­
atic commercial protection.
Why should that have been?
In the first case, in the 1950s, the radio stations carried political 
clout, or potential clout, of the kind enjoyed by the major television 
chains 30 years later. They commanded the close attention of the great 
majority of the public, and their programming decisions, it was 
perceived, could affect the standing of political leaders and the govern­
ment. The mass media organisations are also a volatile lobby on issues of 
f** Spttcf),
in the habit of fusing the ideas of private and corporate rights in 
their rhetoric, and even prepared to publish consistent, abusive attacks 
on proposals for regulation or reform, in terms of the defence of rights.
14 Mr David Griffiths, Alternative Radio Association, Melbourne.
15 Op.cit., Griffiths, p.10.
16 Certainly in the numbers required for duplicating the third network, 
on AM.
That was the case as early as 1935 when a statutory regulation
was proposed, to limit the number of stations that could be controlled
by one owner. A debate in parliament revealed "strong back-bench
support" for the operators, and in the end the regulation was modified
and made more lenient to owners. Menzies was quoted as saying
"everyone had got cold feet about the next election". Asked if something
might be done to check the growing influence of the commercial lobby in
17broadcasting, he said: "We haven't the guts".
It should be kept in mind that many of the metropolitan broad­
casters are owned by the major newspapers or have corporate links with 
them, which means they have always been able to call on very powerful
support if they wanted to act in concert. This fact was seen by Bednall 
18in late 1975, as central to the closing of the band and blocking of
FM, in particular, and to commercial protectionism in general.
One of the props of Australia's media oligarchies - 
unparalleled elsewhere in the world - has been the 
confining of television by regulation to the VHF band.
That confinement effectively rules out the possibility 
of any new television stations and any further 
competition... for the existing licences. And further­
more the filling of all vacancies on the VHF band 
seemed certain - it was thought at the time - to block 
FM radio, which could likewise embarrass the commercial 
radio stations, which the same newspaper proprietors 
also owned, thanks to the same solicitous anti-Labor 
governments.(19)
As the instrument of overall licensing policy the Board did not 
have large autonomy, should it have sought to act on its own initiative
17 Cp.cit., Armstrong, Broadcasting Law and Policy..., p.37. Other cases 
were Wright's tentative for having the powers of the A.B.C.B. tested 
in court, as described by Armstrong (Op.cit., M. Armstrong, "The 
Broadcasting and Television Act...", p.137), and the Senate rejection 
of amendments to the B and TV Act, in 1973, clarifying some of those 
powers (See Section 2, Chapter 2, and Section 3, Chapter 2).
18 Mr Colin Bednall, formerly General Manager of GTV Channel 9, and 
member of the Royal Commission on Television, 1953.
19 New Journalist, no. 19, Sept.-Oct. 1975, p.5.
in getting new stations licensed, or even in forcing material changes
in programming, in line with its declared standards. In his article
surveying the history of the Board, Armstrong showed that its licensing
powers were unclear and for a long time used timidly as well. On the
last point, he ascribes the vacillation of the authority^to the policy
of its Chairman, R.G. Osborne, and provides a sharp portrait of him as
20
a "fairly conservative thinker with a nervous disposition"; one who
could be stood over by politicians.
It did not help either that relations with the Minister, who
retained the ultimate responsibility for licence renewals, were conducted
on a confidential basis. As a result, by Wright's account, there were
many initiatives attempted by the Board, but privately shelved. "The
Control Board was not ideal in planning because it had to report to the
Minister and reports were not necessarily public. So a lot of complaints
that the Control Board didn't do planning things were not true. What
happened was that the reports never saw the light of day because they
21
were reports to the Minister."
Efforts to clarify the Board's powers to regulate, in the field of
program standards, were similarly hampered by government unconcern. A
breach of the standards, for instance as they might apply to children's
programming, might have affected the renewal of a licence, if the powers
were sound. "In its later years the Board was disposed to test its
powers in the courts, but apparently the government would not allocate
22the funds for litigation."
Wright concedes that the Board was slow to recommend expansion.
"It was certainly slow to move after television came." Frequency
20 Op.cit., Armstrong, "The Broadcasting and Television Act...", p.133.
21 Interview, 21.10.81.
22 Cp.cit., Armstrong, "The Broadcasting and Television Act...", p.137.
planning was conservative, in the technical sense, and the large group
of new frequencies proposed in 1974 had been the first such group
brought forward. Before that, earlier solutions to the planning problem
the intricate patchwork of high powered stations, omni-directional
aerials and clear channels, all designed to bring some coverage to most
parts of the continent - were held to suffice.
On other points he argues that neither pressure from government
nor the Board's own conservative line of approach properly account for
what took place. On the frequent rejection of licence applicants, for
instance, he suggests the figures given are exaggerated.
[Question] You'd be familiar with Barry Cole. The rejection 
of 2000 applications?
I'm not in a position to argue with him but certain people, 
notably the church body who wanted to broadcast in 
Western Australia, used to apply regularly every 3 months.
So whether it's 30-thousand, or 30-thousand times, I think 
you'd probably find the figure somewhere in between...Nor,
I might say, Barry Cole notwithstanding, was there any 
outstanding demand for licences in several cities. I didn't 
receive one request to consider another licence in a 
capital city I think in all the years I was Chairman...in 
spite of what people said about millions of requests, there 
was very little expressed demand. The first time we really 
found a demand for public broadcasting licences was at our 
FM inquiry in 1971. They were the first people to come 
forward, and even that was very weak.(23)
Viability of stations, he says, was not so much an issue in the 
Board's planning for metropolitan services, but had to be considered in 
the case of the regions. That was particularly so in the case of 
television rather than radio.
To fill out this description of the scene, in the period before 
the change that began in 1971, we should consider one more set of 
relationships, those among the regulators and the regulated - among the 
government, the A.B.C.B. and the stations.
It has already been shown that the powers of the Board over
23 Interview, 21.10.81.
standards and licensing were suspect, a point not wasted on the
operators. Armstrong concludes that the broadcasters were never concerned
that their licences would be in jeopardy through a lapse of program
standards. Such matters as four-letter words and the periods to be set
aside for advertising were typically regulated, quite closely, but on
broader issues the main official response to any lapse was most likely
to be just a reprimand. The case is cited of a Sydney station that was
regularly renewed, with the endorsement that, "being one of a number of
24stations it can be regarded as adequate". The Board was not assertive.
"It might have been expected that the powers to hold public inquiries
and make recommendations about licences would have been used frequently.
In fact, they were almost never used...it is surprising that the Board
25
held only one public renewal hearing ever."
That was the relationship at one level. At the other, in the area 
of informal day to day dealings, there was ample potential to witness the
"contagion of values from regulating to regulators", almost a standard
26
phenomenon, it would seem, in situations of the kind. Edelman sees
the regulators "learning the others' perspectives and their values".
Osborne described his method of approach to the stations as one of 
27
"sweet reasonableness". From the perspective of public broadcasting 
groups in the early 1970s, beginning to organise the candidate broadcasters 
on the outside of the media organisations, it makes sense to refer to 
the observation of Edelman, that the real gains in situations like the 
one under review, will go to the organised clients. He points to the 
"infrequent distribution of tangible resources and benefits to
24 Op.cit., Armstrong, "The Broadcasting and Television Act...", p.140.
25 Loc.cit.
26 Quoted in Armstrong, op.cit., Broadcasting Law and Policy..., p.19.
27 , 21.10.81.
unorganised groups by the regulatory system, as opposed to the symbolic
28words and actions of the system".
To recapitulate on the structure of the regulatory apparatus in 
1971, we can perceive 3 sets of relationships (Government to Board;
Government to clients, and Board to clients), and 2 main topics of policy «r*t( 
planning, the wider question of commercial protection for the
%
industry as it stood, and the more intimate matter of licensing, in 
relation to the policing of standards.
Referring back to Salisbury ("The interactions of demand patterns
and the decisional system are systematically associated with different
29 . . .types of policy"), we can see the protection issue as a traditional
arrangement for distribution among a select clientele. The number of
parties is small and the level of activity is very low. Large alterations
to the general scheme of things, that might affect the general flow of
business, are not encouraged. The system is regulatory in the sense that
rules are imposed upon the client group by the government and its
agency, but the term cannot be confidently applied as in practice, there
is not much to speak of in the way of direction, coercion or the
application of sanctions.
In view of the evident subordination of the Board in most matters, 
to the government (as represented by the Postmaster General), and its 
weak position in trying to start a planning initiative, or enforce its 
own rulings, we might consider it as an agency of the decisional system, 
in this case, in name only. It can be seen as having been of the demand 
pattern, providing a service by transmitting standards to clients, 
receiving their approaches, and in general itself observing the orders 
of the government. Its most influential function was to help preserve
28 Op.cit., Armstrong, Broadcasting Law and Policy..., p.19.
29 Section 1, Chapter 2.
the status quo by keeping out new stations - mostly by rejecting 
proposals, or proclaiming a prohibitive scarcity of frequencies. As 
for the effective pulling and hauling between government and clients, 
there, much had already been received. It was a stable relationship.
For extended periods there was not much activity in the interface 
between the 2 sectors, "decisional" and "demand". It was in effect a 
relationship of detente, but one which could become turbulent if one 
party were to begin pushing for new advantages. A move to regulate, by 
the government, or demands for generalised self-regulation by broad­
casters (where policies would "impose constraints upon the group, but
would be perceived only to increase, not decrease, the beneficial
30options to the group"), would have the same threatening effect, to one
side or the other. Such shifts and contests in such situations, have
31been known to occur, and have been fought often in public view.
The program standards and licensing procedures under the authority 
of the Board were clearly intended as implements for regulating the 
industry, but for the reasons already canvassed, they were not really 
in effective use as such. The operators were self-regulated, for very 
many intents and purposes. They were able to program for children, for 
example, - and still are, should they wish -exclusively on the basis 
of revenues to be obtained through the particular strategy^ and hope 
to survive without material censure. The stratagem of referring to the 
Board in these matters helped to preserve the self-regulative character 
of the operations, as it removed the need for contact with the 
government. It remained a standing policy of F.A.R.B. that planning 
and regulation of broadcasting ought not to be in the hands of government, 
but in the "impartial" care of a statutory body. In the particular case
30 Section 1, Chapter 2.
31 See Fn. 17 above.
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of the A.B.C.B. it has been suggested that the interests of the 
statutory body and its clients, through a well-recognised process, 
could be seen to merge at important points. (The Board had succeeded 
in gaining firm authority for itself in only one area, its engineering 
expertise, but in that regard it was, if not ineffectual, still 
constrained. Its hopes of achieving major change in any field, of its 
own volition, would always be poor.)
This analysis of the relationships has obvious deficiencies. It
does not give detail on the place of other actors wanting to participate,
such as the unorganised potential broadcasters, and in respect to the
32Board it is perhaps too dismissive. However it can be judged in 
relation to what took place in the system after 1971 when new demands, 
new decision-makers and with them new forms of policy entered the scene.
At the end of the era, signalled as it turned out by the inquiry
into FM, the political machinery of broadcasting was geared to limited
and slow action, to a mean volume of work mostly carried out through
fixed routines. It was known to be durable in preserving the balance
between government and clients, where they might be at odds over
sensitive issues. But it was vulnerable on 2 counts. In the first case,
developments in the society - technological, cultural, and economic, all
referred to in the preceding chapters at some length - were promising
to force unprecedented volumes of work onto the system. The machine
would need to produce more. In the second case, the ambiguous role of
the Board would almost certainly prove the first weakness, once the new
32 Rushton for instance (interview, 21.1.82), denies that relations 
between the A.B.C.B. and commercial radio operators were ever easy. 
More often it was an "appalling relationship. Pathetic. Disgusting. 
The Federation met formally with the Control Board once a year, in 
April. It was a meeting with posturing and role play, and people 
on both sides playing games".
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pressures began to apply. Its ascribed, formal powers were highly 
uncertain, and it had little record for achieving much by any other 
means. The policy apparatus did not appear to be at all suitable for 
the tasks about to be thrust upon it.
ir
Section 3: Chapter 2
under McClelland as minister for the media
What happened in the realm of broadcasting policy after the election 
of the Labor government in 1972 is most often described in terms of the 
creation of "disequilibrium",^ or the shock of forcing "as many changes 
as possible as quickly as possible... after decades of absolute predict­
ability".2
As has been shown in the preceding chapters, growth in the larger
economy and society had created pressure on the broadcasting system. The
existence of such pressure was not always palpable, as we have been in
the argument over the issue of new licence applications and the A.B.C.B.
Broadcasting organisations are not greatly visible, public institutions,
unless and until they are actually broadcasting; so there is always room
to cast doubt on the idea of a "groundswell" of public demand.
3 . . .On the other hand it can be shown that there was significant 
support for an FM service offering "middle of the road" music in high 
fidelity stereo. There was the public radio movement: more than 60 
organisations, some with thousands of members, were canvassing for
4
licences in 1975, and by the end of 1981, with 7 FM stations established
on the dial in Sydney, there was firm survey evidence that FM was being
5
used by a large percentage of the population.
Nevertheless the change of government, obviously enough, was the 
direct and immediate cause of the zealous activity in broadcasting which 
started in 1973. Expectations had had to be suppressed during the
1 Westerway, 27.1.82.
2 H.M. Dickenson, The Evolution, Structure and Functioning of Doublejay 
Radio, B.A. thesis, Dept of Government, University of Sydney, 1979.
Radio Reform section, p.9.
3 See Section 4, Chapter 1, ABC-FM.
4 L.R. Duffield, The Introduction of a Public Broadcasting System in 
Australia, unpublished monograph for East West Centre, Hawaii, 1976, 
p.13.
5 See Section 4, Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Market Share ratings for the 
stations.
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decades of inaction and extreme caution. Now the possibility of change, 
particularly in the form of new stations coming on the dial, was freely 
admitted. If the level of interest among the general public was 
uncertain, there was articulate support for such innovations as public 
radio and the launching of FM, from within the government and within the 
ranks of its close supporters. This became very active support, and it 
was influential - though at first most attention was focused on the new 
Department of the Media, the creation of which had been promised by the 
Labor Party at the elections.
A thorough account of the formation and operation of the Department,
unsigned but evidently well-informed, is contained in the New Journalist
of November 1976.^ The article concurs with informed opinion in general
in claiming that the department did not keep pace with its clientele in
formulating policy for radio and television, and suffered also through
the decision to locate its offices at North Sydney. This had put it
close to the headquarters of major media organisations, but "proximity
to the Parliament and the Minister proved of greater importance. Media
never earned respect among the admittedly prejudiced Canberra-centred
public service. More seriously, a poorly briefed Minister suffers in
7
Parliament and Cabinet". The article emphasises also that the govern­
ment of the day could not get its broadcasting legislation through the 
Senate, a fact which became a major inhibiting factor working against 
proposals for reform.
If the new department was not prone to violent initiatives, the 
seeds of tension were sown anyway, from the beginning, as soon as it was 
charged with the co-ordination of broadcasting policy. This "encroached 
on the preserve of the Broadcasting Control Board, which naturally 
defended itself by pointing to its independent status as a statutory
6 New Journalist, no. 25, November 1976.
7 Ibid., p.59.
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body".8 9
"The Control Board had a statutory responsibility to administer
and it continued to administer", says Wright. "Certainly yes the
Department naturally clashed with us but there was really nothing we
could do about it, unless they wanted to change the law. And the Control
Board was not going to be an adviser to the Department when the Act said
it was an adviser to the Minister." The former Chairman of the A.B.C.B.
had also seen his operation as becoming politicised.
That came of course as soon as they established a 
Department to control broadcasting...By interposing a 
department you then had political considerations 
immediately involved. Not planning considerations for 
need or anything else. They were immediately political.
I recall Ministerial requests coming through very close 
to a direction. We were requested to make some 
frequencies out quickly for Western Australia, when 
there was going to be an election in W.A. in '73 or '74.
That kind of thing started to happen. Planning goes 
out the window.(9)
Added to the Board's fears that it would be the mere instrument of 
policy, and policy sometimes of a crude order, was what it saw as the 
disorderliness of some of the government's clientele. An example: 
staff members of 2JJ, a station set up by request of the cabinet, were 
brought into discussions with the A.B.C.B. on the choice of a frequency. 
The station's management wanted it to have good metropolitan coverage 
(hence transmitter power), and a place at the "commercial" end of the 
dial, away from the other A.B.C. stations, so it could make a large 
impact and outlive its initial designation as an "experiment". It was 
the A.B.C.B. however which had suggested that 2JJ should only be experi­
mental, and it proposed that the station be put on a frequency reserved 
for low power transmissions. The power was to be kept down because the 
frequency was reserved for broadcasting in New Zealand, and there was a 
question of interference.
8 Loc.cit.
9 Interview, 21.10.81.
nIn response to this impasse one of the 2JJ people involved did 
some research of his own, and found out that in fact no station in New 
Zealand was actually using the frequency in question - not at least on 
the specifications recognised by the Control Board. Legally, of course, 
that fact presumably would make no difference; yet it did to 2JJ, which, 
however independent, did have patronage from the government. There was 
exasperation on both sides, but the Board eventually had to concede to 
the station's requirements. The station was allowed to broadcast on 
10 kw - medium power.
Wright recalled the episode, in the interview:
The frequencies available to them were only permitted to 
operate on low power, and there was the senseless thing 
with double-jay, you'll remember, ringing New Zealand and 
saying there's no station operating on that power in New 
Zealand; the Control Board's holding it up. There's a 
written signed agreement by Ministers, countries(10) saying 
we'll never use more than this power on that frequency.
So it was an option...Fine, experimental stations are a 
great idea, but then they were allowed...in Melbourne 
the ethnic people (3ZZ) had never been told that this was 
a 6 months experiment, never. And naturally when the 
time came to close it down (11) they were furious, and of 
course 2JJ was Moss Cass's (12) favourite station and 
there was no hope of it being closed down, so they had to 
find another frequency, and eventually FM.
The betrayal of the Board's rather restrictive view of the 2 radio 
stations in question, in fact the quashing in practice of its recommend­
ations, very openly demonstrated the lines of discord that had developed.
If the practical weaknesses of the A.B.C.B. as a "non political" controlling 
agency were in evidence during the years of stability and poor growth, 
they were made blatantly obvious in the new era. This was all the more 
so as pressure mounted on the government, from intimate quarters, to
10 Informant's emphasis.
11 3ZZ survived 2'/x years and was eventually closed on the orders of the 
Fraser government.
12 Dr Moss Cass, Minister for the Environment, and Successor to McClelland 
as Media Minister. See following chapter.
Vdeliver tangible results such as new radio services, and radio that would 
be different in character to that which had existed up till that time.
The appearance of serious confusion in the governmental area, and
some discord, set in with the challenge by Senator James McClelland's 
13
committee to the decision by the A.B.C.B., to put FM on the UHF band.
The story of the committee's second report, questioning the sense of
developing a new receiver technology when more workable options were to
14hand, and its sequel, are well known. The McLean inquiry recommended
the licensing of stations, including public stations, on the VHF radio
band, and a progressive clearing of that band of other users, to
accommodate that process. It went into detail on frequency allocation
in the high use area covering the conurbation. The report of the inquiry
estimated that a large number of channels could be made available (40 or
15more in the conurbation before the end of 1985), whereas the earlier 
report of the A.B.C.B. had maintained that even on UHF, frequencies on 
FM would be limited in supply.“^
The government's acceptance of the McLean report completed the 
overturning of the decision to go to UHF, and was therefore a major 
turning point. It demeaned the A.B.C.B. in the area where it had obtained 
much of its authority, the engineering area. It also checked whatever 
expectations had built up in the Australian electronics industry of an 
infusion of new life. Under the protection of a decision that called 
for independent research and development of UHF equipment, local companies
13 Senate Standing Committee on Education, Science and the Arts.
14 Accounts include those by Dickenson (op.cit.), Bear (op.cit.),
Duffield (op.cit) and M. Long, "Wanted: More Ratbags on Radio" in 
New Journalist, no. 19, Sept.-Oct. 1975.
15 Op.cit., McLean and Renwick, p.30.
p. 87.16 Op.cit., A.B.C.B., Report on FM Broadcasting...,
nmight have held some competitive advantage in the national backyard. 
Imported sets incorporating FM on the "international" VHF band, however, 
were already easily obtainable, at all stages on the price scale.
17The Minister for the Media, who had supported the UHF plan, and
the Media Department were also evident losers. While the McLean inquiry
was still going on, they had published a review of frequency availability
on the AM band, indicating that a possible doubling of the number of
18frequencies was in the offing. This was seen by many including 
19Pockley as a blunt effort to disparage the inquiry, and perhaps divert
it from its apparent course, towards recommending that more frequencies
20be found for radio, by going to the VHF band, for FM.
There were to be more episodes of the kind, in which the 
Department competed for the initiative with other agencies. The overall 
direction of policy was plain - there would be more stations, including 
ones on FM, and that some would be public or access stations of one kind 
or another - but there was a debate over how many stations, of precisely 
what kind, in terms of ownership, control, programming, financing and 
operating conditions; what the timetable might be for installing them, 
and increasingly, who was to be in charge of the whole process.
17 Op.cit., Griffiths, pp.8-12. Qp.cit., Dickenson, Radio Reform, p.7. 
See also the Control Board report on the proposal initially accepted 
by the Minister: A.B.C.B. Report to the Minister for the Media from 
the A.B.C.B. on Current Status of FM Broadcasting Plans, tabled in 
Parliament, 7.6.73.
18 Office of the Minister for the Media, Media release, 19.2.74. The 
last day of hearings for the inquiry was 22.2.74.
19 Interview, 23.12.75.
20 Oswin reports that as Permanent Head of the Media Department it had 
been his idea to have the review made. He had realised the AM band 
was under-utilised, had disagreed that it should be so, and because 
he anticipated that McLean would probe the situation, he "put it 
very strongly" to the government's engineers that more frequencies 
should be found. The announcement of the result of that engineers' 
review was by the Minister. (Interview, 14.1.82)
Pockley recalled the episode of the public radio conference of 
3-6th July, 1974, which produced serious antagonism between the Depart­
ment and the public broadcasting movement. After the State P.B.A. had 
announced plans for the conference, he had been invited to talks at the 
Department's offices, where it was put to him, by senior officers, that 
the proceedings ought to be under the auspices of the government. 
Eventually it was agreed that the form of the gathering should be two 
meetings, or conferences, in sequence, one official and one convened by 
the public broadcasters as planned. It was at this gathering that 
Document J was produced - an internal departmental plan for future 
allocation of FM frequencies, strategically leaked to Graham Williams 
of the Australian while the conference was being held. The reason for 
the delegates' anger over this document was in part that it gave them a 
limited role (they calculated it would provide only half the stations 
indicated in the McLean report). More importantly, it had been in 
existence at the time that Minister McClelland was promising them an
open conference, "so that a true cross section of opinion may be explored
21before recommendations are finalised". A departmental officer had 
told the assembly there was an "open slate" on FM.
Griffiths gives an account of a third episode in which the planning 
proposals of the Department were seen to be more reactive than positive, 
and more limited than they needed to have been. It was to do with a 
request by the Prime Minister to his Priorities Review Staff to prepare 
a report on broadcasting.
The P.R.S. report, presented to Whitlam in August 1974, had been 
wanted, in part, to provide a "definitive set of proposals that would 
cut through inter-departmental and Ministerial conflicts and rivalries 
concerning broadcasting". The report recommended:
21 Office of the Minister for the Media, Media release, 31.5.74.
that the Minister for the Media and the Department of the 
Media be stripped of most powers over broadcasting. At 
the time the report was suppressed (22) and the Minister 
and Department proceeded with their proposals to ensure 
that they retained control over broadcasting. As far as 
the concerned public and the potential public broadcaster 
were concerned, the government was at best indifferent 
and at worst hostile to public broadcasting. This was 
confirmed when the Minister for the Media put the 'grand' 
proposals concerning broadcasting to the government in 
August, 1974. In a letter to the Prime Minister, Senator 
McClelland proposed further A.B.C. stations, licensing a 
few public broadcasting stations, commercial FM stations, 
the appointment of an advisory committee responsible to 
him and finally, Department of the Media control of radio. 
The proposals were in direct confrontation with the 
recommendations of the Priorities Review Staff.(23)
In some areas adjacent to the Ministry, as well as outside of the
24government, the McLean report had brought jubilation. Evans says that 
opposition to the A.B.C.B. recommendations of 1972 had been keenly 
felt ever since the Senate Standing Committee, charged with inquiring 
into "all aspects of radio and television", had begun to probe its 
assumptions. As Secretary of that committee, Evans himself and the story 
of his involvement in the events that followed, represent the kind of 
elements that were opposing themselves to the Ministry/Department 
positions.
He had been living previously in America and had been impressed by 
the public radio movement there. Not liking the experience of "being 
shouted at by commercial radio", he had been wanting to know why there 
were not the same alternatives to it as in the United States, where 
there was also, "in a lot of respects a liberality of thought, which was
22 It was on sale to the public in 1975.
23 Qp.cit., Griffiths, pp.12-13.
24 Dr Geoff Evans, Principal Private Secretary to Senator J. Button, 
Leader of the Opposition in the Senate. Formerly Principal Private 
Secretary to the Minister for the Media (Cass), and Secretary to the 
Senate Standing Committee on Education, Science and the Arts 
(Chairman, J. McClelland).
good". As by training he was an applied physicist, he had "not been 
daunted by the technical aspects of the Board's report", and, he said, 
"the more I looked at it, on the engineering side, the more I thought 
it was shonky. I mean they had not tied up the loose ends". Further­
more, in its social considerations, he had found it unfairly patronising 
towards the idea of public broadcasting, and ultimately "offensive",
where it had dismissed the idea of independent fine music stations as
25
"waste of a frequency".
The offending part of the report, mainly, was clause 363 in the 
conclusions section of it:
Some evidence was given to suggest to the Board that at least 
some of the minority groups would have prospects of financing 
adequately a modest FM broadcasting station operation.
However, on the evidence, any such station would operate for 
limited hours, on low power, and such an operation could be 
considered a waste of a frequency which, even on channels on 
the UHF band, will, as noted earlier in this report, be limited 
in supply. It would, in effect, represent the granting of a 
frequency to a special group for its individual use. (26)
Evans and others of a like disposition, who wanted to see results, 
were sceptical as to whether the government would move quickly enough 
on the opening of stations, in line with the McLean prescriptions. It 
was a sign of the times, and of expectations encouraged by bold govern­
ment moves in other areas, that people were impatient after a few months.
This scepticism had grounds, as we have seen, in the more limited 
view of things taken by officers in the Department. The Department's 
Radio section, at this stage, was persisting with plans for such under­
takings as government-owned community stations, which would hire out 
facilities and air-time to groups of broadcasters - a concept the public
25 Interview with the writer, 16.2.82.
26 A.B.C.B. Report on FM Broadcasting..., p.87.
27 Griffiths talks of the promise of quick action not being fulfilled 
and complains that "over the next few months, nothing happened, 
publicly at least". Op.cit., p.10.
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broadcasting lobby generally rejected. In the event separate strands
of activity in the offices of government each began to work separately,
and as often as not in competition, towards their own outcomes.
There was first of all the Prime Minister's office, where certain
28officers including Spigelman had perceived there was a problem in
broadcasting, and scope for different policy initiatives. Amid the
sentiment in government circles that firm action was unlikely to be
forthcoming, from the Department, on the McLean recommendations, the
Priorities Review Staff was commissioned to investigate. Evans, who had
made contacts in the Music Broadcasting Societies and believed strongly
in their case, had written a paper on how some stations could be got to
air straight away. Drawing on his researches for the Senate Standing
Committee, he suggested the Wireless Telegraphy Act (WT Act) could be
29
used for licensing broadcasting stations, as an extension of what had 
been done with VL5UV in Adelaide. That station - one of 8 off-band
stations putting out educational or professional services - had very
. . . .  . . .  30specific limitations such as a ban on music, written into its licence ;
but the principle existed that a station might be put to air, provided
it was deemed "experimental", or was set aside for a special purpose,
like education. The second proposition was that certain areas of the
VHF radio band, as for instance the space between television channels
3 and 4, were already clear, and could accommodate a few stations. His
paper "put two and two together".
Through some acquaintances in the office of Cass, the proposal
was given to that Minister who took it to a caucus committee of the
Labor Party, for discussion. Evans says that from that point it was
28 Dr J. Spigelman, later Permanent Head of the Media Department (under 
Cass).
29 Instead of the Hand TV Act, normally used for non-A.B.C. (i.e. 
Commercial) stations. The B and TV Act had no provision for public 
licences, and in view of the position taken by the Senate Opposition, 
could not be changed in that direction.
30 Op.cit., Duffield, p.30.
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picked up by the Minister, McClelland, and found its way into his August 
cabinet submission, which was discussed by the cabinet on 23rd September 
1974.
Also included in that submission from McClelland was a proposal 
he had obtained in form from the A.B.C.B. - the proposal for 2 experi­
mental stations for the A.B.C., which gave rise to 2JJ and 3ZZ, The 
Board suggested that stand-by transmitters for the A.B.C. network 
stations in Sydney and Melbourne could be used, for a fixed period, to 
try out some new ideas. Wright recollected the move as a response to 
pressure:
We put them up as experiments. McClelland was Minister at 
the time and he said he was having difficulty with not 
only the opposition but with members of his own party, in 
what public access radio might be like or about. We said 
stand-by transmitters of the A.B.C. were only used for very 
brief periods each year. Let's set up a 6 months 
experiment to see what access could be. Without discussing 
it properly with anybody... that idea got rushed to cabinet 
and approved.(31)
Cabinet that day also authorised the offer of licences under the
WT Act to the Music Broadcasting Societies in Sydney and Melbourne, for
2MBS-FM and 3MBS-FM, on unoccupied segments of the VHF radio band. It
was decided also to liberalise the standards applied to VL5uV so it
could function as a general broadcast station, as 5UV, on the band proper,
at better power, and with a wider program charter. The question of
32who should control public broadcasting was deferred.
The point of this recapitulation of events is to show differences 
between the situation, and the state of affairs that had existed for 2 
decades previously. In the decisional area, new institutions, including 
the Media Department itself and the Media portfolio (taking over 
broadcasting from the P.M.G.), and new personalities, as a group committed
31 Interview, 21.10.81.
32 Op.cit., Griffiths, p.13.
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to reform of one kind or another, were sorting out how things might be 
regulated. Several points amenable to pressure would exist in the 
situation in the meantime, and there were opportunities for policy 
initiatives to be tried out, or tried on, at many levels.
The cabinet and Prime Minister appear to have functioned as points 
of referral, which is conventional where matters were to be sorted out 
to some degree, and given an imprimatur for action upon which all might 
agree. In this light the Prime Minister's office could be seen as 
intervening, to make an assessment in the interest of the government as 
a whole, when the P.R.S. was put to work on broadcasting policy. The 
cabinet, however, was evidently not so much arbitrating among contending 
options, as doing brokerage among factions, when it produced its 
decisions of 27.9.74. Substantial issues were left unresolved, but 
parties which had got certain proposals up for consideration, were able 
to get something out of the proceedings in the form of action.
(The referral of very salient matters to a forum where the Prime 
Minister would be involved in the settlement took another form at the 
A.L.P. federal conference at Terrigal, early in the following year. A 
report from the Media Policy Committee, described by journalist Peter 
Manning as a "step in the left direction" was reviewed by the committee 
with Whitlam, over lunch. The four-hour meeting, as related to Manning 
by one or more persons who were there, was reported in the New Journalist. 
In the course of the "long lunch", the reporter says, the committee 
report was amended on three points, to do with the Australian Film 
Commission, staff representation on the A.B.C., and the A.B.C.B. On 
the latter, it was agreed to use the A.B.C.B. for licensing of public 
radio stations, but only through augmentation of the Board and formation 
of a special division of it to handle the job. In a word, "the report 
went through the compromise grinder... The atmosphere was not one of
f o f
conflict, it was cordial, affable, if sometimes broken by strong, loud 
words from the patients as Chief Dentist Whitlam and others extracted 
the most sensitive teeth from the committee's set of policies". 
Delegates to the conference then received the amended report, replacing 
earlier copies that had been distributed. There was some indignation, 
and from the floor, they put through a new policy plank, to ban
commercial broadcasters from FM, which stayed on the books for two
33years.)
As outputs, the set of decisions on the new stations were seen
very differently by different parties, depending on their interests - an
issue to be dealt with in the next chapter. It was far from satisfactory
to all, as it was so limited, but it was an answer to the call for more
station frequencies, which had been one of the most strategic goals. As
that goal was seen by McLean, in relation to the supply of more AM
frequencies: "What was wanted was more radio, and how this was achieved
(so long as it was technically satisfactory, and able to present the
34
programmes they needed) was not a particular concern of theirs".
The "they" referred to were of course the public broadcasters, a 
few of whom now had their licences, but the interest group we are speaking 
of was much broader. At large it was amorphous, capable of definition 
only as those who perceived some gain from the change, and showed they 
had demanded it (or would demand that it continue) in some way. We 
could include here the people who subscribed to 2MBS, or attended 
concerts put on by 2JJ, or joined program groups working at 3ZZ, as 
being members of a new formation in the demand patterns of the political 
system.
33 P. Manning, "Now You See It, Now You Don't" in New Journalist, no. 14, 
March 1975.
34 Op.cit., McLean and Renwick, p.2.
More specifically, we should acknowledge the articulate pressure 
groups taking advantage of the relative openness, unpredictability and 
flexible goals of the decision-making apparatus, since the election of 
the Labor government.
These can perhaps best be categorised in terms of the kinds of 
interest they represented:
- Groups from the established clientele of the system of the
preceding 20 years, especially the commercial broadcasters, reacted
predictably enough to the opening of stations on a new band that was
35still closed to them. The commercial operators protested that as a 
major repository of experience in broadcasting, their expertise was 
being wasted through being overlooked, and that small public operations 
would mostly be "narrowcasting" - thereby wasting frequency space. That 
campaign was to grow hostile. It could be comprehended mostly in terms 
of the industry's perception of a direct threat to material interests - 
loss of audiences, hence loss of revenue.
- The public broadcasting movement, consisting mostly of groups 
wanting to set up stations, could be defined as similarly looking out 
for an available material goal. The sophisticated lobbying and adroit 
engineering work of the Sydney M.B.S., for example, was no doubt being 
committed, in the minds of the members, in the service of high values 
to do with music and advancement of the culture. But the thrust of the 
group's activity had to be pragmatic and concerned with getting money, 
equipment, a frequency and a licence.
35 Before the opportunity presented to them, and passed up, in the 1950s, 
the commercial operators had been barred from FM by the broadcasting 
legislation of the Chifley government. The provision was later 
quashed through amendments, under Menzies. The new Labor government, 
in 1973 and 1974, was indicating in effect that it would review the 
ban. It formally embraced it as policy, once more, in 1975.
- People with an ideological concern with broadcasting formed a
third group, overlapping with the bulk of the public broadcasters, in
the second. Griffiths and his colleagues in the Alternative Radio
Association in Melbourne, for instance, drew a distinction between the
establishment of public broadcasting stations, and the démocratisation
of radio. "The first is concerned with the acquisition and the transfer
of power. The second is concerned with the nature and transformation 
3 6of power." Sydney's Fairfield Radio Group wanted a local co-operative 
running an access station, as a "form of communication which can provide 
social and cultural cohesiveness in our community". They quoted 
Brecht:
Radio could be the most wonderful means of communication 
imagineable in public life, a huge linked system - that 
is to say, it would be if it were capable not only of 
transmitting but of receiving, and allowing listeners not 
only to hear, but to speak, and did not isolate them but 
brought them back into contact.(37)
- Finally there were others who were as active as the candidate 
broadcasters without tying their activities to proposals for setting up 
a station, and as determined as ideologues, without engaging much in 
visionary speculation. There were those like Evans, whose case has been 
discussed, who felt strongly that life would be better if the broad­
casting media were pluralised; Labor Party members wanting to see better 
counter-weights to the dominance of the mass-audience commercial 
channels, and looking to public radio as a way for private citizens to 
take part in the ideas trade are included here; and then there were those 
like the journalists who brought out an edition of the New Journalist,
detailing and analysing the shortcomings of the Media Minister and his 
38
Department.
36 P. Griffiths in Video Access News, vol. 1, no. 4, November 1975, p.2.
37 Fairfield Video Centre, Sydney, Fairfield Radio (brochure).
38 New Journalist, 4.5.74. See "The Real Mediocre Man", "Nothing to 
Report", and "U.S. Agency Gets the Cake".
Of these categories of people, only the first, the "established" 
set consisting mainly of the commercial broadcasters, had any history to 
speak of as broadcasting lobbyists. As for the other groups, it is sign­
ificant that they were highly active, as they provided a new clientele 
for broadcasting policy-makers, and a clientele which could claim to 
represent a broad public interest. Whereas for 20 years public demand 
could be seen to be lacking, something that could be classed as public 
demand was now present, its goals and motivation could not be ascribed 
to material self-seeking, and it could not be ignored. What it lacked 
in numbers of supporters at the beginning was made up for a lot in 
persistence and volubility.
There were 2 other significant events to mention: first, this 
movement or party, while mainly concerned with making demands, had 
penetrated the decisional areas, with contacts established and repres­
entatives placed at different points in the networks and offices of the 
government. Secondly, it was hostile to the kind of policy and policy­
making style of the Minister and Department.
Concerning that last important point, it's been shown earlier that 
educational, cultural movements, or changing value patterns - as part of 
resources generally - nurture new demands on the system. In the case in 
point, such demand was slow to materialise and manifest itself, when 
confronted with the effectively "closed" system of decision-making used 
in broadcasting in the preceding era. The main issues grappled with had 
been grappled with some time ago, and were largely resolved; the actors 
in the system were a restricted group with shared values and understand­
ings, and there were few real inroads or points to apply pressure, 
available to the outsider. However things had changed; the field of 
radio policy-making had become much less simple in the space of 10 years, 
and the new stirrings among the outside public were a sign of that.
McClelland had recognised the major blocks he would be working 
with - the large television chains in particular - when making appoint­
ments to his new department in 1973. That was in fact to be one of the 
sore points aggravating his relations with public broadcasters and 
others of the new clientele. It was argued also that the Minister was 
out of date. He had geared his thoughts to the time of his service on 
the Vincent Committee in the 1960s, pursuing links with the media unions 
and commissioning new initiatives like the points system, which was used 
for a while, to boost Australian content in programs - a kind of 
commercial protectionism for the media workforce, with potentially 
laudable cultural spin-offs.
That line of policy provided the Minister, and government, with a
separate and friendly clientele (it was a feature of the Labor Party
at the time that show business figures would appear at its rallies and
lobby the delegates to its conferences). However that was not enough to
satisfy others taking an interest in proceedings, who were concerned as
well that commercial power remained unbalanced in the counsels of the
government. The Minister's senior appointments have been referred to as
an instance, and the following quotation from the New Journalist, is
indicative of the response that came from those vocal lobby groups,
outside among the public, but knowledgeable, and quite often with one
foot inside the door of the policy-making household.
The problem has been that McClelland1s style gets the better 
of him. When in doubt, consult. McClelland is a nice guy. 
Duckmanton, Myles Wright, Arthur Cowan, they're all nice 
guys. Why not be nice guys together?...That same kind of 
weakness seems to have infected him when choosing his top 
brass. Not one fiery radical snapped up (compare Whitlam's 
use of Jim Spigelman, Paddy McGuinness and others...). Instead 
the General Manager of Channel 7 became Permanent Head; the 
station manager of Channel 10 (Sydney), Bob Lord, took up the 
crucial First Assistant Secretary Post of the broadcasting and 
film division of the Department; under Lord went the A.B.C's 
Education supervisor, Jeff Rushton, as head of the radio branch 
of that division, and Ken Sievers, former Media Director of
an advertising agency as head of the television branch.
So that fixes that, doesn't it? Add to that list the 
fact that McClelland has almost completely re-appointed 
the Broadcasting Control Board with managers and owners 
of commercial television and radio stations; added bête 
noir of the film radicals Jack Neary as deputy chairman, 
and, as token effort, included Harold Souter from the 
A.C.T.U. in his declining days, and you get the picture. (39)
The story of the appointments, and the tone of that reaction to 
them, which was far from an isolated one, are indicative of the problems 
that had set in between the government, and significant elements in the 
ranks of its supporters. Competing groups within the decisional appar­
atus, confusion over priorities, piecemeal initiatives, and an increas­
ingly common verdict being passed on the Department as fumbling and 
reactive, led to the big changes of 1975.
39 Ibid., p.9.
Section 3: Chapter 3
UNDER CASS AS MINISTER FOR THE MEDIA
#08
The cabinet reshuffle of June 1975 was especially dramatic as it 
affected the Media Department, and had a dramatic sequel as the new 
administration made its "rapid push for piecemeal reform".
A need for a general clearing out and speeding up had been per­
ceived in many quarters, especially within the government - a reform 
government by then plagued with a sense that time was running out for it.
The highly critical P.R.S. report, with its emphasis on the "negativism
2
of current attitudes to programme regulation" undoubtedly contributed 
to the decision to make some radical changes.
The Media Department itself, under McClelland, was seen to be a 
liability. It was not delivering such required results as a diversi­
fication in broadcasting, without the greatest urging and pressure. In 
the contentiousness among the various pressure groups and government 
offices, the department's interest frequently lay with the status quo.
Griffiths, for instance, writing on the senior officer appointments, 
says that "Quite predictably, in the course of time, the Minister, 
the Department and the Board developed a mutually reinforcing 
philosophical conservatism. There were, of course, disagreements and 
conflicts between the Department and the Board, but the dispute 
concerned who developed policy, who influenced the government and who 
regulated broadcasting. The rivalry was incidental to the compatible 
and complementary conservatism...Advocates of public broadcasting found
themselves opposed not only by the traditional 'enemy', the Board, but
3
by their new 'friend', the Department".
The resentment felt over appointments to the Department, and the 
assumed closeness of the bureaucracy to the commercial organisations
1 Op.cit., Dickenson, Radio Reform, p.2.
2 Op.cit., Armstrong, Broadcasting Law and Policy..., p.44.
3 Op.cit., Griffiths, pp.6-7.
was not assuaged by the public attacks being made on it by those same 
organisations. Oswin recalls that the commercial operators and the 
newspaper companies, quite apart from any particular actions the govern­
ment might take, were suspicious of the fact of a "media" department.
They thought the name signified controls, and the "Department became a 
4
whipping post".
Westerway summed up much of the situation that had developed by 
mid-1975:
[Question] There was a certain amount of instability in 
the system.
Yes. Disequilibrium is better. When the Board was set up 
in 1949 it was a major step forward because it put planning 
and broadcasting [regulation] in one place. In the 20 
years or so after that it gradually I think ossified and 
became quite narrow in its viewpoint...You have to cast 
your mind back to the kind of society you're dealing with; 
one where it was part of the broadcasting standards that 
you couldn't broadcast foreign languages for more than 2£% 
of your output...
With the change in government, in 1973, all the pent-up 
demands of the last 30 years suddenly hit everybody - 
politicians and planners, public servants alike, and of 
course broadcasters who'd grown used to a system like that.
In radio, which was the most conspicuous example, since 
the 1930's there had not been a licence issued in any 
metropolitan city, and all of a sudden all these pressures 
were on the new government's plate, and it wanted to do 
something about it...They'd said things in general terms.
They wanted to deliver. (5)
The process of delivery had come to be perceived in the government 
as seized up and hopeless. The changes that were needed were of the 
order that the Prime Minister should attend to. In the cabinet reshuffle 
of 1975, he removed McClelland to the portfolio of Administrative 
Services, and in a concurrent step agreed to the appointment of Spigelman 
as Permanent Head of the Department of the Media. (Oswin went to the 
new post of Ambassador to U.N.E.S.C.0.)
Cass, who had shown an interest in getting things moving in
4 Interview, 14.1.82.
5 Interview, 27.1.82.
broadcasting, and as we have seen had helped in earlier moves to by-pass 
the Media Minister, became the new Minister. Spigelman was widely quoted 
after that as saying that he'd become the "only Permanent Head to name 
his own Minister".^ Evans was appointed Principal Private Secretary to 
the Minister, and the victory of the opposition within the government 
seemed complete.
This sweeping manoeuvre led to several initiatives including, in
relation to FM, the licensing of the 12 public radio stations based on
7
educational institutions, and attempts to put 2JJ on FM, in both Sydney 
and Melbourne. The five month period under the new Ministry became 
high season for the "ad-hocracy" and "politicisation" reviled by the 
commercial broadcasters, though if the tree is to be judged by its fnuit, 
it materially advanced the cause of public radio, and opening of the 
bands.
The fait accompli of the 12 new stations could not have been 
achieved had Cass not been prepared to act in an expedient way. As it 
was, the fact of the 12 stations coming on the band was accepted by the 
Liberal-N.C.P. government in the following year. In other ways the 
decision to offer the licences came to shape public broadcasting in 
general.
It created pressure for a timetable, for instance. With 15 stations 
licensed, there was pressure intrinsic to the situation, to fill out the 
system with more dots on the map. The type of station had been defined 
as well. The stations would generally follow the American model. Station 
operators would own and run them as independent small enterprises,
5 Evans, 16.2.82.
7 Cass in fact only had time for the first step of licensing, the offer 
of licences to the institutions. The new government, first as 
caretaker Ministry then after the 1975 elections, issued the actual 
licences.
putting paid to such ideas as the government-owned places considered for 
a time by Department and Board. The third ingredient established in 
this way was that the stations would be run, in a lot of cases, by 
"established" bodies with uncontroversial goals.
On that point it should be acknowledged that the decision was more 
by default than design. Not many proposers with blueprints for a 
radical station, and money for it, were readily to hand, able to act in 
the way that the educational institutions were. Most of these had been
g
inquiring about broadcasting for some time, and with their buildings,
staff and organisation were able to meet the Minister's imperative, that
stationsshould be got to air without much further delay. The issue of
the uncontroversial character of public broadcasting will come up again
9in the later chapters.
At the end of 1975, there was enough satisfaction with progress
made for Pockley to sum it up as follows:
The important political fact is that public broadcasting 
can no longer be characterised as 'ratbag radio' as some 
of its critics have averred. Even though we must be left 
gasping at the extraordinary processes of decision-making 
involved, and many would say that other kinds of public 
broadcasting should have been encouraged with licences 
first, the new licences will be flag carriers for respons­
ible (and responsive) public radio.(10)
There was to be considerable debate over the use of the WT Act for 
licensing the new stations. The Control Board actively resisted, putting 
forward the view that the licences should be issued under the B and T
8 According to Evans who handled such inquiries during the sittings of 
the Senate Standing Committee.
9 Section 4, Chapter
10 P. Pockley in Broadcasting Australia, vol. 1, no. 3, October 1975, 
P.B.A.A., p.l.
Act, through a public hearing of the Board. 11
In its annual report, the Board said it had "indicated to the
Minister that while frequencies could be made available, and the Board
had no objection to educational broadcasting, it was undesirable from
the point of view of total spectrum planning, to make ad hoc developments
of this nature". The Minister had indicated that he still wanted to
proceed with the licensings; the Board had then asked him to give it a
formal directive to issue the frequencies; he had done so, and the
12frequencies had been issued.
The applicability of the WT Act to a purpose as general as public
13radio was questioned repeatedly. The Postmaster General, Bishop, was
14concerned about its legality and obtained a legal opinion, which he
15received m  the first week of November. The document pointed out that 
the WT Act excluded from its control all matters covered by the B and T 
Act. It accepted that the specialised programs of the foreign language 
stations 2EA and 3EA (opened in 1975 with WT Act licences), and the 
educational material on 5UV, might be sufficiently limiting to qualify 
them to continue to operate legally under the former Act. However there 
was doubt whether the same could be said of the fine music played on
11 The year before a way had been found around the wording of the Act, 
for the licensing of 2CT and 3CR, using the stratagem of classing 
them as "restricted commercial" stations. They were in effect public 
stations limited to sponsorship announcements with no spot advert­
ising allowed. They were owned by community groups, and broadcast on 
low power. Their inception was bound up with moves by McClelland and 
his officers, somewhat under siege, to keep the initiative in the 
public radio field. The scheme was not very popular and no further 
licences of the kind were issued.
12 A.B.C.B. 28th Annual Report - Year ended 30 June, 1976, Canberra,
Aust. Govt Publishing Service, 1976, p.198.
13 Senator R. Bishop.
14 From C.W. Harders, Secretary of the Attorney General's Department.
15 A copy was given to the writer by an officer of the Media Department.
2MBS and 3MBS. It could give no guarantee that any of the propositions 
it put forward would survive a court challenge. Cass had read the 
opinion optimistically: "I understand that the opinion was as long as 
the purpose for which the license was issued under the WT Act was 
experimental, and for a specific sort of purpose, such as for example 
ethnic communities... it was perfectly legitimate"."^
Armstrong treats the question of the issue of WT Act licences, 
for programs available to the general public, as unresolved. He notes 
that the B and T Act was "often very broadly interpreted as meaning that 
no broadcasting station licence may be granted under the WT Act...it 
is possible, however, to infer from the B and T Act prohibited purposes 
for which licences might be granted under the WT Act". In conclusion, 
"this issue is an important one because of the role which the licensing 
scheme of the B and T Act plays in protecting existing interests from
17
competition and in delaying the introduction of new kinds of service".
18Harding says use of the WT Act, though "certainly a highly unorthodox
procedure" which had never previously been used for ordinary broadcasting
19
purposes, was "strictly speaking quite legal".
Wright's response to the welter of activity originating at the
Minister's office was that it was unplanned and likely to be less
productive in the end than what otherwise might have been.
There'd been an absolute planning vacuum from the time the 
Media Department was established under the Whitlam 
government. Plans left us and just disappeared because 
there was something else between us and the Minister, and of 
course they had to make their.. .bureaucratic system. So when 
there was a change both of the Head of the Media Department
16 Interview with the writer, 28.11.75. Also on New Society, A.B.C. 
radio, 9.12.75 (transcript).
17 Qp.cit., Armstrong* Broadcasting Law and Policy..., p.4.
18 Prof. Richard Harding, Professor of Law, University of Western 
Australia.
19 R. Harding, Outside Interference: The Politics of Australian 
Broadcasting, Melbourne, Sun, 1979, p.27.
and of the Minister, there was a determination to do 
something very quickly, and they decided the quickest 
way to do that was to by-pass all the procedures, which 
I think was a great mistake, and an unnecessarily 
foolish mistake because the delay wouldn't have come in 
Control Board hearings. The report into what led to 
the licensing of 3CR in Melbourne; the system proposed 
in that [should have] been followed...Special licences 
under the ordinary Act, and called in categories...Of 
course they have gone for categories since, but a good 
deal later.
As for criticism of the Board from the public radio movement and
others, "There's a tremendous amount of hindsight in all the criticism
now. Where were all these people who've started talking about FM
broadcasting at the time our FM inquiry came in? Where were they in
20
the 1960s? Why weren't they banging on our doors then?" And e J s * W h e r £ f
on the Board's own report on FM and the proposal for UHF. "If it had
been acted upon when the McMahon government received it in 1972 we would
21
now have a thriving FM broadcasting service."
The commercial broadcasters were similarly aggrieved by the
unceremonious opening of new stations, done without inquiry or delay.
In particular, 2JJ was seen as a challenge to hegemony in a lucrative
market, and the FM stations were symbolic insults as they'd opened the
band without a commercial presence.
But the fears ran still deeper and were expressed in very general
terms, with reference to policy affecting all media, in 1974, when
legislation was prepared to clarify the Board's power for making rules
and standards. The move was received with a torrent of abuse from the
22
commercial mass media, and the television lobby, F.A.C.T.S., promised
20 Interview, 21.10.81.
21 Myles Wright, "FM Broadcasting: A Matter of Clearing the Air", in 
Media Opinion, The Age, Melbourne, 4.4.78. That opinion was doubted 
by J. McClelland and by McLean in their respective reports, looking 
at the time scale and costs involved in developing a new receiver 
technology for UHF, in Australia.
22 Op.cit., Armstrong, "The Broadcasting and Television Act...", p.138.
that every commercial station would stop normal programs simultaneously
23
to carry an attack on the Bill, if it was not dropped. (The Bill was 
defeated in the Senate.)
There were some rational grounds for commercial anxiety. Labor
parliamentarians had spoken in the past about withdrawal of the third
commercial television licence in the major capital cities, to provide
24
for an educational station; A.L.P. members of the Gibson Committee on
broadcasting, in the 1940s, it was remembered, had declared for
25
"nationalisation" of all radio , and there was recurrent talk of a 
national newspaper, funded by the government.
On balance however the campaign put up by the commercial lobby was 
irrational and built on exaggeration. Two sets of arguments were put 
forward, each respectable enough in its own right, but over-done. The 
first was libertarian (individual rights of free speech must be protected; 
corporate rights are analagous with those, and essential to being able 
to guarantee the former). The second set of arguments was about planning. 
If the government hurried and took piecemeal action it would probably 
create an unbalanced system (with perhaps too many of the kinds of 
stations favoured by its members and friends), and use the frequency 
spectrum wastefully.
Rushton recalls for example that commercial broadcasters had felt 
relieved after publication of the McLean report, specifically because 
its recommendations were for a controlled clearing of the band and
23 Op.cit., Armstrong, Broadcasting Law and Policy..., p.43.
24 There was support for this proposal elsewhere. It was included in 
a report to the government by the A.B.C.B. in April, 1976. That 
report said all four of the "fourth" channels (in Melbourne, Sydney, 
Adelaide and Brisbane) should be closed, as a way to improve 
program standards, through better profitability. See Peter Bowers, 
"Call to Drop One TV Channel in Sydney", in Sydney Morning Herald, 
Sydney, 28.4.76.
25 Op.cit., Armstrong, Broadcasting Law and Policy..., p.37.
Hi
allocation of frequencies. If followed, it would guarantee them a place,
and above all, its recommendations would take time to fulfil. It would
rule out any peremptory rush. "The McLean inquiry ended a lot of fears.
26
It demonstrated there could not be an overnight burst, an explosion."
Signs of an "explosion" under Cass had caused an intensification of
criticism from that quarter. At the F.A.C.B. annual convention in
27
Canberra, in October 1975, Craig told the delegates: "Policies are
being implemented with undue haste, without the necessary planning and
proper examination of public needs, and on an ad hoc basis based on
28
political considerations". FM broadcasting would only be meeting the
needs of major audiences if commercial stations were included, and
public radio, "nurtured into existence by elitist groups, academics and
politicians...did not justify the claim that an FM system had been
introduced".
29
Hynes put the attitude more strongly yet:
There has never been a year, in the history of the industry, 
that was so chaotic, so confused and confusing, or so 
menacing to our survival. Never has there been a time when 
the administration of broadcasting has been as aimless, so 
changeable, so expedient and so irresponsible...Our 
[objective has been] to combat the unplanned, uncontrolled 
proliferation of radio stations without any thought of the 
consequences that we feared would take place...(30)
In his series of late moves, Cass was hampered by budget restraints
(the Media Department's allocation for public radio had been cancelled),
but was able to give a power up-grading to the 2 ethnic stations, and
26 Interview, 21.1.82.
27 Mr Don Craig, President of F.A.C.B., later F.A.R.B.
28 B and T - Advertising, Marketing and Media Weekly, Sydney, 6.10.75,
p. 2.
29 Sir Lincoln Hynes, Chairman of the Government Relations Committee of 
the F.A.C.B.
pp.6-7.30 Op.cit., B and T ...,
made some preliminary plans with the A.B.C. both for a second regional 
network, and for community stations to be run by the A.B.C. Author­
isation was given for the inauguration of the ABC-FM network as well, 
which commenced transmission with 4 stations at 26.1.76. Test 
transmissions were sanctioned for public radio groups wanting to start 
low-powered suburban stations in the big cities.
(The fate of these small stations suggests what might have happened 
to metropolitan services if the first 17 had not been put to air on an 
"ad hoc" basis. The local stations stayed on the drawing board more than
6 years. There were many test days, when specimen programs were broad- 
31cast, until these were stopped after a few years at the instruction
of the Communications Department. It was announced early in 1982 that
9 local stations would be licensed in Sydney, and depending on their
32success, others might follow in the other major cities.)
Cass also formed a working party on public broadcasting, made up
of broadcasters and others interested in the public stations, to make an
33inquiry of short duration and lay down future lines of development.
It reported in October, sketching out a pluralistic system, governed by 
2 statutory bodies, one to conduct licence hearings and the other to 
regulate broad standards. In the future, there would be a public record 
kept of available frequency space, and the licensing authority would 
have user representation. The working party also suggested an extension 
of the "experimental" phase of broadcasting, using the WT Act, until 
major changes could be got through parliament.
31 See for one example the Radio Eastern Suburbs program for 13.4.77 
given as Appendix A.
32 "Suburban Radio Comes to Sydney", in Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, 
15.2.82.
33 Public Broadcasting: Report to the Minister for the Media by The 
Working Party on Broadcasting, Canberra, A.G.P.S., 1975.
The report came too late to affect government action and ran into
criticism from different directions, because, it was said, its
"membership and duration indicated a blatant pragmatism that was designed
34to develop a rationalisation for fait accomplis". It synthesised many 
of the ideas about the uses of FM which had been canvassed in the 
preceding years, and foreshadowed later thinking in the bureaucracy and 
the political arena, on licensing and controls.
34 Op.cit., Griffiths, p.15.
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Section 3; Chapter 4
UNDER ROBINSON AS MINISTER FOR 
POST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
The Situation at the Beginning of 1976, 
and General Lines of Government Action
"Extraordinary decision-making processes" and "disequilibrium" were 
general perceptions of the way things had been going, but there was a 
clear direction to the changes which had been made, and the changes them­
selves, as has been said, were influential. Cass had always rejected the 
charge of ad hocery in particular, as on the question of the 12 college 
licences:
It wasn't ad hoc and unplanned. I knew damned well what I 
was doing. I was seeking as many outlets as possible for 
a diverse range of points of view, and to allow the educ­
ational institutions to get into the act...I see no reason 
why we should be deprived of such things as in America, for 
instance, where you've got dozens of stations expressing 
all sorts of views, and a lot of them publicly funded.(1)
The thrust of the reforms had been a redistribution of resources
within a growing fraternity of broadcasters. New program-makers got
licences. The result would be more choice for listeners generally.
Nothing was taken away from the A.B.C. or the commercial broadcasters,
but the latter, through their public campaigns, had shown that the opening
of several alternatives to their own was felt as a loss and a threat.
The issue may not for its own sake have generated much emotion, as in their
considered statements all parties acknowledged that public radio had a
rightful place, especially on the new FM band. However the "re-weighting"
of parties in the d&and pattern was provocative to the beneficiaries of
earlier times. Increasingly the outsiders of those times were being
listened to; getting what they wanted in terms of new radio stations, and
also being enabled to demonstrate their views as to what the future
ought to hold for the system as a whole. Under Cass, the tendency was
enforced by the more overt by-passing of settled procedures, thus bringing
new people into decision-making counsels, and devaluing old contacts.
1 Interview with Tony Walker on 2JJ/2JJJ-FM, 16.1.81 (transcript).
/»/
Over time the concern of commercial broadcasters, and conservative
opinion generally may have been assuaged by the implementation of a more
orderly structure to regulate future growth and the conduct of daily
business. Westerway makes clear that the department had been working
steadily towards the design of such a scheme; a process which in fact led
2
to the Green inquiry. There was unambiguous support for a more "hands 
off" approach in the Labor Party as well as on the right, as evidenced by 
the report of the Working Party, calling for new bodies to handle standards 
and licensing. Both it and the Terrigal conference had supported the 
principle of open licencing hearings.
The change of government signalled that a third shift in relation­
ships and policies was to occur in a three-year period. New anxieties 
developed. Would removal of the patron mean the rout of the supporters 
of more diversified broadcasting; reaction; privileged access for the 
older client groups who had been sent to the back of the class by Labor? 
Some observers thought that just as the "apolitical" agency of the 
A.B.C.B. had been by-passed, for the political acts entailed in a basic 
decision to expand the system, and expand it in new directions, so there 
would be direct political action by the Minister now, to suit the 
requirements of the new government. He might begin closing down stations, 
for example.
One enormous factor in the background dampened down those fears, 
and that was the pressure exerted by the general social milieu for the 
kind of change that had been going on. The new FM stations had undeniably 
affected expectations among consumers. Studies of set penetration showed 
there was a large number of households with FM radios, and that sales had
2 Interview, 27.1.82.
grown recently. Growth of FM and continuation of public radio were
effectively bipartisan issues, and the points of difference among the
parties were not properly known.
Law says this was a point he had had to make to some of his
confreres and consoeurs at the P.B.A.A. at the start of 1976:
A number of our people, prominent people, around the 
Christmas period, were sort of clapping their hands to 
their brows and saying 'It's all done, it's all finished, 
we shan't get any further, what's been put there will be 
torn down', and a few of us sort of went around meta­
phorically blipping these people on the head and saying 
'For Christ's sake shut up'. This sort of statement is 
often a self-fulfilling prophecy. People more often than 
not, unless there's some particular reason why they should 
do otherwise, will behave as they think people expect them 
to behave. I don't think the Fraser government had 
broadcasting as one of the things upper-most in its mind, 
at that time. If instead of throwing yourself around you 
form up to the nearest Minister or bureaucrat and say 'Well 
now, about those licences that were promised...', the 
chances are you'll be taken at face value.(4)
On specific matters, apart from the licensing of the 12 new stations 
(seme licences were signed by the caretaker Minister, the rest by 
Robinson), the incoming government had committed itself to commercial FM 
and to continued public broadcasting in some form. There was a question 
mark over the future of 2JJ and 3ZZ, as technically, each could be closed 
down by administrative fiat. Of the public radio groups who considered 
themselves in for a risky time, student bodies were to have their 
apprehensions largely validated. Other applicants, both public and
3
3 There have been several surveys indicating strong growth in set
penetration, since 1974, sluggish only in the area of car radios. For 
some of the figures see the following:
A.B.C. Audience Research, A Qualitative Research Project: FM Radio, 
75:09, June 1975.
A.B.C. Audience Research, The Market for FM Radio Broadcasts, 705/199, 
July 1977.
"Fourfold Increase in FM Radio Sets" in Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, 
26.6.77.
James Maro, "Flood of FM Sets" in Sunday, Sydney, 20.11.77.
"68% Have FM Radio - Poll", in The Herald, Melbourne, 29.5.80.
4 Interview, 14.12.81.
commercial, were to face a frustrating delay, while a new apparatus was
set up by government to deal with their claims. In the event, 3ZZ was
5
closed and the A.B.C. generally was to face an extended period of staff 
reductions and spending cut-backs. The planned extension of the ABC-FM 
network was delayed.
The main thrust of the administration under Robinson^ was to 
rationalise the situation that had developed in the preceding three years, 
in the decisional area. The government had a majority in both houses of 
parliament and therefore was able to institute its changes, through major 
legislation in 1976 and 1977. This legislation, much of it resulting 
from the Green inquiry set up in 1976, gave rise to the A.B.T., and 
enabled the resumption of licensing of stations in the FM band, in 1978, 
on a new basis.
In the meantime, as has been indicated already, uncertainty 
prevailed among the lobby groups and other interested parties. These were
5 Closure of this station followed a long campaign in Melbourne mainly 
aimed at the foreign language programs making up about one-third of its 
air-time. The station gave access for expression of a broad range of 
opinions, not limited to the "main-stream" services on 3EA, or in the 
ethnic press. (According to 3ZZ Producer Presenters quoted in 
Duffield, op.cit., p.37.) The common interpretation found in the press 
of that time was that Robinson had been "under pressure from sections 
of the Liberal Party in Victoria over allegations of left-wing bias at 
the station" (e.g. "Radio Row: Approach to Minister" in The Age, 
Melbourne, 27.5.76). Harding says the government's "ideological 
distaste" for 3ZZ contributed to its decision to withdraw funds for the 
station from the A.B.C. budget. It said that because of its heavy 
ethnic content the station had been duplicating services on 3EA, which 
was being expanded, and that such duplication was wasteful (see, Harding, 
op.cit., pp.108-114). It was common for 3ZZ to be dealt with wholly
as an ethnic station in this way, whereas the A.B.C., and those 
involved in running the operation always emphasised the "access" 
mission - making channels available to people and groups wanting to 
broadcast, of whom there were many, representing a vast range of 
talents.
6 He succeeded V. Garland as Minister early in 1976. The latter had 
stood down from the Ministry over a matter not connected with the 
broadcasting portfolio.
not just potential broadcasters, but journalists, Christian morality
groups wanting censure against vulgarity on 2JJ, groups wanting to "save
the A.B.C.", and others wanting the A.B.C. punished for having fitted in
with the policies of the Labor government. There were many interests
actively represented; they had been mobilised by the changes that had been
going on in broadcasting, and in the relative openness to pressure of the
decisional system under the former government. Under the new regime,
certainly for most of the first year, the government took its time and
gave few indications of what it might do.
Government officers interviewed in connection with the present
study recall the period for the pressure being exerted upon the office of
the Minister. From within the government, for instance, there was the
pressure from National Country Party Ministers for a continuing financial
squeeze on the A.B.C. From outside, a heavy flow of correspondence.
Westerway discussed it in the interview:
[Question] There must have been an enormous inundation 
still continuing. Public broadcasters...You can remember 
the period of outlandish claims about indecency. That 
must have impinged on the whole process and made it 
difficult to administer. To have public/political inputs 
that were still accustomed to an 'unstable1 system?
Well nobody quite knew...That's the problem for a lobby 
group isn't it? If the system's chaotic where are you 
supposed to apply pressure? You don't know because you 
can't identify a single decision-making point. If it's a 
more rational, ordered long-term system you understand 
perfectly well where the sensitive points are and you apply 
pressure there. But they didn't know who the devil to 
turn to, and nor did anybody else. (7)
It was clear at the beginning of 1976 that a return to the position 
as it had been four years before was out of the question, and this was 
far from being a matter of political promises and public demand only. 
Within the broad field of communications technology new possibilities 
were demanding attention. The A.B.C.B. for instance, in its report for
7 Interview, 27.1.82.
1975-76, outlined its preliminary attentions to UHF television (there 
was a "need for substantial investigatory work on the spectrum productiv­
ity issue")f direct broadcasting by satellite, as a "practical
possibility in the 1980s" ("The Board will be paying increasing attention 
9
to developments") , and cable television (a report had gone to the Media 
Minister and the P.M.G., seeking policy guidelines; a joint Board- 
Telecom working party had been convened, and "further investigations were 
currently taking place").^ These were slow beginnings, by an institution 
known for its high cautiousness on such matters, and constrained now by 
budget limitations and staff ceilings, a heavy work-load (the clearing 
of the VHF band and allocation of new station frequencies), and inadequate 
policy guidance from government. The advance of new technology and the 
commercial and consumer expectations accompanying it would need to be 
dealt with. New institutional arrangements would be needed, ones which, 
it became plain, would finally end the "quiet and retiring existence"* 11 
of the Board.
Managing Demands
The new apparatus set up with the formation of the A.B.T. did not 
come into full effect, so far as FM broadcasting was concerned, until 
1978, when the public radio licence hearings were held. In the inter­
vening period suspense was to continue, with the commercial broadcasters 
and public operators, to differing degrees, keeping up the pressure, but 
not encouraged to feel sure of themselves. Time was needed after all for 
the Green inquiry, and enactment of the legislation to follow that, and
8 Op.cit., A.B.C.B. 28th Annual Report..., p.21.
9 Ibid., p .22.
10 Ibid., p. 39.
11 Op.cit., Armstrong, "The Broadcasting and Television Act...", p.124.
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the government meanwhile, in the strongest position electorally, had no 
obligation to over-respond to demands from outside.
There were controversial episodes however involving government and 
clients, especially in the student radio area. Of the twelve stations 
given to educational institutions, two in particular, 2XX Canberra and 
4ZZZ-FM Brisbane had been handed to student bodies. The format chosen 
for each was an album-orientated rock program with talk on current affairs 
matters; what might be called "broadly" educational material, or 
"enrichment" material, but not educational programming in the traditional 
sense. It was not "school of the air". As well, the consensus in 
outlook among the broadcasters involved was left wing, and fairly unrep­
ressed about swearing, sexual matters, drugs and rock and roll. The
music formats, though looked on as "off the wall" by most commercial 
12
programmers contained an implicit threat to the market dominance of 
the commercials among the young, as 2JJ was seen as a threat in 1975.
Most of the informants for this study saw Robinson as a productive 
Minister, dutiful to his tasks if not really interested in the broadcasting 
side of the portfolio, and also not one to approve of the sort of thing 
represented by the two stations in question. When political commentators 
started talking of the "Old old men" and the "Young old men" in the 
government, he would normally be classed with the former. It was among 
these Ministers that protests about the stations, from conservatives, 
would more likely strike a responsive chord, and from them that demands 
would come that some way be found to cut the offenders down to size.
A formula was found in the devising of the present categories for
public licences - Educational, Special Interest and Community. These
had been recommended by Westerway following a working trip abroad. The
12 The expression used by Mr Ted Seymour, Program Manager of the 
commercial station 4MMM-FM, discussing 4ZZZ. Interview with the 
writer, 11.12.81.
initial purpose was to limit the role of educational institutions in the 
coming round of licensing, under the B and T Act. It was felt that the 
institutions, with their large resources, might take too many of the 
early licences if not cordoned off. This domination had happened in cases 
in North America.
However a rider was attached to the guidelines proposal, that 
student-run stations would not be classed Educational, but Community, and 
relegated to broadcasting only to the suburbs around the campuses, on low 
power. This was coupled with a suggestion by the Minister that public 
broadcasting might only be given two medium power stations in each 
capital city - a state of affairs that would further reduce the students' 
chances of obtaining full metropolitan licences, against a range of 
competitors.
Government thoughts on this issue were not proclaimed, though the
16guidelines were mentioned by the Minister during talks with the P.B.A.A.
(Similarly an inter-departmental report on FM radio, from Post and
Telecommunications, Prime Minister's and the Treasury Department, was
withheld from public view. It was understood to have laid out plans for
17licensing of commercial broadcasters and the public stations. That was 
in August 1977. A similar report, if not the same one, was sought by a 
government back-bencher in the Senate - Senator Alan Missen - a year 
later. He was denied access to it on the grounds that publication would 
transgress the provisions of the forthcoming Freedom of Information Bill.)
The conflict was well-publicised in the press however. McCarthy 
in the Age wrote that the student stations were "treated with the greatest
16 Reported by Denis Reinhardt, "Big Push for Control of FM" in Nation 
Review, Sydney, 6.10.77.
17 See Robert Milliken, "FM Radio: The Report That Will Embarrass The 
Government" in the National Times, Sydney, 7.8.77.
18 "Freedom Go...",]in the National Times, Sydney, 8.10.78.
Sen. A.J. Missen, Liberal, Victoria. Question in Notice No. 338, 
4.4.78. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 1st Session of 
31st Parliament, p.497. 12.9.78.
suspicion by the government, because of some of their present personnel
and their program content..." Robinson had "at one stage or another
threatened both stations with cancellation of their experimental licences",
though both stations had since "toned down greatly", and achieved
19comparatively strong positions in the market share ratings. Elsewhere 
20it was reported that use of the guidelines had been devised as a direct
response to complaints from among the public, and from government MPs.
Staley confirmed that the intention had been to diminish the role of the
students ("I believe they were only going to get the little sort of
pip-squeak signals"), though this had not taken place before his time and
21
he had seen that it did not go ahead. Westerway recalled the thoughts 
of the time:
There was a real fear in government that if you allowed too 
many of these stations or any for that matter to be grabbed 
by a lot of long-haired students who would say four letter 
words and affront people, and preach revolution...that would 
be a bad thing. Now I don't think that was a legitimate 
fear but it happened nonetheless. Remember that the people 
making the decisions in all of these things are in the main 
middle-aged or older, white Anglo-Saxon protestants...They 
work in air-conditioned offices, are tertiary educated in the 
main, though the older style ones weren't, they are not 
disadvantaged groups, they are not women fighting for a place 
in the sun or whatever...They were frightened about it.(22)
The mutual distrust among rulers and clients was taken further by
lesser incidents. The first was a delay in the formal licensing of 2CT
and 3CR, in June 1976. The new Attorney General, Mr R. Ellicott, had
expressed doubts about the validity of the "restricted commercial"
23
licences recommended for them by the A.B.C.B. The licences were issued
19 Phillip McCarthy, "Shackles Ready for Public Radio" in The Age, 
Melbourne, 10.2.78.
20 For example by Robert Milliken, "New Rules for Access Radio" in the 
National Times, Sydney, 16.10.77.
21 Interview, 23.10.81.
22 Interview, 27.1.82.
23 See Peter Bowers, "Access Radio Licences Delayed" in Sydney Morning 
Herald, Sydney, 7.6.76.
tlater, but not without some speculation - to be expected at the time -
that by such means the initiatives of the Labor government would be
scotched. It was reported in May 1977 that a license was to be offered
under the WT Act to a student broadcasting group in Melbourne. It was
pointed out in press commentary on the issue that the government had
supposedly discontinued use of the particular Act for licensing; that the
offer had been made without a public inquiry, and that the commercial
broadcasters as a body had pronounced themselves "appalled" by it. As
well, something was made of the involvement of Georgina Guilfoyle,
daughter of a Minister, in the applicant group, which was based at
24Melbourne University, and comparisons were made with the style of 
decision making imputed to Cass during the last desperate months under 
Labor. On one point the particular student station might not have been 
uncongenial to the Minister, in that it had very restricted objectives, 
proposing to transmit only locally, within a ten kilometre radius, as a 
"community" broadcaster on low power. In the event the licence was not 
issued and the particular applicant group did not take its proposal to 
the A.B.T. hearings the following year.
The A.B.C. had begun the period of the new government with a 
deduction of the order of $1.1 million from its budget, and the with­
holding of a further $7.3 million from its mid-year supplementary 
estimate - the beginning of a rather penurious time for the organisation, 
and of a long season of tension in relations between Commission and
24 See Denis Reinhardt, op.cit. Also:
"Students Break into FM Broadcasting", The Age (Radio-TV Guide), 
Melbourne, 5.8.76.
Phillip McCarthy, "New FM Station Approved" in The Age, Melbourne, 
20.5.77.
"Approval for FM Station", Canberra Times, 5.5.77.
Judith Hoare, "Robinson Grants FM Licence - Against Advice",
Australian Financial Review, Sydney, 20.5.77.
government. In the period in question, two of the principal events were
25
the five-month term of Bland as Chairman of the A.B.C. (Harding called
2 6
it "one of the most disruptive episodes in its history"), and the
abortive move to "spill" the membership of the Commission, as part of the
legislation put through at the end of 1976. The move to reconstitute the
Commission foundered on the opposition of government back-benchers,
flanked by a considerable campaign by A.B.C. staff (who went on strike),
and supporters among the public. The Commission was extended from nine
to eleven members, and while the evident aim of removing the position of
staff-elected Commissioner was thwarted, the change "put the rump of
27
Whitlam-appointed Commissioners well and truly into the minority".
On FM particularly, budget restrictions forced a pause in the
extension of the ABC-FM network, which therefore was to operate for its
first five years with only four stations - in Adelaide, Canberra,
Melbourne and Sydney. Transfer of 2JJ to FM was held up for five years 
28as well, after the initial check of a plan worked out late in 1975 to
make the transfer in early 1976, with the program relayed to an FM
service in Melbourne as well.
29
Cheney recalls that after a great deal of consultation it had 
been agreed by all parties - including Telecom, and the A.B.C.B. - by 
January 1976, that the change would be made within a few months. However 
the project had seemed to die through a process of bureaucratic 
obfuscation:
You would talk to people in Post and Telecommunications 
and the Minister's office and they would say it was the
25 Sir Henry Bland, previously Secretary of the Departments of Labour 
and National Service, and of Defence.
26 Op.cit., Harding, p.63.
27 Ibid., p.84.
28 See Section 2, Chapter 2, and Section 4, Chapter 2.
29 Ms Ros Cheney, formerly a Co-ordinator of 2JJ.
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A.B.C.'s fault. You would talk to someone in the A.B.C. 
and they would say it was the fault of the Minister, or 
they would say the Department of Finance. The traditional 
broadcasting bureaucracy effectively limited the station's 
progression...but if the Labor government had been in 
office another six months, we would have had triple-jay,
FM, in early 1976, and have relayed to Melbourne.(30)
On the relay, says Harding,
Telecom at first indicated that there was some difficulty 
in making the landline connection, later that there was a 
transmitter problem. In May 1976 Mr Eric Robinson... 
eventually admitted publicly that it was by government 
decision that the relay had been held up. I understand 
that he himself had been prepared to let it go ahead, but 
Senators Withers and Cotton had had his recommendation 
over-ruled in cabinet.(31)
The defeat over the extension of 2JJ was keenly felt in various
quarters because arranging it had been a hard-fought battle. It had been
a project much favoured by Cass, whose close stewardship of the A.B.C.,
and 2JJ in particular, otherwise came to be seen as an embarrassment.
He recalled in an interview that he had had to "argue with the engineers"
over obtaining a transmitter in Melbourne. He had been told there were
none available, but he recalled having heard some of the early A.B.C.
test transmissions on FM, and had demanded that that transmitter be
dusted off and put into use. That became one of the options in fact taken
up, as well as use of the A.B.C's redundant black and white television
transmitters in Sydney and Melbourne, for stage one of the new service,
32broadcasting in monaural.
The commercial broadcasters were not complacent in putting
33forward their claims under the new order. In March 1976 Foster called
for the closing of 2JJ altogether. It had been a political creature of
34
the previous government, "reeking of patronage and partisanship"
30 Interview with the writer on 2JJ/2JJJ, 16.1.81 (transcript).
31 Op.cit., Harding, p.39.
32 Interview on 2JJ/2JJJ, 16.1.81.
33 Mr Des Foster, Federal Director of F.A.R.B.
34 B and T Weekly, Sydney, 18.3.76.
More importantly the federation made a demand for automatic and
guaranteed access to FM frequencies, for all existing commercial operators.
It said: "It is imperative to the adequate development of FM broadcasting
that each licensee of a commercial AM station has the opportunity to
35acquire an FM licence in addition to the existing AM licence".
One for one; an ambitious demand made difficult for the government 
by the facts of frequency availability (there had been little progress 
with the expensive process of clearing the band, apart from the moving 
of Channel 5 Newcastle...), and by the possibility of "outsiders" wanting 
the chance to set up new stations on the band. Nevertheless the campaign 
of representations was persistent and the Minister eventually gave 
undertakings to the industry, in 1977, that existing commercial operators 
would be able to participate in FM. Publicly, he reserved details on
36the degree of participation (or ownership of stations) till early 1978.
It was obvious however that there would have to be legislation to relax 
the ownership provisions of the B and T Act, if the existing operators 
were to be enabled to get the extra licences they wanted. Under the law 
as it stood, full control of an additional licence anywhere, would be 
impossible in most cases.
In the event, the actual level of participation given was much less 
than the operators had been led to expect. After the 1977 elections 
Robinson was replaced as Communications Minister by Staley, who reviewed 
the position, and refused to change the Act. As a result, the stations 
were confined to maximum holdings of 15-percent, in new stations within 
their home markets. Other limits continued on the number of stations
35 Text of a telegram to Robinson from the F.A.R.B. convention at Sydney, 
October 1976. Reported in B and T Weekly, Sydney, 14.10.76.
36 For one of the statements being attributed to the Minister at the 
time see Barrie Parsons, "Commercial Radio Will Have FM" in 
Advertising News, Sydney, 11.11.77.
that could be controlled nationally, by any one company. The change in 
tack by the government, through Staley, was to contribute to the new 
Minister's problems within the government in the coming three years. 
Staley:
They thought that they'd win. You see when Eric Robinson was 
Minister he told them, you see one of my problems was he told 
them he'd give them to the existing interests. And when I 
became Minister I had to scrap all this. But I was never 
against them having some involvement. It's like the newer of 
the new technologies. I wouldn't be against existing interests 
having some interest in cable and in new things... It's a 
question of balance.
[Question] There was some talk about them being encouraged to 
form a consortium (to share a new licence among a number of 
them).
That was one of the options. There were many options floated 
by my department.
[Question] This commercial FM...Tony Walker in the Age called 
it the toughest round of politicking he'd encountered in 
broadcasting for some time, something like that...The F.A.R.B. 
and the main stations had actually been to see the Prime 
Minister and Eric Robinson, at a very strategic time...
And they constantly communicated with the Minister, and back­
benchers put views, and they had to be countered.(37)
Decisions and Acts of the Government
It is easy to over-state the importance of the changed tone of 
business in the "demand" spectrum, after the sudden and sensational change 
of government at the end of 1975. The activities of the
interest groups had a direct bearing on actions of the government, as we 
have seen in relation to the ambitions of the commercial broadcasters, 
the student broadcasters, and the A.B.C. However the legislation of the 
period needs at least equal attention as it is, in this case anyway, the 
most thoroughly considered set of government actions.
For example it has been mentioned already that the central idea of 
the 1976 amendments to the B and T Act - the formation of a statutory
37 Interview, 22.10.81.
body to license stations and regulate broadcasting, but kept separate
from the planning authority - had been under debate for a long time.
The value of such an arrangement had been canvassed by F.A.R.B. and the 
A.B.C.B., each in its own way arguing that statutory bodies could keep 
the process free of "politics" - i.e. free of direct intervention by the 
government in matters of control and regulation. Similarly all parties 
appear to have been giving thought to the idea of open and competitive 
hearings for the grant and renewal of licences. Most seemed to have 
assented to the use of such hearings as a central feature of the broad­
casting system. They came to accept this in the time since the 
"awakening" of the public broadcasting movement in 1970-74, and the first 
claims that it would be more "fair" and "open" to base the licensing 
process on the F.C.C. hearings in America.
Ideas of this kind were put forward in a great number to the inquiry 
into the structure of broadcasting, ordered by the Minister early in 1976, 
and conducted by F.J. Green, Secretary of the Postal and Telecommunicat­
ions Department. The resulting report, rightly, is usually termed a
39"milestone in broadcasting" and "the principal policy document of the
40broadcasting system". The work of senior officers of the department 
(Green, Westerway, Wilkinson), it is remarkable on three counts: the 
gathering and organising of prevalent toughts across an enormous range 
of options; the formulation of pragmatic recommendations, also across a 
broad range, and precise acceptance of these recommendations by the 
government, particularly in providing legislation.
On FM broadcasting the report supported allocation of frequencies 
to public, national and commercial stations; opposed changing the
38 Westerway, p. Z in this chapter.
39 Law, 14.12.81.
40 Op.cit., Armstrong, Broadcasting Law and Policy..., p.44.
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ownership and control provisions to accommodate FM stations (though it
said AM operators should be able to change over to FM if they wanted); 
urged that coverage areas should be strictly defined, and that broad­
casters should share transmission facilities with one another/ and imposed 
narrow constraints on any proposals for simulcasting of AM and FM 
services. It also recommended clearing of 88-108 MHz for broadcasting 
"as soon as possible". It can be seen that a lot of the problems raised 
in the course of debate over FM, and through setting up the first
generation of stations, had been grasped and dealt with - especially as
41the report was influential with government.
The first legislation arising from the report was the B and T 
Amendment Act of 1976, which abolished the A.B.C.B. and set up the A.B.T. 
as a quasi-judicial body to handle licensing and the regulation of 
programming. Planning was given to the Department, which had been a 
secondary option put up by the inquiry in case the government did not 
want a second statutory body set up for that purpose. There were changes 
to the composition of the A.B.C., and public broadcasting was given a 
place in the Act (thus banishing the vexed question of the value of 
licensing under the WT Act. The government did renew those licences
4
however, as an interim measure, till new licence hearings could be held).
The second Amendment Act, in 1977, became law late in that year and 
transferred more powers, over ownership and control matters, to the A.B.T. 
Further recommendations from the report that the Tribunal be required to 
hold inquiries for the issue and renewal of licences, and that it must 
keep a register of information on station financing, were included in
41 Postal and Telecommunications Department, Australian Broadcasting:
A Report on the Structure of the Australian Broadcasting System with 
Particular Regard to the Control, Planning, Licensing, Regulation, 
Funding and Administration of the System, Canberra, A.G.P.S.,
September 1976, pp.168-170.
42 Broadcasting and Television Amendment Act (No. 2), 1976.
the Act. Planning was transferred from the Department to the Minister, 
in response to objections in Parliament, and from the commercial lobby. 
The S.B.S. was formed under this act, initially to run ethnic radio and 
television.^
Armstrong points out that the powers given to the A.B.T. in many
respects overlapped those of the A.B.C.B., which it replaced. Most
notably the A.B.C.B. was able to conduct public hearings, These drew
scant attention when they took place - a different situation to hearings
of the A.B.T., which through changing historical circumstances more than
a change in the law, have become important.
Abolition of the A.B.C.B. is given by a number of informants as a
first consideration in authorising the Green inquiry. It can be seen
that the range of tasks in broadcasting policy and administration had
expanded (particularly as the new technologies, cable television, UHF
television and satellites were taken into consideration also). It was a
situation calling for some radical re-organisation. At another level,
this was also perceived as an opportunity to displace Labor appointees
forming the majority on yet another statutory body. For instance, one
informant, in an interview:
As I understand it from a source who couldn't have 
possibly gotten it wrong, one of the things they wanted 
to do from the Green Report was get rid of members of 
the Control Board. Robinson simply said 'I want all 
those people out of the Board by the end of 1976', and 
one thing which definitely had come in by the first of 
January 1977 was that the Board had gone and the 
Tribunal had been created, even though it was basically 
just doing the Board's job.
As a postscript, there has been criticism of the Tribunal which future 
broadcasters might need to look to:- there were the disputes over the 
entitlements of interest groups and individuals wanting to give evidence 
(which at the Channel 9 hearing in Sydney, in 1979, led to the
43 Broadcasting and Television Amendment Act 1977.
resignation of a Tribunal member, Ms J. Strickland, following the
exclusion of individuals wanting to speak), and also a claim that the
Tribunal had sought to restrict its own range of competence, by declining
to consider multiple ownership questions. The main occasion for that
had been the hearing into the News corporation take-over of TEN Channel
10, in 1979, in which "the Tribunal was appearing to overturn the 
44legislation".
There has also been criticism from Wright, that staffing of the 
Tribunal is inadequate (many of the experienced staff of the Board having 
left the public service, or transferred to other departments, after its
45
closure), and that the conduct of business has become too "legalistic". 
"The sort of thing about standards and types of programs should be wide- 
ranging inquiries and not in the context of someone's licence being at 
risk. That's when he gets the lawyers in and the whole debate about
46
what broadcasting should be doing is thoroughly debased immediately."
Oswin concedes there has been heavy pressure of work upon the Tribunal,
but argues it has achieved a balanced relationship with stations, in
which they are reminded to consult on major program shifts and such-like,
. . 47 .but are not harassed by detailed supervision. He says it is
44 tylr Mark Armstrong, interview with the writer, 19.10.81. See also 
Armstrong, op.cit., Broadcasting Law and Policy..., p.41. Certain 
anti-monopoly provisions in the legislation "withstood attack until 
the Broadcasting Tribunal itself gave reasons for approving take­
overs of TEN-10 (Sydney) and WIN-4 (Wollongong) in 1979. In those 
decisions the Tribunal purported to find weaknesses in the Act, of 
a kind which would have prevented it from performing its statutory 
duty. Those two decisions were later recognised to be erroneous, but 
they triggered off many further takeovers, which in turn led to the 
1981 amendments to the Act."
45 Myles Wright, "Broadcasting Reform is All Up in the Air" in The Age, 
(Media Opinion), Melbourne, 15.5.78.
46 Interview, 21.10.81.
47 Interview, 14.1.82.
conscientious regulation, though the Tribunal has not to date found 
cause to try to apply major sanctions on any issue.
On paper the Green report and passage of the two Acts of Parliament 
settled many of the problems which had been bedevilling the system. 
Provision was now made for orderly and fair allocation of resources, or 
rather a re-allocation, in the case of the frequencies to be offered to 
commercial broadcasters. This could be seen as being balanced in a sense 
by the instatement of public broadcasters as a recognised grouping under 
the Act. There would be clear ground rules for the next Minister to 
follow, if he wanted to oversee a further expansion of broadcasting.
These would spell out the technical possibilities, and he should have no 
problems in finding the power to have licences issued, or in establishing 
the legitimacy of those licences. Yet Staley by his own definition had 
a problematic time during his three years as the next Post and 
Telecommunications Minister. It seemed that other factors were still at 
large, and these had to be mastered,so as to make the orderly arrangements 
on paper, begin to work.
Section 3: Chapter 5
UNDER STALEY AS MINISTER FOR 
POST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
*vo
The set of changes recommended by Green and instituted by parlia­
ment comfortably falls into the category of "constitutional" outputs 
described by Salisbury'*' - products of the system which entail some 
remaking of the structure itself. A consolidation within the bureaucracy 
was to begin in association with this. The abolition of the Board had 
meant transferral of its Engineering division to the Post and Telecomm­
unications Department, which also took in broadcasting policy elements 
from the former Media Department, and the Radio Frequency Management
group of the P.M.G. In Westerway's terms these changes had "moved the system
2
decisively", and in time a "rational sort of allocation of functions" 
was being arrived at.
Beyond the formal structure and rules, however, anything might still 
happen. Behaviour can be unpredictable, and can bring about unexpected 
outcomes for the system as a whole. The substantive issues of broadcast­
ing policy and administration, in other words, need to be looked at in 
terms of ordinary pulling and hauling of politics, no matter how orderly 
the formal structures have become, or how willingly the rules are 
accepted by all parties - and this is well demonstrated in the events of 
the three year period reviewed in this chapter.
The new forms and new forums instituted by the end of 1977 would 
be used as the vehicle for substantive changes in broadcasting formulated 
and acted on by Staley, who took over the Ministry after the elections 
that year. (Robinson became Finance Minister and joined the cabinet.)
There is no disagreement that the new Minister's manner of attack was the 
significant factor of broadcasting policy and administration during the 
three years of his term, though his "success" or efficacy as a Minister 
setting out after proclaimed goals, and the final significance of the 
achievements of this period are disputed.
1 Op.cit., Salisbury, p.159.
2 Interview, 27.1.82.
Staley as Minister wanted to see results in broadcasting in the
short term; perceived a lot of bureaucratic preparation for action, as
a threat to actually getting done what he saw as necessary; and as we
have seen (in Section 2, Chapter 2), was prepared to be active at all
overcome
levels to try to overcome material problems, and^procrastination over
expanding the broadcasting system. This industry provoked a certain
amount of resistance, not least within the government. There were knock-
backs for the Minister from cabinet, and also in parliament, where two
attempts to enact legislation (on the Multi-cultural Broadcasting Service,
and on self-regulation) failed. On the other hand, Staley was to say
3
"We opened doors in my time that no bastard will ever shut again".
Certain achievements like the licensing of the existing public radio 
stations plus 9 others, under the B and T Act, if seeming to have been 
done hastily to some, obviously would stick and lead to further expansion 
over time. In this respect, as in the willingness to over-ride cautious 
advice, parallels were drawn with the short ministry of Cass.
Two major initiatives of the three-year period were the public 
broadcasting licences, and the start of commercial FM radio. Significant 
ground work was done on the development of telecommunications facilities 
including the introduction of domestic satellites and cable television. 
Ethnic television, an election promise of the government in 1977, was 
started in Sydney and Melbourne by the end of 1980. In all of this, much 
interest was focused on the up-hill battles of Minister Staley to carry 
the government as a whole with his proposals, and to transform proposals 
into tangible results.
Asked about the question of Ministerial style, he said:
Well I was to some extent like Moss Cass. The difference 
was I got things done. Moss got a bit done but was not
3 Interview, 22.10.81.
long enough at it...it was a great credit to him having a 
go at some things that really matter. The fact is you 
don't do things just because your advisers tell you to...
[Question] 'Lack of long range planning and ad hocracy'... 
According to Tony Walker in the Age. There were lots of 
comments like that. You had a plan, a set of principles 
to work to, but you kept running into opposition within 
the government.
That's normal. Grand plans...the dreamers, dream dreams.
People of politics and government do what they can do. I 
did have views and we got acceptance to implementation of 
much of that stuff by government... in a three year period 
it's enough to get some things established, and other 
things happening, and I'm perfectly content to be judged 
on that record. As to how much was achieved we'll know only 
fully in 15 years time.(4)
It was another aspect of the politics of the period in question that the 
Post and Telecommunications Minister was always said to have the ear of 
the Prime Minister. The two had been allied in party room battles, and 
it was generally acknowledged that Staley most of the time would be able 
to count on one important ally in Cabinet. From time to time he 
described his brief as working with reference to "riding orders" from 
higher up in the Ministry.
The handling of the A.B.C. provided an early example of tension 
between this Minister's progressive impulses and the conservative 
disposition of others in government, putting a check on his movements.
In March 1978 the Minister asked to appear on Broadband, the A.B.C. radi 
program generally recognised as left wing and a target for government 
criticism. He told the interviewer "I think that some things which have 
occurred could have led some honest seekers after truth to wonder a bit 
at times about the intentions of the government with respect to the 
A.B.C."'? then went on to announce that an easing of the burden of ever- 
lower staff ceilings on the broadcasting organisation was being 
considered. It was done, he said later, to reassure the A.B.C., as
4 Interview, 22.10.81.
5 Interview between Mike Richards and Staley, Broadband, A.B.C. Radio, 
21.3.78 (transcript).
The organisation was in fact given"people felt they were under seige".
more assurances of the kind, and later relief in the form of triennial
funding, which it had sought. However, the amelioration of feeling was
soured at the end of the same year, 1978, when the government announced
it would not have another staff elected Commissioner on the A.B.C., after
7
the first occupant of the position finished his term. This precipitated 
a national strike and plans to lower the proposed staff ceiling were 
dropped at that time.
Management of the public broadcasting issue of itself was less 
fraught with danger, though it had been an area of inaction, and one in 
which the operators still hung on with a sense of great uncertainty. A 
round of licensing hearings by the A.B.T. was launched by a Ministerial 
statement in parliament on 5th April, 1978, affirming that "phase one" 
of public broadcasting was about to go ahead. "Phase one" was defined 
in terms of the limited number of frequencies available to offer at that
3
stage, a reminder of the technical arguments still there to contend with 
or, perhaps in this case, to make use of.
It was strategic that on a conservative estimate, only 8 FM 
frequencies could be made available in Sydney and Melbourne, before there 
was further work on clearing of the band. Staley had said (on the 
Broadband program and elsewhere) that the three systems - national, 
public and commercial - would have to be placed, and therefore, by 
deduction, there was no hope that the existing broadcasters, on AM, 
would achieve their goal of an FM licence each - not at least for a long 
time. This was made more certain by the Minister's statement that
6 Interview, 22.10.81.
7 Mr Marius Webb.
8 A.B.T. Public Broadcasting: Report on Inquiries into the Grant of 
Licences for Public Broadcasting Stations, 1978, Canberra, A.G.P.S., 
1979, p.207.
three public stations would be licenced in the principal capital cities,
9 10
not two, as had been suggested previously. So it happened that
technical considerations, sometimes "very handy props" for a political
decision,1'*' could be brought in, in support of a related decision not to
give FM to the AM commercial broadcasters. In addition to this the
parliament was told there was some urgency in getting public broadcasters
licensed, as their experimental licences under the WT Act were again
12
approaching the expiry date.
That was one of the points contained in the Ministerial statement
13to parliament, made in April. At the time, it was being pointed out
in press reports that cabinet discussions had been scheduled on the
subject of FM generally, and as one journalist suggested, the Minister's
statement "had pre-empted cabinet's impending deliberations... by
14
specifying the public sector's share of FM licences".
Public radio itself was welcome enough to a wide spectrum of 
opinion, as by that time it was seen "not just as public broadcasters who 
are radical-type, alternative society, argumentative, disadvantaged
9 Canberra was only to have one, Hobart one, and Darwin one, in its case 
through a later set of hearings.
10 For instance, by his predecessor. See Section 3, Chapter 4.
11 Westerway, 27.1.82.
12 Continued operation of stations under these licences had become more 
awkward than before, after passage of the amendments to the Band TV 
Act in 1977, providing for public broadcasters. Gazettal of the 
relevant sections had been deferred, to avert the issue of whether 
the stations were now outside of a law clearly intended to cover 
them.
13 A.A. Staley, Ministerial Statement, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Representatives, 1st Session of 31st Parliament, pp.996-1002, 
5.4.78.
14 Phillip McCarthy, "FM Will Go Legal and Grow, Too", in The Age, 
Melbourne, 6.4.78.
See also Valerie Lawson, "Battle for the Airwaves" in the Australian 
Financial Review, Sydney, 18.5.78.
Judith Hoare, "Staley Wins Day on FM", in the Australian Financial 
Review, Sydney, 7.6.79.
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15groups having a voice", but as an outlet for a broad range of interests.
It had been "legitimated". There was active support for it coming from 
N.C.P. Members, for instance, wanting services in country towns.^
However the perceived affront to AM broadcasters would be answered with 
persistent manoeuvring, by those stations and their supporters, for a 
revision of plans in their favour. They wanted priority in frequency 
allocations for themselves, without much concern for diminution or delays 
that might be suffered in the public or national spectrum. This 
campaigning went on for more than a year - the full period leading up to 
the announcement of the licensing procedures for commercial FM, in 
mid-1979.
In the meantime the A.B.T. conducted hearings in 15 centres through­
out the continent, including all capital cities except Darwin, during 
the latter part of 1978. The proceedings were carried out without delay
and there was no major controversy. All of the existing stations were
17re-licensed under the new Act. The Tribunal issued only 2 of the
available 3 licences in Perth, saying it was not satisfied with the
18applicants available for the third. It recommended that a fourth
licence be provided for Sydney as it had been impressed with an application
from a group wanting to set up a public affairs/access station, and by
2 other unsuccessful candidates with similar goals. It felt such stations
would fill a great need and formally suggested to the Minister that
applications might be called for another S-category licence in Sydney -
19to provide community service and public affairs programming.
15 Loc.cit.
16 According to Law, Rowe and Westerway. In particular Mr J.D. Anthony 
and Mr A.J.(Sandy) Mckenzie (Member for Calare) are mentioned.
17 See Section 4, Chapter 4 for list of stations.
18 Op.cit., A.B.T. Public Broadcasting: Report on Inquiries..., pp.173-74.
19 Ibid., pp.177, 194-96.
Law commented that the procedure had been welcomed by public
broadcasters as the Minister had "pushed it through and got it there",
and had corrected such matters as the "objectionable references to
20student bodies" in earlier guidelines. Some however thought it was
"all done with excessive speed", he said. "The interval between when it
became publicly known and the time to put in for them was a matter of
21
weeks. It was undoubtedly a pity because with those new stations , we
22might have seen something entirely different."
The fortnight encompassing the Broadband interview and the statement
on FM to parliament plainly signalled a change in the status of the
commercial radio lobby. They were told, through Broadband:
I don't want to go too heavily into this because it's a 
matter of a cabinet discussion in the very near future, 
but let me simply say that I would take a lot of convincing 
that we should go further than to offer existing commercials 
the opportunity to transfer from the AM to the FM sector.
In other words, I'm not predisposed at this stage to accept 
the proposition that existing commercial AM people ought to 
be able in the same city to also broadcast in FM for say 5 
to 10 years. (23)
Changing positions on access to the FM band of course did not 
reverse the tradition of decades, that commercial broadcasters had 
privileged access to government, at least to put forward a point of view. 
It was basic to the particular Minister's problem within the government, 
that powerful interests could find a receptive audience at other points 
in the system. In this case it was within the cabinet, and there the 
plan for opening FM to new commercial operators was the subject of drawn 
out argument.
Two officers from the broadcasting policy section of the Department
20 See Section 3, Chapter 4.
21 9 were licensed in addition to the 15 previously in operation.
22 Interview, 14.12.81.
23 Broadband interview, 21.3.78.
told the writer they could recollect some 30 draft proposals being
worked on for the Minister, on FM radio. About a third of these had
been written in final form for cabinet consideration. Rowe says there
were "3 or 4, maybe 5 fundamental visits to the cabinet room, which
really took the whole policy issue in".
He recalled some of the cabinet inter-changes of the time:
Many of them don't really understand. Broadcasting's very 
difficult and not many get that involved, so there were 
questions in terms of the use of the radio spectrum, and 
legitimate sort of concerns about how various parts of the 
spectrum were allocated...It was a sort of backwards and 
forwards thing. There were a number of approaches used, but 
always there was the one underlying principle that the 
existing provisions of the Act should apply to those who would 
seek a commercial FM licence. Indeed even after the 
announcement was made there were attempts made to try and 
change that. The way they would have done it...There was 
an attempt to confuse commercial FM with some of the public 
stations that were then causing some concern in the minds of 
seme of the members of the government because of their 
rather unstructured approach.
[Question] 'Raunchy' approach, it was said.
That's right. Double-jay...I can't say for sure it was 
brought up in that context, but there was a general feeling 
the commercial radio industry was properly and well 
administered, in a sociological and political sense. There 
was a concern that by adding more voices you might add more 
points of view. There weren't too many people who liked 
that...
There was a proposal to set up a spectrum planning 
committee which did go forward in the final submission, and 
was part of the finally approved position. That was design­
ed to overcome these concerns about difficulties in radio 
frequency allocation. To my knowledge nothing really 
happened with that. It was almost a tool to effect the 
acceptance of the policy...It was a time of reassessment of 
broadcasting policy, because Tony had come in and really 
shaken the thing around a bit. That was causing a few 
ulcers among some of the Old Old Men as you've put it, 
though I wouldn't want to be highly critical of individuals 
or particular blocks in the cabinet. (24)
Of the suggested variations on the general theme of launching 
commercial FM under the existing law, without further amendment, a few 
were publicised at the time, including the suggestion that a consortium
24 Interview, 23.12.81.
of stations might be formed by the existing broadcasters, to share an 
25
FM licence, and Staley's assurance that new opportunities might open 
for those broadcasters in the form of more frequencies, within the 
coming ten years. Of the stratagems used to keep his proposal in debate, 
rather than approve it, there was the cabinet committee set up in 1978 
to carry out a separate review.
This attracted some controversy because it included members with
26
family connections in commercial broadcasting. Senator Colin Mason put
27
questions in parliament in November, asking if a committee or sub­
committee of Ministers had been formed to look at FM, and which of its 
members, if any, had an involvement with the existing commercial sector. 
He was also pressing for a date for introduction of commercial FM, for,
while Staley in the previous February had accurately forecast it
28"within eighteen months", preparation for that was known to have struck
trouble. Considerable public scepticism was being expressed as to
whether any worthwhile innovation would emerge. It appears that the
29
cabinet committee either never met, or only met once, and was later 
disbanded. Staley:
[Setting up a cabinet committee] was a very normal 
procedure with a complicated and hard fought issue.
I didn't like its composition. It did seem to me that 
there were fairly obvious links with commercial 
broadcasters. Not conflict of interest in a direct 
sense, but indirect. I got the Prime Minister to 
disband the committee if I remember rightly.
On dealings with the cabinet in general, he said:
25 See "Canberra Urges FM Consortiums" in The Age, Melbourne, 7.2.78.
26 Deputy Leader, Australian Democrats.
27 Questions nos. 775 and 776, 16.11.78. Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Debates, Senate, 1st Session of 31st Parliament, p.2171.
28 Denis Ringrose, "Commercial FM in Eighteen Months" in the Daily 
Mirror, Sydney, 23.2.78.
29 On the recollections of Staley and Rowe.
I had them [Submissions] before cabinet. [LAUGHS]
I was in and out like a yo-yo. Sometimes up and down 
like a yo-yo. I certainly had to go back a number of 
times. I was absolutely determined to overcome the 
resistance to change which was evident in the commercial 
radio area...and of course also as reflected in the 
political area. I had very few allies in that 
particular.(30)
Resistance on the point of who should be able to buy into commercial
FM was overcome by 6th June 1979, when the second major statement on FM
31radio was made public. Licence applications for medium
coverage commercial stations in Sydney and Melbourne (two each), Adelaide, 
Brisbane and Perth would be called early in the following month. Hearings 
for the applications were held, during October and November, and the 
stations were all put to air in mid-1980.
The A.B.T. said in its report on the proceedings that it had 
drawn on principles elaborated in its 1977 Self-regulation Report, and 
on Ministerial policy statements, to obtain criteria for its choice of 
applicants. It stated that the "key to the growth and development of 
the mode is the provision of programming which attracts wide audiences". 
However there would be equal emphasis on the "public accountability of 
broadcasters, with reference to promise of performance and mechanisms 
for public input, and Australian content in programming". Also sought 
would be diversity of programming, and diversity of ownership and control. 
"All other factors being equal, an application for one of the first 
commercial FM licences would be regarded as less acceptable where the 
potential exists for that company to be heavily influenced by any AM 
station or stations."
Other criteria set out as desirables included wider scope for 
specialisation of services, thereby catering for a more diverse range of
30 Interview, 22.10.81.
31 A. A. Staley, Minister for Post and Telecommunications. Media Release: 
Commercial Fiji Radio for Australia, 79/11, Canberra, 6.6.79.
minority tastes and influences; increased programming choices in the 
broadcasting system as a whole; clear identification of the target 
audience for a particular new station, and acceptable character, reput­
ation and integrity on the part of the potential broadcaster. The 
traditional concern with commercial viability was there as well, with a 
provision that a potential licensee should have the "financial backing 
and stability to expedite establishment of the station", and that 
estimates of establishment costs should be realistic. However it was 
stipulated throughout that the "prime consideration in the grant of a 
licence must be programming philosophy and proposed programming services".
Compared with the narrower set of considerations that had been applied
33to licensing in the past, concentrating as they did on profitability, 
some hopes were aroused that "social goals" might be advanced in broad­
casting, and that the new stations would produce a certain amount of 
innovation in programming.
Some generalisations can be made about the choices made and the
approach taken by the A.B.T. under Gyngell. Throughout the process the
Tribunal took the view that a new "segment" in broadcasting was being
launched. Its perception was that the incapacity of the existing
publicly-owned stations to draw mass audiences suggested the commercial
ones would have to make the full running, in attracting listeners'
attention to the band. Gyngell personally was praised in various
34
quarters for brisk and businesslike handling of the hearings, and as
35
has been mentioned already, showed that he wanted to see the stations set
32 A.B.T. Report on Inquiries into the Grant of Licences for Commercial 
Frequency Modulation Broadcasting Stations, 1979, Sydney, No. 33/79 
6 (R), December 1979, pp.5-12.
33 Compare the 1979 criteria, for instance, with Cole's treatment of 
earlier criteria. Cole, op.cit.
34 Rushton for example, gives the "combination of Gyngell and Staley" 
as the key to a lot of firm achievements. Interview, 21.1.82.
35 See Section 2, Chapter 2.
up with favourable operating conditions, and the kind of backing that 
would give them access to publicity and expertise. A case in point was 
the Chairman's involvement in finding adjacent frequency placements for 
the two Sydney stations, at the cost of a small public controversy and 
some questioning of the propriety of his actions. It was symbolic of the 
same concern that he agreed to be chairman for a spectacular joint 
promotion by the stations, planned for their launch. The outcome of 
the hearings very much reflected this kind of interest. In the main the 
companies chosen had connections with television stations in their home 
cities, cinema chains or the press. Their principals were either 
successful managers from commercial AM (viz Muir at 2MMM-FM, and Chapman 
at 6N0W-FM), or show business or media celebrities of the kind who 
might provide contacts, and have a way with big audiences in their own 
right (viz Kennedy, Laws and Willesee at 2DAY-FM, Barry Humphries at 
3E0N-FM). All of the stations proposed a format with a heavy accent on 
music in stereo, to take advantage of the superior sound quality of the 
FM system, and on the age range, 18-39.
In this process, the stated criteria of the A.B.T. affirmed 
liberal principles generally, and if not highly specific or prescriptive 
about what was to be done, could be seen as the kind of thing that 
Staley had been wanting to achieve. The hearings and their outcome had 
no Ministerial involvement. It was done "utterly at arms length", as the 
law provided . ^
In other matters, some affecting FM, there was a pattern of set­
backs for new initiatives. The legislation to give the S.B.S. a broader 
role, as a "multi-cultural" service, had to be shelved in the face of a
36 As the launch date approached the stations found themselves beset 
with technical problems, demanding priority attention. The 
"spectacular" had to be dropped.
37 Interview, 22.10.81.
sceptical reaction, in a few cases hostile, from commercial television, 
the community television movement, public broadcasters, and the ethnic 
press. Public interest groups and others had objections to the legis­
lation instituting formal self-regulation for broadcasters, mainly in 
television, and this was deferred indefinitely, at the end of 1980.
In the cabinet, Staley's success in getting approval for the Dix
inquiry into the A.B.C., under broad terms of reference, was seen as a 
38"major victory" for him - though it was pointed out too that he had been
39
unable to get it brought forward to an earlier date, as had been sought. 
There had been the series of rebuffs over FM, and also rejection of a 
proposal for the statutory ban on electoral broadcasts, 2 full days 
before a federal election, to be lifted.
Law, who sees the Staley Ministry as a degree over-rated in terms 
of the gains for public broadcasters, thought that the incident of the 
election ban was revelatory.
It was in 1979. He took along several propositions, one 
of which was removing the 48-hour pre-election blackout, 
and he got rolled. The result was that Staley pulled his 
head right in and it was very difficult to get anything 
for months after that. He was a very wounded man. It was 
put to me that if anyone else had taken that to cabinet 
but Staley it would have gone through, but that day, all 
the propositions Staley brought, he put them to the 
cabinet, and they just said 'take it away'.
This is a political rather than a broadcasting matter, 
but it makes you realise that having the Prime Minister's 
ear is not of itself enough, because for one thing a lot 
of people resent it, and it takes more than the P.M. some­
times to get things through cabinet...In retrospect you 
have to say he had a very good first six months, because 
all the real decisions [on public broadcasting] were taken 
in his first six months. For the next year quite honestly 
we lived in constant hope that wonderful things were going 
to happen, but they somehow never did. In retrospect we 
scratch our heads ruefully in the realisation that he had 
us well and truly snowed. (40)
38 Over "cabinet hawks" who wanted more narrow terms of reference. See 
H. Mayer, "A.B.C. Review: The Story So Far" in Listening Post, No. 2, 
November 1979, Sydney 2SER-FM, p.7.
39 Phillip McCarthy, "A Change in the Master's Voiced The Age, Melbourne, 
29.12.78.
40 Interview, 14.12.81.
A further check to the development of policy was the cessation
of work on a general review of the law, intended to result in a new
broadcasting Bill. This review had been decided on under the previous
Minister, and it was understood it would take in certain of the outstand-
41m g  recommendations of the Green report. Armstrong was appointed to 
the staff of the Post and Telecommunications Department for one year, 
early in 1979, to work on the review, a compilation of the "backlog of
42amendments needed to bring broadcasting law out of the 'wireless' era".
After a few months at work on that he received instructions from the
Minister to drop the project, as there had been an instruction that no
politically controversial legislation was to be considered before the
1980 elections. He was told "the political tide was running against it".
He expected that the ownership and control provisions of the act would
43
have been the most likely to generate heat.
Staley dismissed the episode saying he had wanted to have new
amendments prepared and ready for a future time, but the exercise had
not had a "deep policy thrust", and was not directly related to future
reforms in any area. People had learned to live with the existing Act
in an "often appalling form", and he thought that could be continued with
4.
for a time. There was no immediate reason to "stir up a hornet's nest".
Rowe said he had disagreed with that response at the time, though 
talk of any changes in legislation always provoked alarm, and this had 
happened in 1979, with a "deluge of despatches from vested interests", 
upon the government.
41 Op.cit., Armstrong, Broadcasting Law and Policy..., p.44.
42 Ibid., Preface V.
43 Interview, 20.10.81.
44 Interview, 22.10.81.
It is a very difficult thing to take a piece of legis­
lation on which many people depend for their protection, 
and which an equal number of people would love to see 
loosened up for their betterment...Amendments to the 
Broadcasting and Television Act are probably amongst the 
most sensitive, because it really does provide an enorm­
ous degree of protection for certain interests and 
enormous constraints against the ability of others to 
get in. It really does raise the hackles of people. It 
strikes very much at the basis of their economic power. (45)
The three year period under Staley as Minister saw a number of
changes, particularly with FM radio, that might be called "reforms", in
the sense that some innovation took place and the base of ownership and
control was broadened a little. In the overall scheme of things the
pattern of reform would have to be seen as symbolic, or of a variety
46
described by another politician as of the "add-on" type. At the base 
the existing set of arrangements was not changed, least of all in 
television, where no major challenge to the corporations was to get off 
the ground.
That ought not to be regarded as inconsistent with the pursuit of 
diversification at another level, especially as the position of government 
and Minister, as to who should be able to make money at what activity, 
was plainly stated throughout the period. Interviewed late in 1981,
Staley described himself as reasonably in accord with policy movements 
after his time. Aggrieved parties concerned about a "reaction" in 
broadcasting, through new legislation, he thought should lobby and agitate 
to defend their interests.
On such matters as proposals for private operation of domestic
satellites, and for restrictions on the role of Telecom:
My aim was to have a good Telecom not an expansionist 
Telecom, and I laid the groundwork for what Sinclair's
45 Interview, 23.12.81.
46 Senator John Button, Leader of the Opposition in the Senate and 
Opposition Spokesman on Communications. Interview with the writer, 
19.2.82.
'ST
now doing, with difficulty. I saw the satellite as 
diversification out of having just one common carrier in 
Australia. It was not recommended that it be done in the 
way it's being done, but it seemed to me sensible that it 
be done that way.
[Question] With Telecom and who's going to be handling the 
satellite and so on. You can end up with less pluralism 
and less diversity if you hand it over to major corpor­
ations which you don't control.
It's not being handed over to major corporations anyway...
I used to say on the ownership and control thing, you're 
crazy worrying about whether Rupert Murdoch's got this or 
that station. My own view was that it would be good for 
Rupert to have Melbourne and Sydney, because the very strong 
and very effective Packer network has got some competition, 
and the Seven people have to look to their laurels. The 
fact was the moves we were making in my time, major 
structural moves, FM radio, along with very major things 
like cable, were leading to a more diverse structure and 
more opportunities.(47)
47 Interview 22.10.81.
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Section 3: Chapter 6
UNDER SINCLAIR AS MINISTER FOR COMMUNICATIONS
The appointment of Ian Sinclair as Communications Minister after 
the 1980 elections,1 was seen by some in his department to be a result 
of the heavy agenda facing them by that time. At one level it could be 
said that the portfolio would always appeal to the N.C.P. because it 
brought the opportunity of building an infrastructure of new services in 
country regions. At another, Sinclair was being described as an 
"experienced, powerful" Minister who would not fail to steer such matters 
as the cable television inquiry and the licensing of hundreds of new 
radio stations, in the general directions required politically by 
government.
While the end of 1980 would seem a convenient point to terminate 
the present analysis, it would neglect too many questions, not to give 
some attention to forthcoming decisions and events. That is particularly 
so as the field for policy-making in broadcasting must continue to 
expand, under pressure of new possibilities in the technology, and 
increasing demand for services.
A large share of the heavy agenda referred to was accounted for by
the government's commitment to expansion of radio services, especially
in the country, both for the A.B.C., and for commercial and public FM.
An undertaking to construct a second A.B.C. network in the country,
principally using FM transmitters, had been given by the Labor government 
2
in 1975, and a new scheme essentially reviving it was agreed to by 
Staley. In the meantime extension of the ABC-FM network, the fine music 
chain based on the stations in Adelaide, Canberra, Melbourne and Sydney 
was to continue.
1 Staley had retired from politics for family reasons. The portfolio 
name was changed with the formation of the new government after the 
1980 elections.
2 A.B.C.B. 27th Annual Report. Year ended 30 June 1975, Canberra, 
A.G.P.S., 1975, p.15.
Legislation taken to parliament in 1981 included provisions for 
supplementary licences for regional radio and television stations.
These provisions had been intended initially to equip regional television 
for competition against national networks, once the domestic satellite 
was in operation, through being able to offer additional services such 
as subscription TV. However lobbying from various sectors of the 
television industry had caused the section to be withdrawn from the Bill. 
The radio section remained, and plans were in hand early in 1982 to begin 
calling for applications from the existing provincial broadcasters, for 
supplementary licences. These would be licences for area coverage 
approximating that of the existing stations on AM, but would be for a 
separate program, with simulcasting of programs only to be permitted 
under special conditions. Provision would be made as well for the A.B.T. 
to recommend independent commercial FM licences, instead of supplementary 
ones for the existing broadcasters, in certain cases.
That growth in the commercial area and the A.B.C., plus the fore­
shadowed opening of more public stations in the country, expansion of 
television services, and adjustments in operating conditions for certain 
existing stations, was confronting the bureaucracy with a mountain of
business. One engineer counted "several hundred" planning proposals on
3
the books of the Department, and to that must be added work in the 
pipeline for UHF television, and the cable and satellite services in the 
future.
Such information shows how the trend of events has moved the
spotlight onto the state of the public service, which, as has been 
4
mentioned already, had been going through a process of reorganisation 
and consolidation since the disbandment of the A.B.C.B. Something has
3 Mr Jeff Osborne, State Engineer (N.S.W.), Department of Communications, 
interview with the writer, 15.12.81.
4 See Section 3, Chapter 5.
been said as well about the anxiety that was felt in government offices,
for the survival of the public stations, after the change of government
in 1975 - the residue of which was observed by Staley when he took over
two years later. He said that advice being offered was fairly
constricted, and centred mainly on preserving the set of stations already
in operation, and having them licenced under the new legislation.
There were all sorts of suggestions made to me by very 
helpful officials, because they made certain assumptions 
about what I would be prepared to live with, as a 
Liberal Minister. In fact I tore up a lot of it and 
added other things to make it what public radio was all 
about...Some could suggest they were just trying to get 
me into trouble. Most would be Labor supporters. It 
would suit them if we got more antagonism against the 
government. If the Minister fell on his face...I don't 
accept that. I think they honestly thought I couldn't 
bite the bullet of certain sorts of policies which would 
have accepted that public radio, to a considerable 
extent, is an expression of dissent, and very genuine 
diversity.(5)
Seen from another perspective, the administration of broadcasting 
has been stolid in getting on with the procedures thrashed out and agreed 
on in the strictly political area, during the chopping and changing of 
a period of almost 10 years. This has been true of the work done on 
frequency allocations, following up the initial suggestions made in the 
McLean report on FM, which, it was felt, needed to be adapted in practice. 
Successive Ministers were persuaded of that, and with their concurrence 
planning was eventually put in train in terms of the Department's 
Report Number 43A.^
The more outstanding example however would be the Green report.
This was undoubtedly the product of an exchange both ways, of advice,
information and stated requirements between the senior administrative
and political levels of government. In its outcomes it could be seen as
7
serving the needs of the "politicians of the bureaucracy", a potent
5 Interview, 22.10.81.
6 Wilkinson, 13.1.82.
See also Section 2, Chapter 2.
7 Westerway, 27.1.82.
client group in its own right, to be considered by any Minister looking 
to bring about major change. In the main, politicians of the bureaucracy 
will look for authoritative ground rules, and can offer in return 
informed, pragmatic advice, and tangible results. In the particular 
case, the Green report yielded a well-reasoned prescription for allocation 
of frequencies for future FM outlets, and clear understandings on such 
questions as AM/FM simulcasting, and the future location of transmitter 
facilities for new stations. The legislation it gave rise to settled 
disputes, erased ambiguities and removed obstacles to the administration 
of such matters as public broadcasting, which had been the subject of 
much precipitate action, but not many fully authoritative and binding 
decisions.
Two problems affecting the bureaucracy are of interest at this 
point, as they have a bearing on the manner of decisions being reached, 
and the future of the broadcasting system. The first is the progress of 
the Communication Department's internal reorganisation in the five year 
period since the start of 1977, and the second is its capacity for taking 
on the volume of work that lay ahead of it. In both cases, comments 
here will be very restricted, as they refer to matters extending beyond 
the scope of the present inquiry.
An immediate impression obtained from a range of observers, mostly 
within the department, is that the relocation of staff from Melbourne 
and Sydney, in Canberra, affected the pattern of decisions taken. As to 
how, was not made specific in every case, though it would seem to be a 
factor generally touching on efficiency and morale. That could be 
expected in an organisation put together from the parts of 3 other bodies, 
and then set to work on business that was still the object of much 
political debate. If the initial placement of the Media Department 
at North Sydney was seen to have removed it from the centre of
power, the converse was now being argued - that people with a personal
commitment to broadcasting matters for their own sake, were no longer
available to fill jobs. Generalist public servants were taking over, it
was said, beginning at the top with the appointment of a Canberra public
9
servant as Department Head. A representative comment:
Handling of the self-regulation Bill was taken over by 
people in Canberra, as there was a power struggle on at 
the time. It was typical Canberra public service with 
no particular interest in or knowledge of broadcasting, 
in charge of these things...I get back to the creativity 
of people. You won't be able to document the signific­
ance of the move to Canberra, but it's of significance 
that the enthusiastic and determined, the 'non-political'
Department of the Media people, who were attracted from 
other positions because they wanted to do something for 
broadcasting, tended to be replaced by other people who'd 
moved across from other areas of administration.
There were variations on the point. Wright points out that a
number of senior engineers from the A.B.C.B., in Melbourne, left the
service rather than move to Canberra. "It was an unsatisfactory,
unsettling environment and I don't think you can blame a lot of the
senior men for getting out." This he said was to have enormous ill-
effects on planning and development, because it had left the public
authority denuded of highly competent staff, at the upper levels.
His comments were seconded by officers in the Department who thought the
loss of key staff would heavily discount gains that would be made by
bringing policy and engineering elements under the one roof: as it was
explained, much of the day to day contact between the two sections, from
the time of the A.B.C.B., had been lost, when policy functions were
transferred to the Department in Canberra. This move had given the
initiative to people in the strictly policy field, as well, when decisions
8 See Section 3, Chapter 2.
9 Mr R. Lansdown .
10 Interview, 21.10.81.
were under debate. Over time, the old order of routine communication 
within the service could be expected to return, but it would have had its 
costs.
In response to this, Westerway identifies a
growing consensus of opinion, from 1973 through, about 
where we want to go next and how much we're prepared to 
relax the rules [on technical standards] in order to get 
the more services that we want. It's been messy and I 
couldn't pretend that it's been well co-ordinated. None 
of us, back in 1975 anyhow, knew where it was going to 
go, but I think it is now getting mroe and more on the 
track.
Lansdowne as department head had been "prepared to take new attitudes 
and gave the system a substantial kick along". A formal rationalisation 
was being finalised, putting policy staff and engineers together. "It's 
taken a lot of sorting out. Now for the first time there'll be a thing 
called the Broadcasting division which will have both policy and planning 
in it, and I'll be head of that."
Plans were in hand as well to try to stretch resources, to meet the
mounting demand for government services; a problem acknowledged by the
government and made worse, both by resignations, and by strong competition
for technical staff on the labour markets generally.
What we will do, we hope, as part of this supplementary 
licence decision is set up a body especially to do that.
A task force within the department. There is a difficulty 
recruiting and then of training people, and that's true 
throughout the system. It's not confined to government...
We're doing several things simultaneously. Another is 
revising the planning procedure so that the onus is much 
more on the applicant to do the technical work. But 
necessarily he can only do it up to a point. After that 
it has to be taken into some part of the government because 
you have to reconcile conflicting claims and you have to 
honour your international obligations about use of 
frequencies and so on...
[Question] Still, requiring the applicants to do the work.
That disadvantages the small applicant.
Well it's simply a fact of life that the government the 
tax payers elected isn't prepared to pay to do the work for 
them, and you're working in a market economy. (11)
11 Interview, 27.1.82.
Oswin reported that the A.B.T. was facing more than 200 licence
renewals in a period of less than 3 years, as well as at least 30 grants,
take-overs and other hearings. The applications for supplementary
licences would also require a public inquiry. Pressure on the resources
of the Department in allocating frequencies would compound the problems
of the Tribunal, though it was understood the process was to be
12
"tremendously streamlined" to reduce the backlog.
Informed opinion otherwise was sceptical of the chances of dealing
with the situation - one of sharply increasing commitments and demand,
and declining resources. Rushton of F.A.R.B.: "They're in desperate
straits. We can proceed OK today with the supplementaries, but it could
be years in terms of current practice before anything substantial is
achieved. It is frightening. Their machinery obviously isn't appropriate.
13
To be fair, this is being examined by the government at the moment."
Law of the P.B.A.A.:
It's pretty widely known that the Department's planning 
procedures have broken down...It is in a desperate 
situation as the Department has lost so many staff on the 
engineering side. They have lost senior staff. At one 
point they had to my knowledge 11 engineering positions 
of which 5 were filled. That is working level engineers.
The thing that really concerns me is where are the 
Brownlesses, the Beards, the senior engineers who can 
carry some credibility when talking over broad problems 
with utilising the system? F.A.C.T.S. have made a counter­
proposal [for spectrum use] from very excellent engineers, 
and it's a thorough job, a proposal I think will work.(14)
The impression left by these comments, and those of others in a
similar position to judge, is that the flood of development has been
promising to overwhelm the apparatus set up to cope with it. One
engineer pointed out that the technical staff on hand were in not much
better strength than the A.B.C.B. had when it was dealing with one or two
12 Interview, 14.1.82.
13 Interview, 21.1.82.
14 Interview, 27.1.82.
licensing matters in a year, Present capacity was for about 20 each 
year, not hundreds.
Wilkinson expected that the problem would be managed, as government 
agencies withdrew from work he saw as properly belonging to consultants 
engaged at the expense of the stations. At the A.B.C.B. there had been 
a "waste of engineering effort" on such matters as translator stations 
set up for a licensee. "Doing things for the commercial industry has 
worried me. It still worries me that the Department is doing some things 
it ought not to. The government should sit in review, in judgment, on 
proposals that come to it, from the people who are going to earn money 
from them." He sees a change to an adaptation of the American model, 
though presumably much less extreme than the original, in which the 
initiative on the question of new frequencies is with the potential broad­
casters, who propose them.^
That would appear to be the direction of events under prevailing 
conditions in Australia - towards de-regulation, largely by default. 
Whatever interest there might be in assertive regulation of program 
standards, or in systematic planning for services, based on agreed social 
needs perhaps, these are going to be under challenge. As Westerway has 
pointed out, regulators might retreat only part of the way, retaining the 
power to arbitrate among competing claims and to police such things as 
the international broadcasting standards. Re-organisation and staffing 
by short-term contracts may help overcome the problem of staff losses 
and of ceilings imposed on the public service establishment by government. 
After another decade it may be that training of technical personnel will 
have overtaken demand - and so the squeeze will abate.
Yet in the meantime a change has been signalled, and with it 
conceivably a transfer of power, or at least transfer of the initiative
15 Interview, 13.1.82.
in design matters and planning, out of the hands of the public authorities. 
The F.A.C.T.S. study cited by Law, is the sort of case in which private 
clients come to hold the mortgage on expertise, and perhaps then aspects 
of policy. To generalise from that, the question can be put: Is the 
public in this situation apt to begin losing control of the airwaves, as 
a public resource?
It would seem that what looks like a strictly material problem - 
burgeoning demand for radio licences and limited engineering resources to 
deal with it - or a bureaucratic headache, can easily lead into an 
ideological argument as to who should control what. Short of that, the 
implications of the present situation, for the public interest, need to 
be studied.
Other matters remain for consideration. Still on the agenda for
government attention is the program for clearing of the VHF band. Staley
suggested there had been renewed hesitation about going ahead with this.
Apart from the costs, it had been thought that newer technologies -
including cable technology and more exhaustive use of the UHF band for
television - might reduce the need for the full range of frequency space 
16in question.
However that hesitancy had been overcome for the duration, and, at 
a date sane 8 years after the decision of the Whitlam government to go 
ahead with the proposal, it was being negotiated afresh by the 
Communications Department, with the civil aviation and television users 
on the relevant section of the band. Westerway was able to say he had 
obtained agreement in principle from the users, that they should be moved, 
but it remained to be settled which agencies should bear the costs 
incurred. There was considerable expenditure required, for instance, to
16 Interview, 22.10.81.
provide new Distance Measuring Equipment (D.M.E.) for aircraft, and for 
17
ground stations. A new timetable had been devised which would see
television channels 3, 4 and 5 removed from the band over a 10 year period,
although F.A.C.T.S. had requested that a decision on some aspects, for
instance whether to move channel 3 at all, should be deferred. The
government was being asked to approve the new plan for clearing of the 
18band. In a similar way, action was still much in the offing on the
question of power up-grading, for FM radio in Sydney. The issue has been
19dealt with fully in another section.
New legislation was passed by federal parliament in mid-1981, 
following a case in which the A.B.T. refused the take-over of the Melb­
ourne television station ATV-10, by the News group. The refusal had been 
made on "public interest" grounds, to do with the extent of interest to 
be gained by the newspaper chain through the purchase.
Armstrong provides an authoritative account of the episode, which 
is described with ample justification as a "reaction against the 
developments of the preceding 5 years". Among the elements in that 
reaction were "government concern that the ATV-10 decision would hamper 
expansion of the News group and the Publishing and Broadcasting group; 
bureaucratic and political hostility towards Broadcasting Tribunal 
independence, and hostility towards decision-making outside Canberra".
As prepared, the legislation would have allowed the Minister to 
augment the criteria to be applied by the Tribunal in making decisions.
"It would have effectively over-ruled the ATV-10 decision of the 
Tribunal so as to guarantee success for the News group in its appeal to
17 By the oldest estimate, transfer of D.M.E. services to the intern­
ationally allocated UHF D.M.E. band would have cost $20 m. in mid-1976. 
(Op.cit., A.B.C.B. 28th Annual Report..., p.20).
18 Interview, 27.1.82.
19 Section 2, Chapter 2.
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the A.A.T. ...[However] after widespread opposition, the proposed
. . .  21 
Ministerial power was abandoned."
Among the major features of the resulting Act: it removed the
requirement that prior Tribunal approval be obtained for a takeover of
a licensee company; it stated largely exclusive lists of licensing
criteria, which did not refer to concentration of media control, except
in non-metropolitan areas; it made more lenient provision for lenders to
TV companies and institutional investors in TV, and it introduced the
22supplementary radio licence provisions.
20 Administrative Appeals Tribunal. In the event the appeal succeeded.
21 Op.cit., Armstrong, Broadcasting Law and Policy..., pp.47-48.
22 Broadcasting and Television Amendment Act 1981, 9.4.81.
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4: Chapter 1
ABC-FM
The A .B .C . FM network was an early entrant upon the band, and 
one o f i t s  immediate challenges was to help s a t is fy  the expectations 
that had arisen as thousands o f people bought FM radios and prepared 
to receive programs in  stereo. This role did not s i t  comfortably 
with other tasks assigned to the new network, notably as a vehicle  
fo r  c la ssic a l music broadcasts. There were other problems fo r the 
new service as w ell, mainly to do with i t s  relationships with other 
sections o f the A . B . C . , upon which i t  was dependent, but the lim iting  
influence o f which i t  sought to be free o f . A fter 6 years the 
network, in  terms o f fa b ric , had been extended from the orig inal 4, 
to 14 sta tion s, and i t s  programming and organisational dilemmas were 
being se tt le d  to a degree - though there remained the question o f  
whether the service had met, or would ever meet, i t s  f i r s t  potential.
Setting up an FM network presented the A.B.C. with the opportunity 
to provide listeners with rich new forms of experience. That is what it 
did in many instances. At the same time the process brought with it a 
set of problems. Among those: a dilemma over programming, in two parts. 
Firstly, what kind of audience to pursue, in what way? There were 
three main solutions put forward - to be creative, innovative and 
different, as the main staple of activity; to provide a consistent music 
format across the day, as a core, or bed (like a "formated" commercial 
station to a degree, but with quality materials), or to court larger 
audiences through skilful work upon the theme of providing something 
for everybody.
The second aspect of the programming question had been at issue in 
other parts of the A.B.C. as well, and might be called an operational 
one - a matter of how programs should be made and got to air. Simplified, 
it is a question which sets two ways of organising the process against 
each other. On one hand, departments which make programs own segments 
of air-time in which those programs are accommodated. Arranging the 
sequence and "weighting" of programs becomes a matter of negotiation, 
co-ordination and routine. The other alternative is for the daily output 
of the station or network to be designed and planned, and all materials 
placed, by an independent agency, working according to its own criteria. 
Both systems have been known to work well for different purposes. The 
former is known as the old way in the A.B.C.; the latter was tried, to 
a degree, with ABC-FM. Programming for the network became a forum for 
debate over these proposals, and a range of issues linked with them.
Other problems afflicted the new radio network. It was susceptible 
to pressure from an audience lobby with some power and very specific 
aims, frequently not compatible with what the network was commissioned 
to do (it will be called the "hi fi" lobby), and there were problems
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originating in the wider political system. These began with the rush to 
launch the network at the behest of the Labor government in 1975, and 
continued through to the difficulties experienced in trying to maintain 
standards, under the financial squeeze imposed by the Liberals and N.C.P.
The programming tasks faced with ABC-FM might have been easier if 
there had been a clearer brief. There is no sign of any particular 
requirement or request coming from government, except that, following 
the decision at Terrigal to open the FM band, without commercial stations, 
the A.B.C. was encouraged to set up its new network. Funds would be 
available to launch it immediately.'*' Frequencies were made available for 
transmission at 50 kilowatts power in Canberra, Melbourne and Sydney, 
and 10 kw in Adelaide. Studio accommodation was available at the 
Commission's new building in Adelaide, where the network was based, 
connected to the other transmitters through wide-band stereo relay cir­
cuits. There was an understanding with government that this network
would be progressively expanded, by the addition of new cities, year by
2
year, and from the beginning, the service was to run 24 hours a day.
The technical excellence obtainable through frequency modulation 
broadcasting has always been central to any considerations of programming, 
and the A.B.C. has emphasised its efforts to keep improving the fabric 
and structure of the network. After one year, equipment was put into 
service to reverse the circuit between Adelaide and Sydney, so that
concerts and operas from the Opera House could be broadcast direct, in
3stereo. Other technical bonuses included the broadcast of matrix 
quadrophonic records, from May 1978. Listeners with the equipment to 
"decode the information" were told they could add two extra speakers,
1 Op.cit., Harding, p.ll.
2 A.B.C. 45th Annual Report, 1976-77, Sydney, A.B.C., 1977, pp.19-20.
3 Loc.cit.
/7l*
"to provide the reverberation from side and rear walls which a concert-
4 5goer senses in a hall". Commission reported with some satisfaction 
a sophisticated answer to the problem of spanning the time difference 
between Perth and the other centres - installation of an automated stereo 
program delay system, using digital recording techniques.
To what end would this technical excellence be put to use? The 
government of the time, properly, by all accounts did not offer any 
prescription. Obviously enough the A.B.C., with its history of recording 
and broadcasting fine music, would want to exploit the medium for that 
purpose. However it could not help be conscious of pioneering a new 
band, occupied previously by only a small number of public stations. Such 
expectations as members of the public might have of FM, would be focused 
on the new A.B.C. service. There was potential for gaining, and a 
certain obligation to serve, a large audience wanting to receive music 
of a good technical quality. Program makers in all sections of the 
organisation would similarly have high expectations. The possibilities 
were therefore broad and it was decided that while "fine" music would be 
the theme, that wasn't to mean "heavy" classical music all the time.
The definition would be liberal. After six months, for instance, it was 
announced that programming to date was being assessed, and the 
Commission would "continue to evaluate further options. Some changes
already have been made towards lighter music programmes in the early
• „ 6 evening".
That particular question was to become the source of most doubt 
and discussion about the service. It was seen as a large problem still, 
for instance, after 2‘/x years of operation: "Substantial difficulties 
4 A.B.C. 46th Annual Report, 1977-78, Sydney, A.B.C., 1978, p.42.
5 A.B.C. 48th Annual Report, 1979-80, Sydney, A.B.C., 1980, p. 30.
6 A.B.C. 45th Annual Report, 1975-76, Sydney, A.B.C., 1976, p. 12.
mexist in designing the output of ABC-FM to satisfy all tastes within 
the confines of a single service. By testing a number of program varia­
tions, the Commission is seeking to provide a service which exploits to
the full the range of opportunities available through FM, and one which
7
meets with the approval of the majority of listeners." This kind of 
testing was unusual for the A.B.C. which, while it has edged into 
popular entertainment with Radio One, has not included the gaining of 
approval from a majority of listeners for its services overall, among 
its chief prerogatives. It has been able to program according to other 
criteria, while at the same time pointing to high cumulative audience
3
figures and very high public prestige. However ABC-FM was to have a 
peculiar set of considerations to deal with, founded, as has been said, 
on the technical excellence of the mode and the expectations built up 
around it.
The A.B.C's Program Director in New South Wales, Mr C.A. Symons, 
was appointed as the first director of ABC-FM. He had a committee to 
map out programs which included the Directors of both the fine music and 
drama departments of the A.B.C., the composition of which signalled the 
initial trend of policy - but he was known also as an innovator, or as 
one staff member put it, "one who did not believe you should impose 
doctrines as to how things should happen", and looked for staff who would 
break out of ordinary program making habits. A number of people 
selected were therefore "not the accepted, tried and true type", and the 
director "had around him in a sense a number of people who had not been 
happy in their area of interest", and were wanting to make changes.
7 Op.cit., A.B.C. 46th Annual Report..., p.10.
8 A.B.C. Elitist Myth Exposed (Part 3 of an A.N.O.P. Poll Commissioned 
by the Dix Committee of Review of the A.B.C.), booklet reprinted from 
Scan, Sydney, A.B.C., July 13-August 12, 1981.
Other optimistic experiments had been going on in the A.B.C.
Through the early 1970s an organisational development project had been
conducted, observing such goals as "more varied and interesting jobs,
scope for individuals to use and develop their talents, and staff
9
consultation in decision making". Radio 2JJ had been launched in Sydney
as a semi-autonomous production unit, with emphasis on a high level of
"self-management". As the Dix committee saw it some years later, such
ideas were enjoying prominence throughout the Commonwealth public
10service at that time.
The result of the preliminary planning and recruitment for the 
service was a program policy which accepted that a broad range of music 
would be played, but with firm qualifications, and a scheme of organis­
ation designed to provoke the broadcasters to act independently and 
break new ground with their programs.
Symons made it public through various outlets'*"'*' that "as much as 
possible of the music content should be distinctive of its kind and should 
make certain intellectual demands and evoke a direct emotional response". 
Staff were appointed to program folk music, jazz and other forms apart 
from the classical music making up the bulk of the repertoire of the 
service, but there was a firm emphasis on quality. A second strand of 
programming policy at the outset, the drive for innovation, was well 
expressed in the ambitions of staff members to include more in the
9 S. Bochner et al., Organisation Development in the A.B.C., Personnel 
Practice Bulletin, vol. 30, no. 3, September 1974, p.224.
Also T.S. Duckmanton, General Manager, A.B.C., Organisational Develop­
ment Project, Memorandum to all staff, 6.4.73.
10 As expressed in a draft prepared for the Dix report and circulated at the 
A.B.C. It may appear in Volume V of the report, not available publicly 
at the time of writing. See Fn. (24), in Section 4, Chapter 2.
11 For example, C. Symons, "Symons Says", letter to Stereo FM Radio,
Sydney 2MBS-FM, April, 1976.
Also successive editions of 24 Hours: ABC-FM Stereo (monthly program 
guide and magazine), Vol. 1, 1976, Sydney, A.B.C.
category of "sound sculpture" or "sound studies", stereo documentaries 
and experimental drama. One staff member reported a project which 
entailed the broadcasting of "sounds of the city" material, live from 
the field, in stereo - something that was perceived within the organis­
ational hierarchy as "ridiculous, pointy headed nonsense".
Organisationally the FM department was formed on the model of an 
agency, designing and planning the output of an independent "station", 
a term which, significantly it would seem, staff members began to use 
for the service they worked for. Within the station, many of the 
accumstomed roles of A.B.C. broadcasters were no longer formally designated. 
Instead, a system of broad salary categories was worked out, spanning 
several of the existing classifications and gradings of program officers, 
announcers and others. It was hoped that the scheme would overcome 
certain frustrations much complained of. It would permit individuals to 
cross from one mode of work to another, as from producing to presenting.
As the theory went, this would offer enrichment to the employee, and the 
benefit on air of an enthusiastic approach to programs. It would also 
permit people to be paid according to the value of work they were 
currently engaged at, with the possibility of a drop in salary, in 
seasons, recognised by all parties including the principal house union.
With modifications over the years, the system provided an "FM 
Officer" range of $12,620-22,820, in 1982, with two salary barriers.
A review committee with staff representation (a senior FM officer 
elected from the staff) was designated to handle barrier assessments and 
claims for accelerated advancement. More radical departures from the 
standard organisational structure were made at 2JJ, and in proposals 
being circulated within the A.B.C. by 1982 for a more general 
12 Op.cit., A.B.C. 46th Annual Report..., p.10.
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consolidation and broadening of roles. The plan devised for ABC-FM
was effective however in permitting staff members to work in diverse
ways, and advanced the possibilities of working on the "radio station"
model. Harrison commented in 1982:
The staff are free to develop whatever kind of programs 
they want. In fact it's almost a necessity in what is 
almost a self-contained unit. One of the advantages of 
being kind of separate I suppose is that you do actually 
have, as in triple-jay, an identity amongst staff, that 
they're working for the station, which perhaps specialist 
department people don't feel.(14)
An organisational framework permitting the department to run ABC-FM 
as a station; staff selected with a view to their taste for creative 
experimentation, and a policy intended to subordinate all other goals 
to achieving a certain standard (as with the music standard, to make 
intellectual demands and evoke a direct emotional response) - it would 
seem to be an attractive prospect, a formula that would produce advant­
ages for the listeners and broadcasters. In the event though, the 
ascendancy of the "new ideas" platform associated with Symons was always 
held in check. Resistance and limitations emanated from three areas: 
from anong the public, where there were articulate demands for a 
"Middle of the Road", or "Beautiful Music" FM station, of the American 
kind; within the A.B.C., where demands for more popular programming were 
being felt, and where the independence of the new network and its 
liberal staffing arrangements were causing irritation; and within the 
national political system, where federal spending was under constant 
review, and the A.B.C. in particular was being cut down in size and given 
less money.
The A.B.C's predicament on the latter point was spelt out clearly
13 See 0. and M. Department, Head Office, A.B.C. Radio Officers Exercise, 
Stage One (0. and M. Discussion Paper), April 1980.
14 Mr Denis Harrison, Controller of FM, A.B.C. Interview with the 
writer, 14.1.82.
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once the Commission had decided to start registering complaints in its
annual report. In 1980, for example, it reported "the level of the
A.B.C's appropriation - after growing for 9 years up to 1974-75 - has
been reduced in real terms every year, for the last 5 years...The
Commission's appropriation, expressed in real terms, for the financial
year 1979-80 was worth approximately $27 1/3 million less (that is a 22%
15 . .reduction) than the appropriation for 1974-75". On staff ceilings
imposed by government, these were "clearly in conflict with Section 43(2)
of the B and T Act", which stated the Commission itself should appoint
16staff, "as it thinks necessary". Despite all complaints the reductions 
took place and were translated into more routinisation, less variety and 
less originality in programming. Experimental programming is labor 
intensive, and the withholding of funds and unavailability of extra staff 
imposed pressure on the FM service, with its staff of only 35 for a 
24-hour operation, to become more a conduit playing records to the 
public, and much less a production house or an agency for commissioning 
or purchase of new types of material.
Two funding matters bore directly on the FM service. The first was 
a proposal to reduce the service to 18 hours a day, as an economy 
measure to help compensate for the budget reductions announced at the 
beginning of 1976. This option was rejected by the Commission of the 
A.B.C. at its January meeting, the same meeting at which it resolved to 
persist with the moves for a relay of 2JJ to Melbourne, and with the 
station's transfer to FM. The threat to FM as a 24 hour operation
17receded steadily, with only occasional re-surfacings, from that time.
The other matter was the postponement of any extension of the
15 Op.cit., A.B.C. 48th Annual Report..., p.6.
16 Ibid., p.5.
17 See Phillip McCarthy, "The A.B.C. Holds Firm on New Radio" in The Age, 
Melbourne, 13.1.76.
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network beyond the first 4 stations, as the government was withholding
funds. The freeze was first made public in the same month, January 1976,
and continued until the launch of the Newcastle station in March 1980.
Subsequent extensions were made to Brisbane, Hobart, Launceston and Perth
(1980) ; Ballarat, Mt Gambia*-, Bunbury and Rockhampton (1981) , and Townsville
(1982). At the time of writing there were no further plans for
expansion, which was seen by the A.B.C. as a matter to take up, when
18
funds again became available.
Manufacturers and distributors of electronic equipment, their
customers who bought stereo sets and wanted to hear soft music, and
certain writers of entertainment features in the press conducted the
campaign for M.O.R. music programming on ABC-FM. It has never been
suggested that the campaign was centrally organised or funded, but rather
that it flowed from false expectations. One staff member from ABC-FM,
on the subject of the misunderstandings: "Chris Symons did not mind
having diverse musical styles, but they had to be... identified by
quality. We were not to have wallpaper music. It had to require some
listening, and have some basis to it...
There were a couple of unfortunate things that occurred.
When the test transmissions were being run, Telecom had 
allowed them to carry Middle of the Road music, partic­
ularly in Melbourne. Not classical. Middle of the road 
schmalz, throughout December 1975 and January 1976. We 
went to air on Australia Day, and up to that time they'd 
been running sort of muzaky test transmissions, and it 
set up, in a lot of listeners, an expectation that that 
is what they were going to get more of. When it came on 
without that, you immediately had a group who'd been 
given something and weren't being given any more of it, 
who jumped up and down and got very irate about it.(19)
Much of the complaining went on in the letters columns of the
newspapers. The Canberra Times was alive with a debate on the question
18 Harrison, 14.1.82.
19 Mr Peter Morton, Interview with the writer, 16.12.81.
during April 1976, all in response to one letter complaining about the
preponderance of classical music. At least 10 people wrote in support,
and 2 or 3 others wrote in defence of the station. Some of the comments:
'Don't bother me, you musical peasants', says he [Symons],
'the technical excellence of FM transmission is for the 
musically educated minority purists.' (20)
Each of us has recently invested a large amount of money 
in equipping ourselves with the latest in stereo hi fi 
reproduction systems, including the best available FM 
stereo tuners...What a waste of effort and money this has 
turned out to be. Twenty hours of classical music per 
day is...more than the most avid of classical music 
supporters themselves could stomach.(21)
The A.B.C. seems to reflect the preferences of the 
powers-that-be in the establishment, not the preferences 
of the community at large (as indicated, say, by listener 
research). Personally I believe that classical music 
should be curtailed to not more than 50 percent of the 
available [music] air-time on ABC-FM...(22)
Having recently purchased a stereo receiver with the 
intention of hearing good quality hi fi, I was disappointed 
to hear nothing but classical recordings every time I 
switched to FM...0ne would imagine that due to the scarcity 
of FM stations a more fair and just range of music would be 
offered.(23)
(Late that year, after a move in the programming towards M.O.R., a 
counter movement started, with much less force. One writer complained 
as follows: "Before the A.B.C's Melbourne FM radio station was established 
it was widely reported that it would cater exclusively for classical 
music lovers. In spite of this warning, many popular music fans purch­
ased FM sets and created such a hullabaloo that the A.B.C. felt obliged
24to pander to their tastes during peak listening hours...")
Representative comment from manufacturers and distributors came
20 W. Law, "FM Radio Programmes", Canberra Times, Canberra, 5.4.76.
21 R.J. Byrne, J.K. Eckold, M. Watson, R.H. Collins, loc.cit.
22 R.R. Miles, loc.cit.
23 D. Carroll, "FM Radio Programmes", Canberra Times, Canberra, 6.4.76.
24 C. Bush, Nation Review (letters), Sydney, 5.11.76.
from Mr L. Black, Managing Director of Pioneer Electronics Australia and
25
Chairman of the Hi-Fi Industry Association, quoted in Advertising News 
"The market's potential won't be realised until FM licences are issued 
to private enterprise. The A.B.C's stations have technically excellent 
transmission...but their programmes are dominated by classical music, 
are too high brow and have limited appeal. The same applies to the 
subscriber stations". Of the entertainment writers Mr Bill Newnham of 
the Adelaide Advertiser was typical in his conclusion, "the public pays 
for FM and listeners who enjoy the records of James Last and Nana 
Mouskouri should not be denied hearing them enriched by FM's stereo and 
interference free sound".^
This was influential pressure at the A.B.C., where there was no
consensus for the policy as it stood. A larger audience was attractive,
and there would be those on hand to whom M.O.R. on ABC-FM would be
privately very acceptable. Demands within the organisation to be able
to put on an M.O.R. program, "Kaleidoscope", between 5 p.m. and 7 p.m.
17 . . .daily, were eventually assented to. A formal directive was given to 
Symons, that the program be placed, and he later resigned from the 
organisation, towards the end of 1976.
Symons put out a statement which referred to what his goals had 
been in terms of a cultural mission for the A.B.C., as a "force that 
should operate with flair, imagination and courage in making available, 
and allowing the public to participate in, a whole range of ideas and 
experiences". He made particular reference to the third problem area
25 "FM Equipment Marketers Hamstrung by ad hoc Industry Development", 
19.3.76.
26 "The Future Looks Bright for FM", 29.4.76.
27 "Kaleidoscope" was extended after a short time from 5 to 7 days a 
week. The 1978-79 Annual Report of the A.B.C. praises it as "the 
best in light music", and notes that it has "wide appeal. The 
later afternoon and evening programmes provide ABC-FM with its 
largest audience". (A.B.C. 47th Annual Report, 1978-79, Sydney,
A.B.C., 1979, p.46.)
for the new network, the internal mechanisms of the A.B.C. He said he
28
hoped the new A.B.C. Chairman was a quick learner,
not in the sense of bowing submissively to individual 
departments or programme makers, or of laying about him 
with an economic broadsword, but in the sense of 
appreciating the A.B.C. as a cultural force, in the widest 
sense of the word... Highly departmentalised, it has tended 
to become, as the McKinsey investigation of a few years 
ago put it, 'more involved with administrative trans­
actions than the end product - programmes'.(29)
Also in the statement he criticised the Fraser government, which by then
of course had imposed the first of its financial restrictions on the
organisation.
The trouble with the interior life of the A.B.C. was principally
over the relationship between the new department, operating as virtually
an independent radio "station", and specialist departments used to
providing programs for the conventional networks. A staff member of the
time recalled a line-up of federal A.B.C. departments, offering programs
but demanding a set allocation of air-time for them:
They couldn't understand that he [Symons] was saying if 
you wanted to plan a radio station you've got to have 
someone who can on a daily, weekly basis shape programs 
in relation to one another. You can't say I'm going to 
give this hour to this person, this hour to that, and 
have a sort of jigsaw as on Radio 2.
[Question] He was going to use their stuff?
Yes he was going to use it, but they couldn't accept it 
would be at his discretion. What they wanted was 
ownership of air-time.
It must be understood that the program making organisations referred to - 
the Light Entertainment, Radio Drama and Features, Music, Religious and 
even Sport and Rural Departments - are large and powerful within the 
A.B.C., as they provide the bulk of program material on the main radio
28 Bland.
29 "Top A.B.C. Man Resigns" in The Advertiser, Adelaide, 16.10.76. The 
statement was also run in detail in the Melbourne Age.
*  U e .  informal * nah -h> Quoted f>j * on jpotdi .
networks. The small staff numbers at ABC-FM made it dependent on 
services from the departments, to fill its 168 hours weekly. Being based 
in Adelaide, away from the other departmental headquarters, compounded 
the difficulties of liaison between these large organisations wanting to 
operate in the "old" way, and the small one wanting to find new ways.
A further aspect of the "A.B.C." problem for the FM service was a 
run of skirmishing over "presentation standards" and the role of 
announcers. Announcers traditionally, in their style and tone, have 
represented the A.B.C. to the public. In the Reithian tradition they 
have sounded a degree impersonal and uniform, but cultivated and self- 
assured. When ABC-FM was formed with its producer-presenter categories, 
the "FM Officer" classifications, there was no place for announcers as 
such. There was a place for music specialists who could select music for 
themselves to play, then put it to air, but the generalist announcer, 
taking on all scripts and generally hosting the run of block programs, 
from the departments, was mostly a stranger to the scheme. That was seen 
as part of the "old" way - as one informant put it, a "bottled up, 
prepared script, sterile treatment of music". The reaction to this was 
in the form of criticism mostly within the organisation, though it spilt 
over into the newspapers, along the lines that the FM presenters were 
untidy, hesitant, fumbling and casual, and in a lot of cases didn't have 
that cultivated, self-assured type of voice.
Mr A. Mckirdy who succeeded Symons and was Director of FM during 
1977 and 1978, attacked that problem by directly coaching the limited 
number of presenters on his staff. As a veteran announcer he was suitable 
for the task and by all accounts that worked out well. McKirdy inherited 
a situation in which large blocks of music other than classical, headed 
by the controversial "Kaleidoscope", were claiming a prominent place on
the station's schedules. Radio writers in the weekend and afternoon press
mhad been describing the situation, mostly in favourable terms, as one
in which the Middle of the Road had become ascendant, and in which it
30seemed that "listener reaction had won out". The Melbourne Herald 
said "Angry radio fans who abandoned the ABC-FM station might try tuning
again this month. For popular music from Cleo Laine, Leo Kottke and the
31
folk group The Chieftains will soon hit the airwaves".
The approach that was in fact taken, led to a pause in the
progression towards "more M.O.R.". Working on audience research studies,
32
in particular a qualitative study on listening styles, McKirdy proposed 
a change in format to the Commission of the A.B.C. This was rejected, 
but approved after revision and presentation to a second meeting, in 
December 1978. The plan was to reinstate classical music as the staple 
of programming on the network, in conformity with the perception that a 
station will be turned on by listeners, and used regularly, in response 
to their view of its main character and content. To gratify those 
expectations the main "core" of the programming - and in this case 
listeners clearly saw the station as in the main one for classical music - 
needs to be well represented through the day. This is an adage of 
commercial broadcasting, at least for stations using "newer" formats 
like continuous "beautiful music".
30 Gloria Bruzzone, "FM Soon to Give Listener More MOR", in the Sunday 
Mail, Adelaide, 29.8.76.
31 7.8.76, "Switched Off Fans Tune in Again".
32 A.B.C., The Market for FM Radio Broadcasts: Marketing Research Report 
Prepared for the Audience Research Dept, A.B.C., Job No. 705/199, 
Sydney, July, 1977. (A study of 760 Melbourne households assessing 
set penetration, levels of support for the ABC-FM service, and the 
potential for expansion of the audience. 36% of households at the time 
had an FM receiver, though that was double the number of the previous 
year, and 17% had high fidelity reproduction equipment. No more than 
one fifth of the potential market - i.e. set owners - could be class­
ified as regular listeners, though another one-third of that number 
were amenable to become listeners. They had been discouraged by what 
they saw as "esoteric" programming. The regular listeners were 
characterised as being of the higher socio-economic status and educ­
ation ranges, and younger rather than older than the norm.)
At ABC-FM the change meant that certain rock music, jazz, show 
business and childrens' programs were dropped, or relegated to a 
secondary role. The Age Green Guide of 12th January, 1978, quoted from 
a document which it said was read out at the previous month's meeting of 
the A.B.C.:
It is not intended that materials of this sort be discont­
inued but that they be placed where they fit more neatly 
into the pattern of ABC-FM, the material then being more a 
servant of the whole than itself being a focal point...For 
example rock music would find a place in a feature on the 
impact which music has had; folk music would find a place 
in a feature on the cultural heritage of various countries.(33)
The changes caused a new flurry of public interest but generally were
not seen as radical moves. ^
The present Controller of FM, Mr D. Harrison, has followed more the 
pattern of "something for everybody", which he points out was included 
in the loose brief given to the station by the A.B.C. in 1975, one which 
emphasised classical music but admitted the possibility of much else.
He took up the position at the beginning of 1979; gives his position as 
being responsive to demands and proposals from whatever quarters, whether 
from staff members wanting to embark on a new kind of program, or 
program departments wanting a place for major productions; and stresses 
that policies for the network are best seen as "flexible" and "developing".
33 Mark Lawrence, "ABC to Revamp its FM Radio Programming".
34 Phillip McCarthy, "Rock and All That Jazz Will Stay: ABC", in The Age, 
Melbourne, 17.1.78. ("The new format is designed to give the FM 
service a more integrated sound without sudden changes from one form 
of music to another... But yesterday Mr McKirdy said the new format 
would include a daily week-night jazz and blues programme plus the 
return of his own mellow music programme once heard on 3L0...")
"Classic Row Brewing Over FM Programmes" in the Sunday Mail, Adelaide, 
15.1.78. ("About 20 hours of regular weekly programming - including 
the popular 'Rock-day' and 'Jazz Track' are being scrapped...
Announcers affected by the decision have been instructed not to 
comment...The A.B.C's Controller of Radio Programs, Mr James Peter, 
told me that FM listeners would still be able to hear folk, jazz and 
rock, 'but not in the solid block...which we get at the present time'.")
35 Interview, 14.1.82.
Over time, and particularly more recently, there has been a 
concentration on the placement of "lighter" material in a strip of time 
beginning in the lunch hour ("Midway with Maynard", now "Straight Down 
the Middle") and extending through the late afternoon ("Kaleidoscope") 
and into the early evening, with the selection of better-known classical 
music, or music "from the repertoire", for the period between seven and 
eight. A point has been made to programmers that in the selection of 
material for this hour the best-known and best-recognised composers 
should be represented, prompting a rejoinder from one critic on the staff, 
that it's "the Reader's Digest top ten classic hits". In other ways 
there has been a leavening and "lightening", as in the case of opera, 
where Gilbert and Sullivan old favourites are now included in the class­
ification for programming purposes. Time is also found for brass bands, 
"big" bands and mellow ballads under the "light entertainment" heading.
The extension of the network into provincial cities has been seen 
by Management as another reason to adjust programs for the network 
overall, more towards popular tastes. Harrison explains it in these 
terms:
It is complicated as we are national plus...The move to the 
country has interested me in the last twelve months because 
there, we have suddenly become an alternative A.B.C. station.
It may not have been intended, but as it happened, we offer 
a choice. There you have a chance of picking up a reason­
able proportion of the audience. Numbers admittedly are not 
big, but they are reasonable. It's already proven in 
Canberra. We're the only FM station and do quite well.
We've adjusted to that in the extension of 'Kaleidoscope' to 
7 days a week, as part of that.(36)
Part of the rationale for this policy is that it is after all fair 
to provide for a wide range of musical tastes, so that people have the 
opportunity to hear their favourite kinds of music, broadcast in stereo. 
There is a theory being propounded as well that audience attention given
36 Interview, 14.1.82.
to more popular material will transfer to other programs which are
harder - more intellectually demanding, and requiring a more specific
emotional response. "We start them with something very pleasant and not 
37too banal." It is partly an educational theory, and since the audi­
ences are larger in the late afternoons and early evenings than at other 
times, it would be reasonable to see if such a transfer starts to show 
itself.
It is true also, however, that aggregate listenership for the
service has always been very low and shows little potential for increasing.
The "other FM" category which takes in ABC-FM, in the McNair Anderson 
38surveys, has rarely moved up beyond an overall market share of 2
39percent. The Head of A.B.C. Audience Research perceives that the 
service draws listeners predominantly from the same field as the A.B.C's own 
Radio 2,itself a minor field, and that the potential for a substantial growth 
in aggregate numbers is rather negligible. Fluctuations in audience 
numbers contained in the McNair Anderson reports are within the margin 
of statistical error for those surveys, and therefore give no solid 
information to programmers.
The orderly drift towards the "middle of the road" has meant a 
partial solution to the dilemmas facing the A.B.C., at the beginning of 
the six year existence of the network. That does not mean either that 
quality is abandoned. Given that the sound quality and presentation of 
recordings and live music broadcasts are held to be of a good standard, 
virtually by all, some crude figures should help to confirm the 
impression of a plethora of riches coming to the music lover. Forty 
operas are broadcast each year. In 1981 "Figaro" was presented in two
37 Interview, 14.1.82.
38 With the exception of Canberra where there is less competition - none 
at all on the FM band.
39 Mr George Jakab.
consecutive months, as there were two new recordings out and "people
40wanted to compare them". During the concert season m  1978-79,
ABC-FM presented 25 concert broadcasts direct and an average of 4
41 . . .recorded A.B.C. concerts a week. Television simulcasts are represent­
ative as well of an area of activity well received by the public and
receiving good attention on the ABC network, especially with orchestral
42
concerts and opera. Experimental music is represented, and
"contemporary radio art: electronic music, improvised music on a variety
43
of instruments, audio art, sound poetry and pictures..."
Internally the network organisation, by general consent, has been 
44
"settling down". There have been departures from the unit, by people 
disappointed with the outcome of events, and the engagement of others 
wanting to come to terms with the situation as it has evolved. Complaints 
over bureaucratic procedures and hierarchical blockages have persisted, 
as in the case of delays in getting approval for costed program 
proposals - though broad salary scales have remained, and offer uncommon 
freedom of action to the broadcasters.
More importantly, demands have been made with the backing of most 
staff for relocation of the network headquarters to Sydney. The 
argument, as might be expected, is that proximity would help in relations 
with the production departments, and that the program makers would 
benefit enormously in their work if located closer to the cultural 
"centre". This is an argument which rejects the picture of Adelaide as 
the "Athens of the South". "They'd look at the place and say isn't it
40 Harrison, 14.1.82.
41 A.B.C. 47th Annual Report, 1978-79, Sydney, A.B.C., 1979, p.45.
42 In some cases these have been compared to disadvantage however with 
opera being offered on simulcast by 2MBS-FM and Channel 0/28.
43 Op.cit., A.B.C. 48th Annual Report.♦., p.37.
44 Harrison, 14.1.82.
lively", said one broadcaster, "but they didn't realise it only happened 
every two years". The argument for a move has been added to by 
observations that the initial choice of location was pragmatic, and 
political: the A.B.C. was in sympathy with the decentralisation policy 
of the government in 1975, and prepared to fall in with the government's 
desire to see quick results, by setting up operations where it had 
facilities on hand. After time, it was estimated the move would cost 
less than $300,000.
In response, Harrison sees little prospect for a move, even if the
financial options were better. "Cultural life in Adelaide is sufficient
to be a reasonable environment to work with. You do not feel isolated.
In this day and age, and technology, the headquarters could be anywhere,
though I wouldn't particularly welcome Broken Hill. Historically it's
important to recognise that had it not been set up in Adelaide, it would
45not have been set up at all." At the core of that debate is the
question of whether the headquarters of a cultural enterprise of the
type, really can be located at all remotely, without appreciable loss of
quality. There is no agreement, and the debate will have to remain
deadlocked on that point for some time to come.
Because of the nature of the issues dealt with in this chapter,
it is fitting to go back to a question raised at the beginning of the
period under review. In 1975, much was made of the possibility that
ABC-FM would be an instrument to break new ground. In one aspect, this
ambition to address new audiences through new strategies was expressed
by one of the first program makers, Mr Tony Bond:
There's also the rather faint hope that if you play 
popular things, if you play Beethoven all day, then 
you'll build an audience. The station argued that 
you don't, of course. You're preaching to the 
converted and what you should be doing is building a
45 Interview, 14.1.82.
generation not an audience...I think to appeal to the 
younger generation you've got to play music of the 
present time. You can also expect that they may grow 
into some of the older music, but you can't catapult 
them back to the 17th, 18th century...The historical 
perspective is something that has to be learnt over a 
number of years. Yet there's so much modern classical 
music, if we can categorise it that way, modern sounds 
which we know young people respond to. They don't tune 
in to hear it on FM because there isn't that 
consistency of programming.(46)
The same kind of challenge was put to the network early in its 
life by a writer in Quadrant. It is quoted in the following, and the 
question is left open as to whether, or to what extent, the challenge 
has been answered:
We grow up listening to the ABC's narrow idea of "good" 
music, the same repertoire is then regurgitated in an 
eternity of Subscription Concerts, and finally we die 
with our headphones on, straining to hear the same old 
favourites on the new FM. We may not know much about 
music, but we like what we know...
There can be no real justification for restricting 
and then re-inforcing tastes formed by exposure to a 
prejudiced choice of music. (I should say that there is_ 
a certain amount of unfamiliar music broadcast on FM, 
and they are to be commended for doing so, but most of 
it is either obscure, second-rate Baroque or the kind of 
cloying, late-Romantic rubbish which rots so deservedly 
in the back rooms of second-hand bookshops.)...
ABC-FM is not just unimaginative, it is boring.
Tortuous compendiums of faintly related material may look 
clever on paper, but it all comes out as long slabs of 
music attractive to very few ears.
Because the ABC finds it comfortable to continue 
pandering for a minority they already know, they disen­
franchise perhaps a million listeners...
ABC-FM has crept upon us in stereophonic 
anonymity, and seems set to stay that way. It shouldn't.(47)
46 Interview with the writer, 8.1.82.
47 David Salter, "ABC-FM: Mega Hertz Elites" in Quadrant, Sydney, June, 
1976.
Section 4; Chapter 2
2JJJ-FM
'V
Radio 2JJ in  Sydney attained notoreity from i t s  inception and 
has loeen the subject o f various studies, which normally focus on two 
aspects, the s ta tio n 's  programming, and i t s  internal organisation, 
planned as i t  was as a form o f democracy at the work-place.
I t s  history is  well-known and can be encapsulated in this way: 
the sta tion  was founded by the A.B.C. a t the request o f the Labor govern­
ment in  January, 1975; i t  made a big impression as i t  was the f i r s t  new 
sta tion  in Sydney since the 1930s, and immediately broke out o f the 
programming restr ic tio ns observed by the existing  sta tions - especially  
restr ic tio ns on the wide selection  o f music available to  be played, and 
on ta lk  about sex; i t  suffered set-backs however, f i r s t  o f a ll  through 
having to use a stand-by transmitter which gave only poor coverage o f 
the Sydney area, and then through a series o f delays in  transferring i t  
to FM; even a fte r  the FM transfer took place, in  mid-1980, there was no 
improvement in  the s ta tio n 's  ratings performances, which were mediocre 
from the s ta r t, and which came to be used against i t ;  the weak audience 
response in  quantitative terms spurred on the soul searching and 
discussion that took place, over the quality and social value o f the 
s ta tio n 's  output. Throughout the short history o f 2JJ/2JJJ-FM i t  has 
experienced internal turmoil, which should be looked a t in  terms of i t s  
value to programs, as a creative form o f product, or i t s  adverse e ffe c t  
on them.
The present study w ill look a t the internal arrangements o f 2JJ/ 
2JJJ-FM, in terms o f the rationale for se ttin g  i t  up as i t  was, and in  
terms o f the stra ins i t  endured, and i t s  future prospects. Three other 
sets o f problems w ill be dealt with: programming and audience relations, 
the transmitter issue, and other p o litica l matters.
The writer worked as a journa list a t 2JJ during 1975, and again 
from the s ta r t o f 1979 t i l l  early 1982. Much o f what follows obviously 
w ill be drawn from regular contact with the situa tion  under review.
•n
Origins, Structure and Organisation 
The strictly political origins of 2JJ have been looked at already}
It was a matter of a section of the government becoming anxious to see 
changes in broadcasting, and finding the material wherewithal in the 
form of the A.B.C., and its stand-by transmitters in Melbourne and Sydney. 
Younger audiences up to that time had been served almost exclusively by 
commercial broadcasters who, with the emphasis on maximising audiences 
and minimising risks to themselves, had plainly left much room for 
creative exploration by a non-commercial station. The Sydney station was 
marked off as a "young style" station in the hope that the challenge 
would be taken up.
Both government and the A.B.C. then had need of some means, or
more exactly some suitable people, to put the proposition into effect.
The A.B.C. called on the producers of its successful album rock
2
program, "Room To Move", and on some staff members, notably Webb, who'd
3
been associated with R.A.M. , and/or "n+1", a group that had been
4canvassing for a licence to open a rock station on FM. This was the
collection of people identified by Harding as "a small group of bright
young broadcasters sympathetic to the concept of broadcasting which was
eventually epitomised by 2JJ, [and who] had excellent informal lines of
5communication with the Labor government".
One aspect of the commercial broadcasters' ire over the formation 
of 2JJ was the interest taken in the station by the government - a 
government not overly concerned with guarding the interests of 
competitors in the market place. The Whitlam government, while it lasted,
1 Section 3, Chapter 2.
2 Mr Ron Moss, Mr Ted Robinson, Mr Chris Winter.
3 The Radio Action Movement, a group urging reforms within the A.B.C.
4 Op.cit., Dickenson. Radio Reform pp.11-14.
5 Op.cit., Harding, p.6.
did assist the station directly, by guaranteeing to provide funds for
its continuation beyond the initial "experimental" stage, and by making
arrangements, unsuccessfully in the end, to transfer the service to FM
and relay it to Melbourne. Cass as Media Minister, as we have seen,^
took a particular interest in 2JJ. In a most indirect way the government
helped shield the operation as well, through its appointees to the
7
A.B.C., notably the Commission Chairman, who were always prompt to 
dismiss illiberal claims and extreme allegations made against 2JJ.
The group eventually formed to run 2JJ however, far from being a 
radical group, was as notable for the number of people in it who were 
uninterested in politics, or not knowledgeable on the subject. This 
was the outcome of recruitment to fill the needs of the job - the task of 
getting the station to air in a matter of months, as the government had 
asked, and in operating it for 24 hours a day. Recruits came in roughly 
equal proportions from within the A.B.C., commercial radio, and from 
other areas including the record companies.
All were caught up in the excitement of the enterprise - a new 
outlet, in a coveted audience area, emerging at the centre of a political 
storm - but, in as much as there was a consensus over social goals, they 
saw their mission in the following terms: they could break and weaken 
inhibiting rules governing what could be said on air, and they would be 
able to broadcast much more of the enormous volume of contemporary music 
by then being recorded, and being sold in large quantity in shops, but 
given very scant attention on radio. A case in point would be that of
6 Section 3, Chapter 2.
7 Professor R. Downing.
8 The Contemporary Radio Unit (C.R.U.), of the A.B.C., numbering some 40 
people when part-time staff members and persons on secondment from 
other Departments are included.
9 An assessment drawn from comments by staff members during interviews 
with the writer, late in 1975, and recorded in a paper: L. Duffield,
The Experiment with 2JJ: January 1975-Janu.ary 1976, September, 1976.
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a Producer Presenter who'd had long battles with his previous employer, 
2SM, over the handling of sex on air. He had had to cut the word 
"sexy" out of a song on one occasion. His inaugural project on 2JJ was, 
accordingly, a program called the "Ins and Outs of Love", in which 
people got to reminisce about the first time they had sex. It was 
greeted with some protests in the press, but the episode ended with the 
impression made, that perhaps some barriers had been made to crumble.
At its centre, nevertheless, the group obviously had its attach­
ments to ideas concerning power and organisation which were strongly in 
vogue at the time. This was reflected in the way the C.R.U. came to be 
structured, at the outcome of months of discussion with the Organisation 
and Methods (0. and M.) Department of the A.B.C. What eventuated was a 
blending of left-wing notions of collectivism and worker control, and 
liberal behaviourists' ideas about industrial democracy.
A researcher who spent time at 2JJ in 1980, observing the work 
routines, examining files and talking with staff past and present,10 
concluded that "idealism in the structure and organisation of the C.R.U. 
was a reaction against structures of the A.B.C., against formularisation 
of the commercial stations, and against hierarchy in general. Broad 
social movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s also informed these 
ideas".* 11 To help substantiate that she quotes from Cheney in an 
interview: "I've always thought the strictly authoritarian and 
hierarchical way most people organise their working lives was very 
wasteful and that there simply had to be another way. The other influ­
ences with me were the womens' movement... and the moratoriums. You saw
12people there working in coalitions and co-operatives".
10 Helen Dickenson.
11 Op.cit., Dickenson, Development p.13.
12 Loc.cit.
The structure of the unit was centred on 2 Co-ordinators, an
arrangement that evolved out of a situation in which Moss and Webb had
been jointly leading the team, while forming the station. As Moss put
13it, the partnership idea helped to "break down hierarchy", management 
had no objection to continuing with it, and as well was prepared to 
leave the same two persons in charge of the on-going operation, once 
establishment of it was complete.
Other main features were broad salary scales, similar to those at 
ABC-FM, and formed on the same inspiration. Staff members would be 
assessed by committee and paid at a point along the scale commensurate 
with the estimate of their work. Within the broad categories, they would 
be able to work in a number of different roles. The main program-making 
category would be the Producer Presenters, and a smaller group,
Program Clerks, would provide production and clerical support. There 
would be no salary barriers, but rather regular reviews for all. The 
review committee would have 3 members elected by staff, a person from 
outside the C.R.U. but chosen in the same way, and
14
one station Co-ordinator. The other Co-ordinator and the A.G.M.(R) 
would sit on appeals. General business on the station was to be 
referred to regular staff meetings, and a committee system was in use 
for a time, to handle such matters as the annual direct expenses budget, 
or publicity for special programs.
Management took a generally "hands off" attitude towards the unit, 
with very little direct involvement or supervision in matters of 
planning, staffing or programming. The main exchanges with management 
occurred when there was trouble over a program, as when, in 1980, a 
freelance announcer said on air he was experiencing "technical fuck-ups".
13 Moss..., op.cit., Duffield, Experiment with 2JJ..., p.7.
14 Assistant General Manager (Radio).
There was a listener complaint to the CR1, who ordered that the 
announcer no longer be engaged. The announcer left Sydney for an 
extended period; the station Co-ordinators argued his case in the mean­
time, and he was eventually reinstated.
In general the absence of a detailed management interest is 
welcomed by the staff, for the plain reason that they are thus less 
inhibited in their work. On the part of the managers themselves, their 
relative inattention is explained as an intentional position, founded 
on the idea that the people making the programs will learn from exper­
ience, and in the meantime are always likely to make the best estimates 
of what is best to offer the public. MacKriell articulated the 
position, talking about some of the controversies of 1975:
In some instances I think that judgments have been made 
with which I wouldn't necessarily agree, but from the 
management level it is not acceptable for one to say that 
there is a measure of autonomy given, and then to say 
'but you must never make a mistake'. That seems to me 
quite inconsistent. People must,and the Commissioners have 
said this in the past, must have the freedom to make 
mistakes...(16)
There are two possible objections to this line of approach, which 
have emerged during the years that it has been tried out. Both concern 
the extent of managerial responsibility for what takes place, in the 
first case, to do with internal organisation, when the operation breaks 
down, as when there is inertia and conflict; and in the second case, 
when objections are made to the program performance of the station.
The "living system" at the C.R.U., the kinds of relationships 
produced by the way the work is organised, is often uncomfortable, and 
can be oppressive when there are matters in dispute. The shallow 
hierarchical structure invites power struggles at all levels, over issues
15 Mr A. Wyndham, Controller of Radio 1, who has responsibility for the 
C.R.U.
16 Mr K. MacKriell, A.G.M.(R). Op.cit., Duffield, Experiment with 2JJ...,
p. 38.
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big and small. This activity might be seen as acceptable to a degree, 
in an environment where creative people are found, and creative activity 
is the norm. However to the writer it frequently presents itself as 
pathological and extraneous to the work of the radio station.
Support for these conclusions is offered by the report of 
Dickenson, the outside observer. She noted a high level of dissension, 
though the organisation at the time she was there was embroiled in one 
of its worst divisions - a protracted dispute between two groups, each 
urging a different program policy (broadly "popular" versus "creative"), 
and each identified with one of the 2 Co-ordinators.
She made further comments however which may be said to have 
applied throughout the station's experience:-
- Where there were disputes, they were allowed to go uncontrolled, 
ironically because of the system of shared management and group 
decision making, which made no provision for mediation;
- Individuals could be excluded, derided and dismissed, if they 
failed to comply with consensus attitudes. It was "almost suppression 
of free speech". The example was given of the journalist P.D. Jack, who 
would put forward a resolution at a meeting, for instance, that "The 
salary assessments system means the kids have got the keys to the bikkie 
tin", or "We should admit we have failed to attract a young audience and 
should stop stacking the place with friends and ageing hacks". He may 
have been taken to task over the serious claims he usually made, but 
instead was "barely tolerated as an amusing trouble-maker", and attempts 
were made to "talk him down".
- Policy matters were still not being formulated at general 
meetings, where announcements and administrative arrangements were more 
the order of the day;
- Staff were uncertain whether the group democracy experiment
I f f
could be considered a success at the end of 1975, and still differed 
over that point 4 years later;
- "For some the idea of being responsible to a group rather than
to an authority figure seemed to have little influence on behaviour", and
- "Group politics within staff meetings in 1975 showed that most
media workers do not have the background or type of education which
would equip them for equality in decision-making." Co-operation and
experimentation might be more likely to take place, in a group "educated
in the concept, trained in its operation and willing to undergo constant
17debate and challenge to its way of thinking".
Problems for the station were exacerbated additionally by a high 
turnover in the Co-ordinator positions. If we include one person who 
acted as Co-ordinator for 6 months, there were 6 Co-ordinators during 
the first 6 years. Three left for other jobs with the A.B.C. (including 
Webb who stood down while a member of the Commission), one following 
disagreements with the other Co-ordinator, and 2 to follow a career 
outside the A.B.C. The result was that during the early years of the 
operation a firm, consistent lead was not forthcoming from Co-ordinators 
in working out broad policy for the station and getting it organised.
One problem contributing to the resignation rate in this area was the 
burden of work entailed in co-ordinating so much production, and handling 
such extra matters as the inadequate transmitter and change to FM. 
Further, people appointed as Co-ordinators were usually in their 
thirties and at a point in their careers when a range of competing job 
options were opening to them.
None of these observations would seem to require drastic inter­
vention, or automatic restructuring of the unit along conventional 
lines, but the experience of 7 years of operations has suggested ways
17 Op.cit., Dickenson, Development pp.26, 28, 33 and 34.
to make adjustments and improvements. In the relationship between the 
C.R.U. and the wider organisation, these might include (i) more active 
liaison with confidences exchanged in both directions, and more 
detailed monitoring by managers of the situation at 2JJJ; (ii) consult­
ation between management and staff members over problem areas, where
18the structure and organisation can be modified; (iii) mediation where 
intractable disputes break out within the station, especially in a 
situation where managers have good information on the situation <jnd can 
make informed suggestions, and (iv) thorough training for all roles, 
both in the area of broadcasting skills, and the managerial skills, or
at least organising skills, needed to one extent or another, by all
__ 19 staff.
Beyond that it would correct the perspective of this report to 
give a reminder that most if not all organisational settings have their 
problems with human relationships and morale. Boredom and repressive 
supervision, and a tradition of saying no to new proposals are some of 
the features of many conventional work places, which experiments like 
the C.R.U. were intended to change. While the shortcomings of the 
arrangements at 2JJJ may be evident, and must be held to cause damage, 
the operation is perhaps best judged on its own terms. It can be judged
18 At the time of writing something of the kind seemed that it might 
be in the offing. After consultation with a meeting of staff the 
Co-ordinators arranged with the A.G.M.(R) to defer salary assessments 
for 1982. It was argued that the process was too involved to be 
done annually, as it required several interviews and much preparation 
for same. A modification of the assessments system was to be 
discussed. On a related point, it was generally acknowledged that an 
"incremental creep" had developed, with a number of Program Clerks 
and Producer Presenters moving rapidly to the top of their salary 
scale. That was perceived as an embarrassment to supporters of broad 
banded salaries, if not as actually invalidating the scheme. Some 
salary reductions were made in 1981, and in meetings of staff it was 
suggested often that a pause of one year would help reduce the 
pressure for continued rises.
19 There were some steps in this direction in 1981, with staff members 
attending courses in staff selection, team building and transactional 
analysis, as well as courses in general broadcasting techniques, at 
the A.B.C. Training Centre.
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fruitfully by the product.
Programming
Programming on 2JJ/2JJJ and audience responses to it have been
20the subject of recurrent studies. The volume of output is high in 
every sense. Production facilities at 2JJJ, which consisted in 1981 of 
two monaural production booths and the second of the two broadcasting 
studios, have always been heavily booked. The stream of pre-produced 
programs has meant a much heavier concentration of documentaries, 
music "specials", news segments and interviews than on any competing 
station. Quality is apt to fluctuate, though there have been many 
accolades for programs out of 2JJ/2JJJ as production house. There was 
early recognition for 2JJ comedy material, beginning with the grotesque 
Captain Goodvibes character, Chuck Chunder of the Space Patrol, and 
then the Naked Vicar. More recently 2JJJ productions have been taken 
up for replay on the A.B.C. network stations. Two such programs were 
the documentaries, "The Body Beautiful", a program for summer, and the 
"Titanic", a "history" special with eerie effects. Another "Summer" 
program, tentatively called "Ocean, Motion and Lotion" was being 
recorded as a joint production by 2JJJ and ABC-FM, in the summer of 
1981-82.21
It would be a fair summary comment to say that the recorded 
programs of 2JJ/2JJJ have been essential in differentiating it from 
other radio stations, especially among those that play to the younger 
age ranges; it is an area of high investment both of money and talent, 
which competitors normally do not or cannot match, and an area where
20 Op.cit., Dickenson, Duffield. Various research reports by students 
in media or government courses at Sydney University, U.N.S.W. or 
N.S.W.I.T. Audience research projects undertaken by 2JJ/2JJJ (see 
below, this Chapter).
21 These programmes are listed each year in the supplementary public­
ation attached to the annual report of the A.B.C. For 1979-80, more 
than 200 documentaries and news specials, live music broadcasts and 
recorded music specials were listed. The following year, even after 
the drastic curtailment of programs of January 1981, more than 85 
were given.
the station's contribution is taken most seriously in the general 
community, again, particularly among the young. There is a promising 
future, as the unit has been re-equiping for stereo, as rapidly as its 
finances will allow.
The 24-hour music service is however the staple of the operation
and the key to how the station is used by the public, and how much.
The choices open to music specialists on 2JJ in 1975 were relatively
easy. In the contemporary music field, people were buying more albums,
which they could listen to on good equipment. These sales were at such
a high level there was no doubt about what was happening in the market
place - yet radio stations generally were sticking to highly restricted
22play-lists, and using mainly "singles". The initial strategy of 2JJ
was therefore uncomplicated: to play a wide selection of music.
Given its transmission problems, the new station achieved a very
noticeable share in the McNair Anderson market share ratings, normally
an average 5 or 6 percent of all listeners, for its first 18 months.
This was sufficient for Harding, and others to make out an argument that
the station was posing a strong commercial threat to its competitors.
It peaked to about 8 percent. As its signal could only 
be received regularly and satisfactorily in half the 
Sydney area, it can be seen that it has taken away from 
the commercials up to 16 percent of the audience. This 
achievement undermines the standard commercial justific­
ation for banal programming - 'People listen to us in 
great numbers so we must be giving them what they want'
...it has been vibrant, irreverent, and most unforgive- 
able of all, successful.(23)
22 There were strong commercial reasons for continuing to do so.
Stations playing only the "Top 40 singles and Top 10 album tracks", 
in constant rotation, still dominated the audience ratings in 1975.
23 That argument is an example of the kind of polemical backing given to 
the station, and the hopes vested in it, as a counter-weight to 
commercial services. It is correct in putting the emphasis on market 
share ratings, as it is difficult to underestimate the persuasive 
power of these figures in debate about radio. Rightly or wrongly, 
virtually everybody takes a lot of notice of the ratings - irresp­
ective of other critical standards they might also recognise. In the
As it came to pass, quantitative measures of success were
dangerous ground for 2JJ. It became apparent rather early that the
transmission problem would not be rectified in the short-term, if the
station itself survived, and that the audience share was not likely to
grow. It slumped to 3 percent by the middle of 1977 and has stayed at
around that level for virtually all successive surveys. The poor
ratings performance has in fact been registered as a sign of failure in
many quarters, not least the Dix committee inquiring into the A.B.C.,
which decided the station had not gained strong acceptance in Sydney,
and recommended that it be given a new role, not as a station for young
people any more, but as an outlet for experiemental programs in such
fields as public affairs and ethnic radio. The committee also dismissed
24
proposals for networking the service to other cities.
Many reasons have been settled on for the failure: a response from
other stations to 2JJ and to market forces generally, - especially by
2SM - by playing a broader range of music; the arrival of new stations
25
aimed at one section or other of the 2JJ age group; a kind of 
attrition tiring out the loyal listener, as reception continued to be 
bad, with no relief in sight; the novelty of the new station wearing off 
for listeners as fatigue set in among the staff, after the first 
tremendously hectic year; and a demographic shift away from 2JJJ and 
stations like it, as the generation of the "baby boom" moved on.
More obviously, the music format needed to be looked at. 2JJ, with
(Fn. 23 continued) particular case, Harding's argument did not stand 
the test of time, as 2JJ/2JJJ continued to lose audiences and 
receded as a threat to commercial domination. The station's ratings 
reached their highest point at 7.1% in 1976, and thereafter declined, 
reaching a low of 1.9% in the first survey of 1982. With the AM 
transmitter, early listener research by the A.B.C. established that 
unsatisfactory reception of 2JJ was being experienced by of Sydney 
households. (A.B.C. Audience Research, Early Progress, Double Jay 
Rock, Sydney, 9.4.75).
24 The A.B.C. in Review: National Broadcasting for the 1980's. Report 
by the Committee of Review of the A.B.C., Canberra, A.G.P.S., 1981. 
Vol. 1, Part 2. Paragraphs 8.23, 8.24, 8.26, and 8.59 to 8.65 incl.
25 2WS, 2SER-FM, 2MMM-FM, 2DAY-FM.
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its eclectic brief, came to commit itself increasingly to the promotion
of new music. Its overall impression, as listeners reported in the
surveys, was of good "variety", but not much familiarity. In particular,
while the audience response remained predominantly in the target age
area of 18-24, females were very poorly represented. A contract
researcher who began doing small qualitative studies for the station in
1980 probed this problem and suggested that females more than males
rejected the music program, if it was found to be too esoteric and
2 6
demanding of attention. Larger surveys made after 1975 did not do
much to elaborate on the suggestions of a report commissioned by the
station in August of that year, which represented its "irregular"
listeners, the ones it needed to attract to build ratings, as differing
only from the "regulars" in attitudes to the music. They "expressed a
desire to change double-jay's role from that of a leader or innovator
in musical awareness and appreciation toward music played by commercial 
27broadcasters".
Put simply there was not much potential in the short term for 
attracting a big audience to the more adventurous, less familiar 
program on 2JJ. If the program were perservered with, hope would have 
to be pinned on the theory that listeners might become more educated to 
it over time. The station was thus apt to be seen - fairly or unfairly - 
as the teacher, even "talking down to people" and being "snobbish" 
about the music, which it felt they ought to listen to, and which it 
insisted on putting in front of them.
26 Surveys by Mr R. Ayers, 1980-82. A change toward higher female 
representation, mostly in the younger age groups, is suggested 
in the most recent to date: Ricki Ayers, Audience Survey for 
2JJJ-FM, Sydney, March, 1982.
27 Hoare, Wheeler and Associates, Radio Station 2JJ: An Audience Review, 
Sydney, August, 1975.
A compounding of the issue occurred with the advent of British
punk in 1977. Programmers on the station told Dickenson that staff
members had been "feeling an ennui" with what the station had been
playing, and also had begun to run out of "classic" rock and roll songs
to include in daily schedules as a fresh element. As the young audience
"presumably required novelty in their music", a sudden change was
engineered, away from a mix of loose styles within a loose format
presented by a constantly-changing roster of announcers, to a stable on-
air roster emphasising punk music. This had "since been seen as a major
programming error. Programmer Russell Stendell was enthusiastic over
the new sound at the time, but believes now that punk music was too
28demanding for the average listener". In particular, the new wave 
music of that time was even less suited to "background" listening than 
anything which had gone before, with the result that listeners who 
complained about the unfamiliarity of the music would also complain that 
it had to be actively listened to, or, because it was rowdy, turned off.
As programmers themselves are keen on the variety of music avail­
able, it would prove most difficult for them to persuade themselves to 
make truly radical adjustments in the "popular" direction. Yet some 
adjustments have been made. Interviewed by the writer, Stendell 
described a rotational system in use by 2JJJ, under which some 2000 
records are used on a monthly basis. A number of tracks may be played 
from each record. The variety is therefore immense, and while a lot 
of tracks are given high rotation, these are not necessarily ones already 
popular with the mass audience. The device of high rotation is in fact 
to "make tracks familiar", where they appear likely to take on. The 
selection process here is fairly intuitive, based on "taste and 
popularity, in terms of if we like them; if others like them; we keep an
28 Op.cit., Dickenson, Programming p.14.
eye on developments overseas, or local developments, and what's being
29
sold in the import shops".
There is much gratification for the radio station in the high 
number of new songs and new groups it has introduced to the larger public, 
and gratification also for substantial elements in the community who 
closely follow popular music. (Frequently songs featured on 2JJJ are 
picked up by commercial stations much later.) A few random examples 
of performers so assisted are Dire Straits, the B-52s and Ian Dury, all 
given heavy attention on 2JJJ before breaking into the bigger markets 
in Australia. The station is popular with Australian bands because of 
this preparedness to promote new material, in their case through making 
its own recordings of live performances. The role of "first car off 
the rank", or of promoter-publicist is important, too, because no other 
outlet, certainly none in commercial radio, is able to take the risk 
of carrying the failures along with the ones that become hits.
Serious tension therefore exists between the desire to be popular, 
and the very valid function of offering a kind of cultural (not to say 
commercial) service. Efforts have been made of course to resolve the 
dilemma. A drive to move the program towards a more limited, more 
popular range of music early in 1978 resulted in full pre-programming 
of the breakfast show - a departure from the practice of allowing 
maximum discretion to the announcer. The rotational system put into 
service early in 1981, though very wide-ranging, gives announcers the 
choice of only 20 percent of the tracks they play, to be taken from a 
selection of 40 albums and 20 singles, kept for them in the studio. The 
rotational system is amenable also to making qualitative changes at 
short notice, and by design, a program that was noticeably "lighter" 
was being tried early in 1982, within the system's limits.
29 Interview with the writer, 21.1.82.
With the hindsight of 7 years, it seems unlikely that marginal 
changes will radically alter the listening pattern. Commercial stations 
wanting to boost audiences through a program change make sure the change 
is pronounced and obvious, and advertise it heavily. A large shift of 
that kind for 2JJJ would endanger the station's carefully built relat­
ionship with its existing music clientele, with no guarantee of delivering 
a mass audience. That is the nature of its programming dilemma.
To turn back a few pages, some mention has been made of the
interest of management in programming issues. The position of the
management has been consistent throughout, though rarely put forward as
a firm demand: the A.B.C. favours expansion towards a bigger audience,
which always helps with such things as political defences and budget
claims, but management are reluctant to become directly involved in
programming, towards achieving that aim. For one reason, there is the
studied reluctance to interfere in the business of the semi-autonomous
unit. For another, the strategies involved in program changes would
entail much detailed work, and detailed knowledge of an immense stock of
music. To radically change the format, it would take concerted
attention to the problem, and active supervision, to cause staff at
2JJJ to forsake their predilections and divulge the information and
advice necessary to make the change, or to circumvent the efforts of
staff opposed to it. In other words it would be difficult to do and
30could well cause a lot of trouble.
However, notice was given by MacKriell in December 1975, that while
the audience share at the time was acceptable, "it would worry me if
30 The situation is of the kind discussed by Allison, using grander
materials, in Section 1, Chapter 2, either as a case of Organisational 
Process or of Bureaucratic Politics. It is not adequate just to 
consider change in terms of people in organisations acting according 
to simple directions passed down the line.
having gone into an area which does attract a broadly based audience
among young people, we fell away from, rather than built on the figures
, 31we've got .
That eventuality having arrived, Wyndham called in the account in 
late 1980, when he spoke to a general meeting of staff, and said 2JJJ 
should demonstrate its cost effectiveness, by producing more audience 
support (cost effectiveness was a concept much spoken of at the Dix 
inquiry). Minutes of that meeting, taken by Webb, read in part: "The 
station has got to rate and it has to have a more clearly defined music 
policy. The populist approach has to be taken seriously".
Added to that was a message that for the sake of enforcing a 
central music policy, which "had to be implemented and accepted by on- 
air staff", members of the C.R.U. might have to forego some of their 
accustomed democracy. Essentially, meetings needed to be cut down.
The rest of that message was ambiguous. As the record has it: "Co­
ordinators are going to have to make some difficult decisions in a
democratic manner", and be "more ruthless in exercising consensus
. . 32politics".
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The changes precipitated by this exercise began dramatically.
All specialist music programming, comedy and "block" programs were 
cleared from the schedule, and the station adopted a format of back-to- 
back music, without announcer comments or any identification of the 
music. That continued through the early months of 1981, and precipitated 
an influx of mail, protesting mainly at the withdrawal of the morning 
comedy segment, Dr Poo, the news-information program "Frontline", and
31 Interview with the writer, 1.12.75.
32 Minutes of staff meeting, 2JJJ-FM, 10.12.80.
33 Which was followed by a second meeting (8.1.81) at which a formula 
was set; 2JJJ was to obtain a share of the market comparable with 
that of the 2 commercial FM stations.
back-announcements identifying the music. By stages the accustomed 
program elements were reinstated, though in less volume, for the sake 
of permitting a smoother and more consistent flow of music through the 
day. To that effect as well, a new system for rotating the records, 
already explained, was put into use.
The change had occurred all at once and without announcement, on 
19th January 1981, the anniversary date of the station's opening, and 
the occasion of the switching off of 2JJ, leaving the station to operate 
solely on FM (it had been simulcasting on AM and FM since July 1980). 
Audience figures dropped below 3 percent with the withdrawal from service 
of the AM outlet, but had returned to that level after one year. After 
a few months music was again being identified by announcers, and some 
"block" programming and comedy had returned. The principal effect of the 
moves of 1981 had been to clear the board for a fresh start,and remove 
the prerogative of individual announcers for defining the musical tone 
of the station, from shift to shift.
Within the organisation, general meetings of staff were cut down, 
but specialist groups, such as announcers or journalists^ were formed for 
the purposes of consultation with the Co-ordinators. It could be said 
that significant changes took place during 1981, though there was not 
a transformation, nor the kind of diversion of course to startle and 
seduce a large public following.
Transmitter, and Political Questions
The position of 2JJ at the beginning of 1976, in political terms,
was one of classic vulnerability. The station had been designated
experimental and on that basis could be closed down by expedient means.^
34 See Harding's account of the various ways that were canvassed for 
closing 3ZZ. Op.cit., pp.108-114.
Audience strength at the time was thought to be potentially high, but 
this was unproven, and it was well-known that by virtue of its trans­
mitter problems, the station's coverage of metropolitan Sydney was rather 
poor. In other respects too, it lacked allies. The main support for 
continuing 2JJ was within the Commission of the A.B.C., but the Commiss­
ioners themselves were facing replacement, over time, or through the
35agency of new legislation and a "spill". On the other hand, the station
had enemies, the principal of whom, the leading elements in F.A.R.B.,
perceived themselves as politically ascendant, and were openly
36campaigning for termination of the station.
Not surprisingly then the future prospects of 2JJ, a "very public 
37institution" since its inception, became the subject of much public 
speculation. Garland as Minister for Post and Telecommunications was 
quoted as saying that 2JJ would be "seriously considered by the govern­
ment", and would "continue or close" after a review of its performance
, 38and success.
The chances of obtaining a replacement transmitter on the medium 
wave band, which had proved forlorn even during 1975, obviously were out 
of the question in such circumstances. The focus of attention became 
instead the question of the planned relay to Melbourne, and a move to FM - 
a cheaper system to install than AM, and very suited to the heavy musical 
accent of 2JJ's programming.
35 See Section 3, Chapter 4.
36 See Section 3, Chapte^ 4. Also Dickenson, op.cit. Outside Reactions, 
p.2, quoting Senator^Young in Parliament, that 2JJ was "frightening 
and disgusting many people", and enjoying a level of freedom in its 
programming which unfairly disadvantaged commercial stations.
37 Webb. Interview with the writer, December 1975, quoted in Duffield, 
op.cit., The Experiment With 2JJ..., p .37.
38 See "A.B.C. Set to Axe 2JJ Relay" in The Age, Melbourne, 31.12.75.
"Rock Radio to 'Be Discussed'" in the Herald, Melbourne, 31.12.75.
"2JJ Paranoia" in the National Times, Sydney, 4.1.76.
The issue has been discussed already but it's pertinent under
the present topic to add certain points. The first is to observe that
while a variety of arguments were put forward for the decision - the need
to cut costs, the desirability of waiting till after the proposed
inquiry into all broadcasting, and technical problems in setting up the 
40
landline - the over-all thrust, that the government was not prepared
to go ahead with the relay, was unambiguous.
This would not be to say that the gesture of the Commission in
demanding that the landline go ahead, was fruitless. Harding, from his
perspective as a member of the Commission, decided that "had the
Commission meekly retreated from the relay proposal, the principal
station itself would have been put under even greater pressure in the
41following years, both at government level, and within the A.B.C."
Webb, a Co-ordinator of 2JJ and Commissioner, reached the conclusion "the
42station was going very close to getting the chop".
Such thoughts were revived, obviously, in mid-1977 when 3ZZ, 
launched at the same time as 2JJ, on the same experimental plan, also 
with a stand-by A.B.C. transmitter, was switched off. Staley avers that 
as late as 1978, when he took over the Ministry, he was encouraged to 
believe that if 2JJ were closed down, such a move would not be opposed 
by the A.B.C. It would be congenial in fact to persons in very senior 
positions. This message had certainly come from the Commission itself, 
and evidently from within the management, though he had received nothing
39 See Section 2, Chapter 2.
40 See "2JJ Relay Deferred Again" in The Age, Melbourne, 6.5.76.
"A.B.C. Plans Stereo Broadcasts Cut to Trim Costs" in the Canberra 
Times, Canberra, 3.1.76.
Campbell Smith, "Government Stops 2JJ Relay" in Farrago, Melbourne, 
9.7.76.
41 Op.cit., Harding, p.39.
42 Op.cit., Dickenson, Development p.17.
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directly from the latter area. The composition of the Commission had 
of course changed through new appointments by that time, and become more 
conservative.
The first sign that the experimental status of the station would
not be invoked to close it down came in the form of a set of terms of
reference, issued by management, "for a report on the administrative
arrangements necessary to establish 2JJ as a permanent unit...maintaining
the semi-autonomous working arrangement, in keeping with Commission 
44
policy".
More material assurance was given in 1979 when the government, 
having started the process of placing commercial operators on the FM 
band, confirmed its intention to place 2JJ there as well, on the under­
standing there would be no extra money given to the A.B.C. for the
45
purpose. A process of extraordinary delay, well documented above, then 
set in; though it culminated in the June, 1980 announcement by Staley, 
of 11th July as the launch date - the same date as the commercial 
stations.
At this point it becomes relevant to draw attention to 2 related 
aspects of the politics of the issue, of what to do about bureaucratic 
situations which were labrynthine, and within which information, 
especially that sought by the A.B.C., would often go missing. The 
repeated efforts by the A.B.C. and Telecom to find out what was happen­
ing with the move to FM, in the political decision-making area, are a
, • • . 46good case in point.
The second aspect is the very great importance of engineering 
considerations. These determine not only the material substance of
43 Interview, 22.10.81.
44 Quoted by Dickenson, op.cit., Development p.12.
45 See Section 2, Chapter 2.
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46 Section 2, Chapter 2.
whatever broadcasting system is in question, but contribute to prog­
ramming decisions (as in the case of the inability of 2JJJ to emphasise 
its stereo capability in its launch publicity, in July 1980, due to the 
fact that its stereo studios could not be made ready in time. It 
broadcast in monaural FM for the first few months), and in many cases 
to the operation's material viability (as in the case of 2MMM, with its 
claims that it needs a change in operating conditions, to cover completely 
the metropolitan zone).
While none of this is wasted on commercial broadcasters, as wit­
nessed in the political warfare between Sydney commercial television and 
the FM stations, the A.B.C. is seriously handicapped by the fact that it 
does not control its transmitters. Cheney, who as a Co-ordinator of 2JJ 
handled many of the negotiations within the bureaucracies, over 
transmitters, saw this in practice as "a very effective means of
government control over the planning of A.B.C. radio and television 
47broadcasting".
Before the episode of the move to FM began, there was a similar, in 
the end fruitless drive to get something done about the AM transmitter. 
This case provides an illustration of the way that engineering factors 
are apt to be put out of mind, or glossed over, when planning and 
negotiation is going on, either because political reality in some way 
demands it, or because the engineering area, a field of arcane wisdom, is 
rife with obfuscation.
Cass showed much goodwill towards 2JJ but under-rated, or failed to
appreciate the meaning of, its reception problems. He said he had gone
along with the government view that it "was not going to spend money" on
48
a transmitter while 2JJ was still classed as an experiment. Ironically,
47 Interview on 2JJJ, 16.1.81.
48 Interview on 2JJJ, 16.1.81.
Z t l
f u l l  p e n e t r a t i o n  by th e  s t a t i o n  th ro u g h o u t  Sydney w ould have  s o f te n e d  o r
done away w ith  many o f i t s  p ro b le m s , on es  c o n c e rn in g  w h ich  th e  th e n
M in is te r  was in  f u l l  sym pathy w ith  i t s  p o s i t i o n .  He had been  c o n c ern ed
49a b o u t " a l l  th e  w h in g e in g "  when s t a f f  had ta k e n  th e  s t a t i o n  o f f  th e  a i r  f o r
some h o u r s ,  in  J u ly  1975, in  p r o t e s t  o v e r  th e  t r a n s m i t t e r  s i t u a t i o n  -
th e y  had been  t o l d  much e a r l i e r  t h a t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  w ould be  r e c t i f i e d  in
50t h r e e  t o  s ix  m on ths.
Cheney r e p o r te d  t h a t  even  w h i le  i t  was known, in  J a n u a ry  1975, from  
t e s t  t r a n s m is s io n s ,  t h a t  c o v e ra g e  w ith  th e  s ta n d -b y  t r a n s m i t t e r  was p o o r , 
th e  e n g in e e r in g  p ro b lem  was r a t h e r  an  unknown phenom enon, and o th e r  
im p e r a t iv e s ,  w hich w ere t a n g i b l e  and m ore o b v io u s , demanded an e a r l y  
la u n c h . "We d e c id e d  t h a t  th e  b e s t  th in g  to  do  was j u s t  t o  g e t  t o  a i r ,  
b e c a u se  we had a l l  s o r t s  o f a s s u r a n c e s  t h a t  th e  t r a n s m i t t e r  would be 
f i x e d . . . " 51
The k in d  o f  ru n -a ro u n d  in  s t o r e  f o r  a s t a t u t o r y  body l i k e  th e  A .B .C .,
a t te m p t in g  to  p r e c i p i t a t e  a c t i o n  on su c h  a m a t te r  a s  th e  2 J J  t r a n s m i t t e r ,
i s  h in te d  a t  in  th e  fo l lo w in g  e x c e r p t  from  th e  m in u te s  o f  a  Com m ission
m e e tin g , j u s t  a f t e r  th e  24 hou r s to p p a g e  r e f e r r e d  t o  above:
Mr Duckmanton s a id  t h e r e  had been  no la c k  o f e f f o r t  on th e  
p a r t  o f  A .B .C . m anagem ent in  a t te m p t in g  to  a c h ie v e  a s t r o n g  
s i g n a l  f o r  2J J . . .D uckm anton s a id  t h a t  on 20 J a n u a ry  he had 
w r i t t e n  t o  th e  th e n  M in i s te r  f o r  th e  M edia , S e n a to r  D ouglas 
M c C le lla n d . . .  s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  M cC le llan d  r a i s e  t h e  m a t te r  w ith  
th e  P o s tm a s te r -G e n e ra l  t o  e n l i s t  h i s  s u p p o r t  f o r  th e  
e s ta b l is h m e n t  o f  a  new t r a n s m i t t e r  a t  a s  e a r l y  a d a te  as  
p o s s i b l e . . . In  a d d i t io n  th e  G e n e ra l  M anager and A s s i s t a n t  
G e n e ra l  M anager R ad io  had been  in  com m unica tion  many t im e s  
w ith  th e  B ro a d c a s t in g  C o n tro l  B oard in  an en d eav o u r t o  
a c h ie v e  some im provem ent. M a c K rie ll  had a l s o  w r i t t e n  t o  th e  
A u s t r a l ia n  P o s t  O f f ic e .  The C o n tr o l  Board had n o t  been  a b le  
t o  s o lv e  th e  p r o b l e m . . . I t  was s t i l l  n o t  c l e a r  when any 
s h o r t - te r m  o r p e rm an en t im provem ent c o u ld  be  m a d e . . . (52)
49 I n te r v ie w  w ith  th e  w r i t e r ,  2 8 .1 1 .7 5 .
50 O p . c i t . ,  D ick en so n . I n te r v ie w  w ith  C heney, D evelopm ent p .1 2 .
51 L oc. c i t .
52 M in u te s  o f  th e  m e e tin g  o f  th e  A .B .C ., 2 4 .7 .7 5 .  Q uoted in  D ic k e n so n , 
o p . c i t . ,  Program m ing p .1 0 .
Such attempts were normally restrained in style and carried out 
by letter - presumably as much by way of necessity as of preferred 
method - and had to compete for attention with other preoccupations of 
the A.B.C. They were much in contrast with the aggressive lobbying 
style of a commercial entrepreneur like Muir, which Staley for one, 
found effective: "Letters aren't the ant's pants are they? Small entre­
preneurial shows can make the pressure felt on issues better than great 
bureaucracies. I don't mean that in the pejorative sense, but it's fact.
I was much more conscious of Rod's problems of signal because he banged
53on the door so much."
As with all sections of the A.B.C, the period of the radio
station's existence has been one of forced economising. The annual direct
expenses budget for the station, a little over $250,000 at the time, was
not changed, for instance, for 4 years, and dropped in real terms by 40%.
This fund is the prime source of payment for artists and entertainers,
and commissioned programs. The result of the reductions was accordingly
the curtailment of much comedy production, especially after 1980, and
well before that of most of the station's heavily-attended, promotional
54out-door concerts (promotional both for station and performers).
A concluding note should point out that 2JJ/2JJJ, despite the 
impression of harassment and insecurity that may have been created, is 
not Cinderella, but rather has always been valued in the parent 
organisation. It represents many of the aspirations of the A.B.C. to 
make itself a more truly "comprehensive" service, as it is charged to do 
by legislation, and it has provided a ground for the cultivation of 
refreshing new ideas on programming, and new approaches to organisation 
and work.
53 Interview, 22.10.81.
54 Op.cit., A.B.C. 48th Annual Report..., pp.79-80.
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The station received priority attention during the year that it 
was setting up, with staff, equipment and other support. In 1980, 
budget pressures notwithstanding, it was equipped with two custom built 
Neeve studio consoles for stereo FM, designed to the station's require­
ments and much advanced on the equipment in use at comparable commercial 
stations. Cost of the items was not publicly advertised but each is in 
the category of equipment costs counted in the hundreds of thousands of 
dollars.
As ever the future holds a mix of mystery, promise, some excitement 
and doubt. The faith of management was expressed at the start of 1981 
with an invitation to staff of 2JJJ to outline proposals for national 
networking of its service. The scheme was expected to remain on paper 
for a long time, but offered a vision to work towards. More immediately, 
the radical changes proposed by the Dix committee were under review by
government, at the end of 1981.
V C
Section 4: Chapter 3
COMMERCIAL FM
Admission o f  commercial broadcasters to the FM band was a stormy 
drama in  3 parts.
The f i r s t  phase o f  a c tiv ity  began in  earnest, once i t  became pla in  
the VHF band would be opened to radio, in  19 74. No guarantees were 
forthcoming fo r  the ex isting  commercial broadcasters on AM; the govern­
ment o f the day showed a preference fo r  g iv ing the band to public 
stations and the A.B.C., and so the commercial broadcasters, very wary, 
began a long and highly pub lic campaign, agitating in  th e ir  own cause, 
and disparaging both the public operators and such operations o f  the 
A.B.C. as 2JJJ.
The lobbying in ten s ified  a fte r a decision and formal declaration 
by the Labor government, that i t  would indeed block commercial entry in to  
the band -  a very s ign ifica n t departure from the tra d ition a l "duopoly" 
o f  broadcasting, and occurred in very heated general p o l i t ic a l  circum­
stances, in  1975.
Uncertainty did not end a fte r the e le ction  o f  the Liberal-N.C.P. 
government. The issue became whether the ex is ting  broadcasters, or other 
in terests , would be given FM. Government in te res t and perceptions 
sh ifted  with changes in  the M inistry. I t  eventuated that the f i r s t  
commercial FM broadcasting arrangements would represent a kind o f  r ich  
man's p lu ra lisa tion  or démocratisation o f  radio. The new group o f 
owners were entrepreneurial syndicates, usually with representation from 
the entertainment industry, or from among practis ing broadcasters. These 
were therefore a new fa cto r, neither enterprises on the scale o f A. W.A. 
or Fairfax newspapers, nor public educational in s titu tio n s , or community 
broadcasting groups. The la tte r  came to complain that the a rriva l o f  
commercial FM had cut down the scope fo r  pub lic  broadcasting, by 
reducing the number o f  frequencies to be made availab le. For th e ir  part 
the new broadcasters claimed to be broadening the horizons o f  commercial
radio3 though admittedly within very definite limits of their own 
devising.
The advent of commercial FM contributed to a diversification of 
interests and of programming3 though it remained an issue whether such 
a restricted change3 added onto the main structure of Australian mass 
media as it was3 would make much difference to society at large.
ESTABLISHING COMMERCIAL FM ON THE BAND
The virulent response of commercial broadcasters to the opening of 
the VHF band for FM - without them on it - was founded in acute awareness 
of the commercial importance of that event to profitability. They 
perceived that formidable competition could arise from it and, in a less 
defensive sense, that they might well engage in a lucrative money-making 
venture if they could contrive to join in. Trends in America, with 
which Australian commercial broadcasters keep themselves familiar and 
from which they have copied many of their programming styles, had 
alerted them to this. As well, there was the proprietorial feeling of 
having been both the dominating force in Australian broadcasting, and 
the recipients for many years of the advertising dollar - by courtesy of 
enterprise to be sure, but also of government policy, especially on the 
non-allocation of new frequencies.
In the first twenty-five years since the wholesale opening of the 
American FM band to several new stations, in the late 1940s, a huge 
capture of audiences had begun to gather momentum. In the course of the 
Australian debate on FM, it was often said that FM stations and FM 
audiences would grossly outnumber those on AM, in the U.S.A., by the end 
of the 1980s. A national poll commissioned by the major American 
networks in 1977 showed that on a 24-hour basis, FM had 43% of all 
audiences, and just under 52% of audiences between 7 p.m. and midnight.^" 
On this kind of indication it was recognised as a possibility, however 
unlikely it may have seemed at the time, that commercial radio would find 
itself relegated to a back seat in Australian broadcasting, if it did 
not succeed in getting a place on the new band.
1 "AM and FM Slice Up the Pie", in Broadcasting (U.S.A.), 25.7.77.
Results of a study by Statistical Research Inc. for A.B.C., C.B.S.,
N.B.C. and Mutual radio networks, during Autumn 1976 and Spring 1977.
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Earlier perceptions of American FM, as being a minority affair 
comprised of small insolvent commercial outlets, and radical public ones, 
was fading fast by the mid-1970s. One of Sydney's FM commercial broad­
casters saw the American experience as really a process of coming down 
to earth: "I don't think we've wasted time as happened in the U.S., 
where they experimented with all sorts of way out formats, weird and
wonderful things. We just bit the bullet and went straight into a
2
commercially viable format". The idea of "weird and wonderful formats" 
had strong appeal for many of Australia's non-commercial broadcasters, 
national and public, but the territory they were claiming had become hot 
property, and they were going to have to compete for it with those who 
had other uses in mind.
For the existing commercial broadcasters wanting to diversify, 
there were additional challenges in FM, apart from the strictly material. 
As broadcasters, like the non-commercial people, many saw the inspir­
ational chance to develop new types of services. Industry leaders also 
had grounds for their much-repeated claim that as so much of the expertise
in broadcasting was found in the commercial area, it would be wrong not
3
to make use of it in some way, in the new band.
Some of those wanting to open "new forms" and prepared to invest 
in independent ventures provided the support needed by Staley, in his 
wish to provide a commercial presence on the band, but in such a way 
that there was increased competition, and a chance for "outsiders". It 
was not a small step to seek to disappoint a set of corporate interests 
with means to hurt the government, or at least to frustrate the Minister's
2 Sheedy, 21.12.81.
3 Perhaps the strongest of such claims was the statement attributed to 
Rutherford of 2SM on 12.6.79: "FM is a development of the industry 
we are already in - an industry into which a lot of broadcasters 
have put a lot of effort for 50 years or so..." See (20) following.
intentions. Staley confirmed that he had been advised by his department
head it would be pointless to "take on" the commercial broadcasters.
"He said, 'They will destroy you', but I was delighted to prove him
wrong. And notwithstanding the official view I maintain pretty reason-
4
able relations with a lot of those commercial AM people."
Considerable squabbling and well organised campaigns took place
after the beginning of 1978, as the members of F.A.R.B. sought to
overcome the Minister's intentions and obtain licences for FM. Much of
what took place has been outlined already.4 5 67 The lobbying campaign
penetrated cabinet and Minister Staley was put to the test in defending
his position. The episode contributed to what Rowe, of the Minister's
staff, was to look back on as an exasperating time: "I don't want to be
bitter but we had a rough time for three years. I think if you try to
0
take a position of reform or change you're going to be criticised..."
The government line remained consistent nevertheless. As Westerway
recalls he and Lansdown were in a position to spell out unambiguously
to the commercial broadcasters that their demands would not be met,
at a F.A.R.B. seminar in 1979. "That was the first time that the
commercial broadcasters really had to accept the fact, despite all the
lobbying that had gone on...that we weren't going to accept the whole of
what they wanted; that the full protectionist policy wasn't going to be 
7
applied..."
The climax had come with the announcement of terms for the calling of 
applications for commercial licences, in June 1979, formally relegating 
the principal metropolitan stations to no more than a 15 percent share
4 Interview, 22.10.81.
5 See Section 3, Chapter 5.
6 Interview, 23.12.81.
7 Interview, 27.1.82. F.A.R.B. seminar on Commercial FM in Non-metro­
politan Areas, Gateway Inn, Adelaide, October 1979.
in FM stations in their own market. Much groundwork had been done to 
gain entrance to the band, including the commissioning of the A.W.A. 
laboratories by F.A.R.B., to prepare an engineering report on Sydney
g
spectrum space. This put forward ways to provide 11 to 14 station 
frequencies on the dial, thereby providing space for the AM broadcasters, 
even at the level of one for each of them, if as one report said "the
9
growth of new commercial, A.B.C. and public stations was restricted". 
There had been extensive preparations for FM by individual stations as 
well. 2SM had purchased FM studio equipment'*'*“* and A.W.A. sold one of its 
8 stations, the maximum holding permitted under law, so as to be eligible 
to bid for an FM licence.'*''*'
Approaches to government had intensified as the months went by,
with management heads from the commercial stations, particularly from
12Sydney, finally arranging direct talks with the Prime Minister. A
reciprocal campaign was being mounted by the new group of entrepreneurial
figures wanting to set up independent stations, among them Muir, and 
13 14Walker and Armstrong, both of Melbourne.
8 Rushton, 21.1.82. Also "Canberra Urges FM Consortiums" in The Age, 
Melbourne, 7.2.78.
9 Loc.cit.
10 When the existing stations were passed over for FM it was made public 
that a group of 2SM staff members putting in for a licence would be 
permitted to lease this equipment, if successful in their application. 
This was the unsuccessful applicant, FM 2000 Ltd. (See A.B.T. 
Commercial FM Broadcasting Licence Inquiries, No. 33/79 G(R), Sydney, 
December 1979, p.57.)
11 The station sold was in Launceston. Without a station in Melbourne, 
and with only 7 in the network, A.W.A. qualified to apply for an FM 
licence there. However it was unsuccessful before the Tribunal. In 
1982 it made an unsuccessful bid to purchase 3MP.
12 The National Times of 7.1.79 reported for instance that Mr K. Archer of 
2UW and Mr S. Wilmot of 2UE had seen Fraser about FM late in 1978.
13 Mr Rhett Walker headed an applicant group that campaigned heavily but 
failed to receive a licence. He was appointed however as the first 
General Manager of 3F0X-FM.
14 Mr Bill Armstrong was from the S.B.S. and before that had had a long 
career in broadcasting and the recording industry. He is Managing 
Director of 3E0N-FM.
Muir for instance says that he had been wanting to venture into
FM as a "new medium" in 1976. At that time he had given contractual
undertakings to his former company 2SM, not to set up in opposition to
it - though he had obtained a clause exempting FM, which he saw as a
particular "personal interest". He had then formed a committee to carry
out the campaign for commercial FM, and to form the nucleus of the
eventual company board for the station, 2MMM.
He provides an account of the final stages of the campaign, from
the perspective of one of the new stations:
It was a matter of principle. As I said to Staley, we 
didn't have helicopters to fly to lunch(15). We weren't 
that well connected. Tony Staley himself wasn't strong 
enough to carry it through cabinet. Even though he was 
trying, he'd met block after block. We wrote to I think 
every cabinet member...[Eventually] Tony Eggleton(16) was 
the pea. Tony's there as a gateway. A lot of companies 
use him. I'd known Tony. He'd known me for my stands 
[though] I don't actively support any party...At that 
stage Stan Wilmot of 2UE and Ken Archer who was running 
2UW got an appointment with the Prime Minister to carry 
the weight in cabinet. I went to Canberra and requested 
a meeting with Tony, and Tony ah gave me one foolscap page 
which he promised the P.M. would read, and said to put my 
case on that...We came back and we wrote this full page 
mate; it was real tight...(17)
Once the decision taken finally by cabinet was announced, the 
F.A.R.B. group commenced a steady reconciliation with the new situation,
15 A reference to a famous incident of the time in which a group of Sydney 
television managers used a flight of their "eye in the sky" 
helicopters to go to a strategic meeting with government leaders in 
Canberra.
16 Mr Tony Eggleton, Federal Director, Liberal Party of Australia.
17 Interview, 21.12.81.
first
18 The olive branch wasy(extended between public broadcasters and the 
commercial sector when Craig and Rushton accepted an invitation to
the P.B.A.A. conference late in 1978. In a paper, Rushton re-stated the 
qualms of F.A.R.B. about competition for advertising funds, stressing 
that sponsorship provisions needed to be very restricted, and that 
the public stations should get government finance. There was also 
some concern about the programming specification applying to public 
broadcasting licences, saying the stations should "complement and 
supplement" other services, and not, as a matter of intention, seek 
to compete with them. "We are not going to have a fit if a public
after just a few, final rhetorical thrusts. Foster as Director of
F.A.R.B. described the licensing process as a "bandaid job patch-up".
He said he believed "public acceptance" of FM radio would be slowed by
the absence from the band of the established commercial broadcasters.
He suggested that estimates of set penetration were grossly over-stated
and that it would be a long time before the new broadcasters made a
profit. The government's move had not been the outcome of systematic 
19
policy-making. Rutherford of 2SM was quoted as saying:
We are being denied access - by Ministerial decree - to 
a technological advancement in our own industry. FM is a 
development of an industry we are already in - an industry 
into which a lot of broadcasters have put a lot of effort 
for 50 years or so. And we are being told we are not 
eligible. This is ludicrous to me.
At the same time he put forward the view that public stations would have
a valid role on the new band, and also 2JJJ, which had done much as
202JJ to introduce a wider music choice to radio.
The position of AM operators was to remain that the new band would 
have attained stronger public support had they been enabled to use it.
In Rushton's view, the "fundamental marketing problem" was to be "getting 
people across to the band". That would have been achieved more 
effectively if stations on the AM band had been used to promote another 
kind of program, which was adjacent.
(Fn. 18 continued) broadcasting station throws in an occasional 
'Top 40' recording - but if you come up with formats traditionally 
associated with our sector then that's another matter." Even so 
the tone of the occasion was conciliatory, the two sides acknowledged 
that each had a valid place, and declared an end to the situation in 
which "there had been absolutely no significant dialogue...at an 
industry level". (J.M. Rushton, Address to Sixth Annual Conference, 
P.B.A.A., at Albury, 16.12.78.) In a number of cases, for instance 
that of 2ARM-FM in Armidale, commercial stations had assisted public 
operators with their licence applications to the A.B.T. in 1978, and in 
setting themselves up. Some value was being attached to the 
"complementary and supplementary" functions of the new system.
19 Margaret Geddes, "FM Ruling Criticised" in The Age, Melbourne, 8.6.79.
20 Jefferson Penberthy, "Commercial Radio Licks Its Wounds After FM Blow" 
in Australian Financial Review, Sydney, 12.6.79.
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The subsequent trials of the Sydney FM stations, with their demands
for better coverage and for a solution to the question of television
interference, are cited by F.A.R.B. as an out-growth of the "bad planning"
it had been objecting to. "They're operating on power lower than they're
entitled to under their licence grant. They've had to contain their
signals. We believe that's appalling...Now there's a question of adaptors
21
which might be paid for by the stations. Ridiculous." Westerway of
the Communications Department conceded that the move to put more stations
on the FM band in 1978 and 1979 had been "way ahead of where our
planning was", but believed it had been crucial in changing the nature
22of the radio service. The industry position was to remain that there
had been too much of a rush to allocate frequencies.
Some further points can be made about the procedure for installing
the new FM stations. The first was raised by Bear in an article
concerned with the effect of it on public radio, and that was the
"arbitrary" choice of 3 as the number of such stations to be allowed in
the major capital cities - 2 immediately and the third perhaps in 10
years or so. The reason given was that frequency space would be scarce
until the band was cleared of other users, in Sydney in particular, where
only 8 stations could be accommodated, at a maximum.
23
There was some concern that the new stations would run into early 
financial difficulties, which was a principal consideration in the 
deferral of the third station. The comment has been made as well that 
use of the technical argument meant that government did not need to enter 
into debate on the allocation of frequencies, on other terms. From one 
perspective there is the complaint of the AM broadcasters that it was
21 Rushton, 21.1.82.
22 Interview, 27.1.82.
23 See Section 3, Chapter 5.
a rather spurious argument, and was being used as a means to keep them
out. From another, the public stations saw themselves being displaced.
The decision for 3 commercial stations "served to shatter one of the
great hopes and one of the great achievements of those who had fought
for the introduction of public broadcasting - it allowed the authorities
to fall back once again on the apparently discredited 'limited resource'
24or 'shortage of frequencies' argument." Clearly the ageing question of
the clearing of the band, though subject to only slow action, remained
a central factor in political argument over FM, and would continue as
such into the future, especially as pressure could be expected over time
for yet another generation of stations.
In certain other ways loose ends were tidied away as the new
stations were got into position. As has been shown above, considerable
manipulation of details took place in Sydney to get the two stations
25
there into position beside each other. As in Melbourne, the A.B.T. 
had selected applicants that were proposing complementary formats, with 
one orientating itself towards listeners in their twenties, and the 
other more towards those aged 24 to 40. The neatness of this present­
ation was extended right across the FM band in Sydney, where the range 
of formats went, from fine music (A.B.C.), to another fine music station 
(2MBS), to a station mainly for middle-aged listeners, playing M.O.R. 
music (2CBA), to the "soft contemporary" format of 2DAY, to A.O.R. on 
2MMM, to the relatively "crazy" end of the dial - a "harder" rock 
program on 2JJJ, and the educational station 2SER, with a strong student 
input in programming. (In the future, local community stations would be 
found there as well.) Most of those involved, such as Oswin and
Westerway aver there was no central contrivance to this impressionistic
Bro*ica±t/»n
24 A. Bear, "Open and Closed Options for Public Broadcasting" in 
Journal of the Broadcasting Association of Australia, No. 8, November 
1981, p.7.
25 See Section 2, Chapter 2. Section 3, Chapter 5.
progression of styles. The latter pointed out that the higher powered
stations would normally obtain better technical results if located in
the lower frequency range, which was why A.B.C. stations were usually
2 0
apart from the others, in television as well as in radio. The same
convenience to listeners was not repeated in every city. In Melbourne
for instance 3MBS, with fine music, was located on the dial between
3E0N (A.O.R.) and 3F0X ("soft contemporary"/variety).
Listeners in Sydney also had the experience of 3 new FM stations
being presented to them at once, as, through a process that has been
described already, 2JJJ was held off until 11th July 1980. There had
27been recurrent reports to staff of 2JJ, and reports in the press, that
an earlier launch date was set, but these dates had come and gone
28without any change. Speculation automatically followed that commercial
considerations were at work - that it was thought the potential of 2JJ
as a competitor for market share would make it dangerous to the financial
health of the 2 commercial stations, if it were allowed to go first.
Representatives of the stations in question say they did not seek to
29have 2JJJ delayed.
While the eventual postponement to 11th July was to cause some
26 Interview, 27.1.82.
27 For example: Debbie Tarrant, "2JJ Still Getting Static" in the 
Daily Mirror, Sydney, 25.10.79.
Debbie Tarrant, "Progressive JJ Still Waiting" in the Daily Mirror, 
Sydney, 19.7.79.
"Radio 2JJ Will be the Envy of Commercial Radio Stations when the 
Change to FM is Made About Next April...", The Sun, Sydney, 24.12.79.
28 For example, minutes of the 2JJ staff meeting of 27.2.80 give 3.5.80 
or 3.6.80, in the Co-ordinators' report, as the alternative launch 
date for 2JJJ.
29 Muir said the entry of 2JJJ on the band had been favoured, as it 
helped to build a strong presence on the band as a whole, and 
therefore attract a better aggregate of listeners to it.
(Interview, 21.12.81)
and
anxiety within that station^at the A.B.C. generally, it was not recalled 
as a major issue by those responsible for the timetable. Rowe said 
there had been some problem in finding a frequency for the station, 
especially as it was designated eventually to become a 50 kw outlet.
The intervention of the Chairman of the A.B.T. in the frequency placement 
issue30 had also "had some impact of the transfer of double-j ay".3"*’
Staley believed he had "thought it was sensible to have the start date 
all at one time". He did not recall enough detail to be able to say
that serious consideration was given to there being different starting
32times. The issue became diminished in the minds of all after the fact 
of the launch of the three stations. In the event, 2JJJ enjoyed a few 
weeks of pre-eminence, as the commercial stations encountered drastic 
equipment failure with their antennae, and spent much of the time off 
air.
By contrast with responses to the public radio licensing of the
year before, the expedient handling of the applications by the A.B.T.
33 . . . . .was generally welcomed. Bissell represented a wide viewpoint m  saying
the lead-up to the granting of licences, a period of years, had been
too long, and the expenses incurred by applicants too great. It was a
relief to have the process over with. "The frustrating thing was the
amount of money that went down the tube by the people who didn't get the
licences...A lot of money in a lot of cases. $100,000 or whatever, just
34
to get a submission in...It was a very expensive lottery ticket.
30 See Section 2, Chapter 2. Section 3, Chapter 5.
31 Interview, 23.12.81.
32 Interview, 22.10.81.
33 Barry Bissell, Program Director, 3F0X.
34 Interview with the writer, 22.10.81. According to Bissell, there 
were cases where it could cost $80,000 "to get someone to represent 
you". After legal fees, the evidence of audience research sought by 
the A.B.T. was a major item. Muir said $30-40,000 would be needed 
for thorough survey work, for an entirely new service.
Regulation by the A.B.T. was carried out along the lines given by Oswin.
In the absence of aggressive monitoring or detailed prescriptive rules 
governing programs, stations were expected to comply with the undertakings 
given in their "promises of performance", and in the transcript of 
hearings, at time of licensing. They were expected to consult with the 
A.B.T. on major changes contemplated on such matters as program format 
and ownership. Some instances of this kind of regulation were to occur 
with a few of the new stations, in the early period being looked at here.
35
DESCRIPTIVE EVALUATION OF THE STATIONS 
The following review of the 7 commercial FM stations deals with 
the challenges they have met during the first 18 months of operation. 
There are strong similarities among the stations in programming and 
organisation, and they have in common their problems with audience resp­
onse, financial viability and development of formats.
Programming Choices
The programming choices available to the new stations were not
complex, given the evidence of demand, the technology available to them,
and the pressure of economic factors. Nearly half of the population
was aged in the 11-39 age categories, representing a large share of
disposable incomes, and the evidence of surveys on FM such as those
36conducted by the A.B.C. was that younger listeners showed higher 
awareness of the new form. Despite a downward trend in the recording 
industry, there was still continuing diversification of popular music 
styles and abundant enthusiasm for the concept of music broadcast in 
stereo. The main option, with stereo, would be to play quality sound
35 See Section 3, Chapter 4.
36 Op.cit., A.B.C. Market for FM Radio Broadcasts..., A.B.C. Audience 
Research. A Qualitative Research Project; FM Radio, 75:09, Sydney, 
June 1975.
recordings, mostly music on discs. Talk would be expensive in any case, 
and despite the success with talk-back radio and growing interest in 
radio news in America, was a rather unknown quantity in terms of gathering 
audiences in the present era. "Sound sculpture" and adventurous 
documentaries or fiction were out of the question for small units coping 
with large establishment costs.
Two musical formats emerged as the main solution. For the A.O.R.
stations like 3E0N the challenge was to play a better diversity of music
than the "Top 40" stations on AM, without digressing too far from the
37range of tolerance of a mass audience. Simon adopts the principle of 
playing mostly the most popular albums, in terms of sales, but of 
choosing a range of tracks from those albums well beyond the hit singles 
used by the AM commercial stations. He said he had commenced by doing 
more, especially at night, with a program resembling the range of choice 
available to programmers on 2JJJ. However audience response to the 
station had been sluggish and he had been forced to withdraw to the more 
restricted play-list.
With the Rolling Stones we played all the tracks on 
Tattoo You; with Australian Crawl we played about 7 of 
the tracks off the Sirocco album. All they played on 
AM was Errol and Lakeside, when they were individual 
singles. Our oldies aren't always oldies that have been 
huge hits...Once we get into the night time area which 
is more FM's domain we don't worry about playing an old 
Carson track for 17 minutes which you never hear on AM.
It was never a hit...On Sunday nights in particular we 
play a little more instrumental. We're broadening it 
out left and right, a bit...
[Question] The choice of albums. You wouldn't be as 
broad as triple-jay or tripie-R?
It doesn't work. We tried that to start off with. We 
had, with hindsight, an exaggerated idea in our own 
minds to what extent people would be spread out music­
ally. The reality is most people like hearing the sort 
of material that comes up on the Top 30 Album chart, or 
the Top 40 Singles. It's the way in which it's 
presented and the quantity that's made all the difference...
37 Mr Lee Simon, Program Director, 3E0N.
We were playing music right across the board. It wouldn't 
be at all unusual to hear urn a Django Reinhardt track in 
breakfast, or the weirdest of weird things, like one side 
of a Brian Eno album at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
Ratings went from 5.2, to 4.5 to 3.8. It didn't work. We 
did group research as well as the McNair Anderson and the 
reality was people didn't like all the weird music. They 
wanted to hear the hits.(38)
As A.O.R. came to mean a cautious expansion away from the narrow
confines of the top 40, the "soft contemporary" format followed by 2DAY
denies its links with the "beautiful music" and conventional M.O.R. on
AM stations like 2CH in Sydney.
The success of anything is, I think, that if you're going 
to expect a listener to switch over from AM to FM, you've 
got to have something they can make a comparison with. If 
they hear unfamiliar tracks they can't get comfortable with, 
they'll find it hard to appreciate. But if you come down 
from hearing some of that, to say some flashback, that 
makes the benefit very clear. We're playing a lot of 
Beatles. The songs we think suit the sound of the station 
...And I Love Her, Michelle. We play them what they want.
We go on 'phone reaction, really, to find out what they're 
tired of, what they don't want...
Blind Freddy could see the 25-39 group was not really 
being catered for...We call it soft contemporary. Soft 
top 40 content. For people grown out of the top 40, but 
not wishing to split into beautiful music either. You get 
the Beach Boys, Boz Scaggs, George Benson, the Eagles,
America, Dooby Brothers, Peter Paul and Mary - variety 
within certain parameters. It's not a dull music station.
There are highs and lows.
[Question] You can't be too far away from beautiful music.
Close to, but we haven't taken the small step. You won't 
hear Ray Coniff or Johnny Mathis.(39)
Another programming style was attempted by 3F0X-FM during its first 
year - a variety program which in its description sounds familiar to the 
"light music" played in "Kaleidoscope" on ABC-FM. It was an uneven mix 
of jazz, show music, some light classical material, big bands and other 
popular forms. The station's market share figure was only about half 
that of 3E0N and after a year the management, programming staff and some
38 Interview with the writer, 22.10.81.
39 Sheedy, 21.12.81.
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announcers were replaced. A format was devised broadly sympathetic 
with the "soft contemporary" one outlined by Sheedy, for the corresponding 
market in Sydney. It was intended however to penetrate to sections of 
the audience being served by 3E0N at the bottom of the 24-39 age range, 
creating an overlap between the two stations. To mark the change an 
advertising campaign was launched with the slogan the "Fox rocks".
Bissell said it had been a problem for both stations that there 
was no overlap before.
3F0X was even more extreme [than M.O.R.]. It was not 
bland enough to be muzak. It was actually quite pushy in 
a way because some of the music styles were so extreme it 
wasn't really back-ground music either. The gap between 
FOX and EON was so wide you could drive a convoy of semi 
trailers through. It was not healthy for the FM band.
There was a fair chance 80% of people tuning across would 
not find anything they liked at all...Now, to use U.S. 
terminology, we are adult contemporary or A.O.R. We're 
playing roughly 50% of the top 40 and about 80% of the 
top 40 albums.
[Question] We won't hear you playing Cold Chisel, AC/DC?
We're playing softer Cold Chisel. Cheap Wine, Choir 
Girl, things like that. We're playing the new Police 
single. Also Icehouse. It's broad-based. It's only the 
extreme new wave things we're not playing. We're not 
restricted to a teenage audience.(40)
Regulation, Relations with the A.B.T.
The change in format had produced an inquiry about it from the
A.B.T., which took the view that the station had moved too far from its
initial self-description, at the time of licensing, without reporting to
the regulating authority. Oswin was disposed to see this failure as an
oversight on the part of a new station which the longer established
41
broadcasters would not commit. The matter had not been resolved at the 
time of writing.
Bissell thought the original applicants for the station had had
40 Interview, 22.10.81.
41 Interview, 14.1.82.
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too vague an idea of what they were attempting.
42
The transcript was real law talk. Very open to inter­
pretation. The Tribunal said they were very upset that 
they weren't advised and asked. That's unjustified as 
far as I'm concerned because any other station can do what 
they like. They can turn around tonight and turn it into 
a beautiful music station...We responded. We went through 
the wording. The main thing it said was we'd appeal to a 
specific age group...Music would be broad, but not as 
'strident' they said, not punk or 'loud or aggressive 
rock and roll'. Which we don't play still. A 50 year-old 
would think it was loud but we think it still fits those 
guidelines. Probably there were complaints from one or 
two radio stations we were targeting towards.(43)
3F0X also feels embarrassed by a commitment to 2 minutes of community
service announcements each hour, which in commercial broadcasting
represents an extraordinary production effort, and would exceed the high
commitment given to such services by stations such as 2JJJ and the public
broadcasters.
It can be seen how pressure from the A.B.T. will regulate broad 
programming policy in a case like this. The proscription of 'strident 
and aggressive' music will certainly affect the station's moves. There 
is nevertheless unease within the new sector and incipient rebelliousness 
about the prospect of having to defer to the regulator, on undertakings 
given.
2MMM for instance made certain commitments to serving the younger 
end of the target audience, giving as its examples a robot character for 
station promotions, and a schedule of editorial comments spoken by 
young listeners. Muir had found that in practice some of these under­
takings were not workable, or at least not rewarding. Attempts to record 
editorials had not met with the standard imposed by the station's easy 
and naturalistic style on air, as the speakers were found to be 
"expressing what they thought was expected of them, rather than what
42 Of the A.B.T. licence hearing.
43 Interview, 22.10.81.
they thought". Community service spots had been retained on the
station however, in which it sought to "respond to their needs", "find
out what's on their minds", and represent "radio as a friend in the
44loneliness aspect of life". The robot idea, as a detail, had been
stolen by a competitor station and had been dropped. Generally, the
station, according to Muir, perceived that it had limited potential for
increasing its role as a service to people in the younger teens, and
instead was under pressure from its market share ratings to increase its
audience at the opposite end of the target group. "The age group
empties out after 24 or 26...We need to go to 31...So I'm damned if I'll
put stuff on the air just to please the bureaucracy, with no thoughts
given to the consumer. I like little kids but I'm doubtful about
45
childrens' programming."
Expensive, demanding commitments were a problem particularly at
2DAY. Some of the undertakings given were ambitious; were seen to have
no direct relevance to the narrow goals being serviced by the music
policy, and carried no obvious advantages as a way to build audiences
quickly. The 2DAY company, putting its case, had talked about having a
strong news and current affairs input, wi-th the possibility that one of
the principal shareholders, Mike Willesee from the television public
affairs show, would be involved on air. It had committed itself also
to do as much as it could to broadcast "drama segments, comedy segments
and childrens' programs", and to do outside broadcasts on major events
46
such as a papal visit or a crucial sporting contest.
44 Muir, 21.12.81.
45 Muir said his station had offerred "not a bad performance" on its 
undertaking to put on live concerts, and was emphasising television 
simulcasts, which it had also undertaken to play.
46 Op.cit., A.B.T. Commercial FM Broadcasting Licence Inquiries..., p.72.
Sheedy had been brought in as General Manager after an initial
period with engineering problems and poor audience response; had
decided to emphasise a stream of music with interspersed "lifestyle"
47
material as the staple program, and regarded the commitments made to 
the A.B.T. as a cross he could not bear. He was trying to get out of 
them:
We're doing a review of the licence at the moment because 
there were things put in the application originally that I 
believe were at the time genuine in what they stated, but 
once you get the station on the air and you start to build 
it, and you look at where your response is coming from: 
childrens' programming, religious programming in blocks, 
current affairs, are not applicable to this format...We're 
going through the procedure of notifying the Tribunal that 
we've done some research on those things. We've looked 
at our listening flow-charts to find out where our listeners 
are, and how we're programming when other stations have 
these things on, to see if we're losing audience to say news 
on 2GB or 2UE. But it's also for cost reasons as well 
because we've incurred some pretty heavy losses...These 
sort of projects are expensive and if you're going to do 
them you've got to do them properly. But all in all it 
just comes down to a programming point of view, they just 
don't fit the sound of the station.(48)
The tension between commercial pressure and the associated drives 
to build audiences, on the one hand, and abstract social goals or public 
interest on the other, is at the centre of any debate about regulation. 
It is complicated by the fact that mass audiences, mainly, have gone to 
the formats which are narrowest and the least diversified. It can be 
argued that by crude public consent, so long as there are stations 
available to look after minority pursuits, the stations set up to make 
money should not be regulated to an extent that prevents them from 
maximising their chances. In response to that, the reminder has to be
47 The station sees itself as providing for a population interested in 
leisure. Segments of talk among the records, apart from chat by 
and about the musicians, include such contributions as a series of 
30-second comments on the Sydney-Hobart yacht race, by Sir James 
Hardy, or a similar series on keeping fit, by John Newcombe.
48 Interview, 21.12.81.
given that station frequencies are a public asset, licensed out for the
benefit of a diversified and ever-changing public. An argument then
develops: the requirements of an authority such as the A.B.T. are those
of the public, and once determined, for the sake of keeping faith with
the public they should not be tinkered with - whether or not the growth
of an aggregate audience is at stake.
With the expansion of radio, more challenges can be expected of
the kind described here, in the case of the 3 stations dissatisfied with
their operating briefs. The A.B.T. has experienced some curtailment of
its prerogatives and has taken criticism over its decisions on television 
49matters. It will need to be watched to see how effective it proves as 
an instrument for balancing and reconciling the future claims of 
different interests in the theatre of broadcasting policy and control.
Finances, Audience Share, Other Factors 
As new enterprises the commercial FM stations have been notably 
susceptible to financial pressures operating against experimentation 
with programs, and it is a characteristic of them that their innovations 
have been within narrow parameters. By comparison, the public stations - 
with much less money and often with less expertise - admit more 
possibilities and overcome great obstacles to act on them.
Nevertheless the 7 stations were given the opportunity, with the 
stereo FM medium and a clean slate for programming, to do something 
different, and in some respects, with the aforementioned limitations, 
services available to listeners have been extended. All have expanded 
the range of music available on commercial radio, presenting it in a 
variety of forms. More frequently whole albums are played in a session; 
live recordings are featured; musical sequences are "hand picked" in 
the words of one program director, no longer organised into a rigid
49 See Section 3, Chapter 6.
rotation. Three stations in particular, 3E0N, 4MMM and 6N0W have
invested in promotional concerts which, when recorded have contributed
50to a high "Australian content" register for some of the stations.
The advantage of the stereo mode has been exploited in television
simulcasts, a form of presentation heavily in vogue in the early 1980s
and attractive for audience-building. Muir gives a figure of about
$70,000 as the cost to his station of presenting the film "Tommy" on
commercial television. However on the evidence of a survey the program
had held a television audience rated at 15 points, about 3 times more
than the initial estimate of the television executives. The radio station
recouped much of the cost through selling advertising time through the 
51program.
In audience size the stations had begun to compare with the lower­
rated AM stations. 4MMM had eclipsed 4IP in Brisbane, by a few percentage 
points, at the end of 1981, and the Sydney stations were a few points 
behind the closest commercial AM stations in the last McNair Anderson 
survey for that year. There were some dramatic performances in the 
capture of audiences in the target age ranges, most notably 18-24. 4MMM
reported increased figures in 3 successive surveys, culminating with 32%
52
of the 18-24 bracket, and 10.2% overall. 6N0W had 25%, and 12.5% 
overall.
The disastrous start of commercial FM in Sydney, with long periods 
off air for repairs and adjustment, made sure of a poor initial response, 
with each station taking only 2-3% of audiences overall, until late 1981*
50 3E0N claims 38% of its music is Australian, against the A.B.T. require­
ment of 25%.
51 Muir, 21.12.81.
52 4MMM-FM, The Brisbane FM Success Story: Stereo FM-104, Brisbane,
1981 (brochure).
53 6NOW-FM, 96FM Stereo Makes Radio History, Perth, 1981 (brochure).
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Much was made of this failure in the trade papers and elsewhere, with 
management at some of the other 5 stations arguing that it was discour­
aging advertiser support nationally. The argument was that advertising 
agencies had their headquarters in Sydney, with many of their offices in 
a generally poor reception area on the lower North Shore. The starting
difficulties of their local stations, and continuing reception problems,
54had created an adverse impression of FM radio as a significant medium.
Notwithstanding that lapse of solidarity the stations as a group 
obtained promising audience support in their first 18 months. Much of 
that had been generated through extended publicity campaigns. In a few 
cases a figure of $250,000 was suggested as the bill for the "launch" 
campaign for the station. 3E0N for instance had advertisements running 
on all 3 commercial television channels. Promotional costs for all 
stations represented a sizeable proportion of the bill for setting up and 
launching the enterprise, given as between $750,000 and $1.4 million, 
total for each station - with the average at just under $1 million.
Institutional links made some difference. 3F0X lost heavily in
its first year but was able to obtain time for advertising its format
change on channel 10, the associated channel. Sheedy says that 2DAY
arranged similar contra-deals in Sydney with channel 7, though it was
putting more faith in cinema advertising with another of its shareholder
companies, Village Theatres. The cinema outlet seemed to be giving good
access to "leisure oriented" groups in the particular station audience.
The exploitation of such relationships had been anticipated at the time
of the A.B.T. licence hearings; had some influence on the early survival
54 This was mentioned in interviews by two of the station representatives. 
Muir in response pointed out that the audience response in the 
smaller cities was achieved against weaker competition, and that in 
financial terms his company had been "trading better", with its 
smaller share of a larger market. (Interview, 21.12.81)
of the stations, and had the potential to be developed further. Bissell
for instance perceived that news required more emphasis than the nominal
service being provided on 3F0X, and speculated that it might be expanded
with the help of channel 10, within the same building at Nunawadding,
55and "with a massive news room just twenty yards away".
News gathering was a Cinderella area in these stations with staff
56
levels varying from only 28 to 35 people, of whom normally 5 or 6 would 
be engaged in sales. Stations typically have 3 indoors journalists 
re-writing agency copy and taking all sound inputs, either local inter­
views or reports from stringers overseas, by telephone. Bulletins are 
concentrated in the breakfast and late afternoon ("drive") shifts, and 
are short. It is common for station managements to demand that all copy 
be rewritten to a station style, and that stories be turned over at such 
a rate that bulletins are almost entirely fresh. Given the staff 
available these are high pressure conditions for the journalists and 
don't allow time for such things as special backgrounding of stories, 
or discussions over the merits of alternative versions. No thought is 
given to documentaries or investigations in depth. 6NOW gives more
emphasis to news than the others, making a promotional point out of the
5725 years' experience of its news editor.
On advertising support and profitability, there is recognition 
among the stations that their programming strategy, with the key emphasis 
on extended music at a good level of technical reproduction, will not 
sustain a heavy load of advertising. The limit set by stations is 6 or 8 
minutes in the hour, mostly the latter. One, 3EON, said it was booked 
3 months in advance, at 8 minutes. Most of the others were below that 
quota but describing their bookings as "satisfactory". For a time 6NOW
55 Interview, 22.10.81.
56 Except 4MMM with 24.
57 Cp.cit., 6N0W-FM... Also George Chapman, Managing Director, 6N0W-FM. 
Interview with J. Clements, 7.12.81.
was attempting to sell advertising time - though without outstanding 
support - only in one-minute spots, to be used solus - a break in 
aesthetic terms from the more traditional blocks of 30-second messages. 
There is some interest in pressing the agencies to have commercials 
made in stereo, because of dramatic effects that can be achieved from it, 
in sound.
Beyond that there has been no large break from convention in the 
revenue raising styles adopted by the 7 stations, although their ratings 
success in certain target areas has given them a credible position in 
the market place. Advertisers can be approached to "purchase" audiences 
in certain segments of the listener population, where they have 
applicable goods and services to sell. Judicious buying, usually from 
the FM station and one other, it can be shown, make it worthwhile to 
advertise on FM. Were this to continue, the FM segment will have found 
the means for a staple income.
Advertising rates have had to be pitched below those of AM stations
still commanding bigger audiences, though some stress was laid in
promotional literature on the "buys" available in the specialised
audience areas, where the stations were strong. To that effect 2DAY and
2MMM issued a combined rate card, to capitalise on the spread of the
stations across the 18-39 age range, with according to their surveys,
58only 16% overlap or audience swing between the two stations. The rate
was $66-80 per unit for packages of 30-second spots on the 2 stations,
on a run of the station basis. B. and T. magazine calculated that "the
18-39 cost per thousand reach for combined FM is $1:87, well below
592UW's $2:24, 2SM's $3:25 and 2UE's $4:16". Average rates of the
58 i.e. 84% of total listeners to 2DAY or 2MMM listen to one only of the 
2 stations. Figures from Sheedy.
59¿The AM stations can deliver more thousands however, in different age- 
groups, within the quoted outlay.)
other stations were Melbourne, $35 (30 seconds) and $70 (1 minute), 
and Adelaide, Brisbane and Perth, $25 and $50, for weekdays across all 
time zones.
Most of the stations were able to report that they had begun to 
trade profitably after one year, but without expecting to pay signifi­
cant dividends. 2DAY and 3F0X were the significant exceptions, though 
both were following new strategies which, by the indications they were 
receiving, would bring them better support from audiences, and presumably 
from advertisers in the wake of that.
Two remaining problems have occupied the minds of station managers 
and been given by them as reasons for a slow beginning to FM. The first 
is the reception problem in Sydney, which has been dealt with 
exhaustively.^ In Melbourne, 3F0X has made a claim to the Communications 
Department for upgrading of its transmitter power, mainly on the ground 
that its aerial in the Dandenongs is remote from large sections of the 
designated service area - a factor more likely to affect the stereo FM 
signal than AM, as it is a characteristic of FM that the signal will cut 
out abruptly at its extremities. The station says it has identified a 
number of "dead spots" for typical receivers. The other problem is one 
familiar to American operators, the fact that car radios are not 
converting to FM at the same rapid rate as the hand-held transistor 
population, or the market for home stereo sets. Particular reference 
was made to this in interviews by Seymour and Sheedy, who outlined 
approaches being made to the principal auto manufacturers, in efforts to 
have an FM capability included in all radios supplied with new motorcars.
The new operators who came into being with the FM licensing of 
1979 have proved to be vigorous for the most part; prepared to exploit 
the advantages given them by the new technology; and willing to enter
60 See Section 2, Chapter 2.
program areas not explored by their competitors on AM - though they may 
do that very cautiously. They have made their innovations within 
limits, and tied down particularly by their awareness of financial 
constraints, have moved off only in a few directions at the one time.
It is interesting to see what has happened in the parallel area of public 
radio, where different opportunities, and different restrictions apply.
Section 4; Chapter 4
PUBLIC BROADCASTING
The public in te rest was s ig n ific a n tly  advanced when a small number 
o f  in terested  people decided to canvass fo r  public radio in  A ustralia . 
Those people were very adept at turning p o lit ic a l  circumstances to their  
use, although the circumstances were ever-changing, and often d i f f ic u lt  
fo r  them. I n it ia l ly  classed by many professional broadcasters, conserv­
atives in  general, and other c r it ic s  as the ratbags o f  radio, they 
eventually gained wide p v b lic  and governmental acceptance, opened a targe 
chain o f radio sta tio n s, and revealed the existence o f a big sector o f the 
community in terested  in  making and receiving specia l in terest broadcasts 
o f one kind or another. Importantly radio, and to a degree the entire  
mass media had tost much o f their mystique - private citizen s now had a 
presentable chance o f acquiring "media" s k i l l s  by participating in  public  
radio, and learning how things could be determined "from the in sid e".
Over time, i t  would a lt  c learly  make fo r  more open and active exchanges, 
to some extent, as part o f the democratic process, to have many private  
c itiz en s involved in  broadcasting in  such a way.
Andrew Bear has drawn attention to 2 important considerations very 
central to the advent o f public radio in  A ustralia:
F ir s t , we are te llin g  about an extraordinarily fe r t i le  
period in  Australian thinking about broadcasting - 
perhaps the only one. B r illia n t , creative and id e a lis t ic  
minds were turned to broadcasting,  with stunning r e su lts .
Without that amazing quality o f  thought, matched by 
equally amazing dedication and determination, the 
o ss ifie d  r ig id ity  o f the dual system would never have 
been altered at a l l .  A l l  Auastralians should be grateful 
to the smalt and courageous band o f men and women who 
forced the set face o f broadcasting to change. Second, 
we are talking about an extraordinarily tumultuous 
period in  Australian p o lit ic a l  h istory . To an extent 
never before known, broadcasting p o licy  issu es became 
p o lit ic a lly  changed. Many o f the decisions taken in  the 
seventies were overtly p o lit ic a l , and must from now on be 
seen in  that context. (1)
p .7 .1 O p .a it .,  Bear, Open and Closed O p t io n s ... ,
PUBLIC RADIO 1
POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO PUBLIC BROADCASTING
The public radio movement that emerged in Australia from roughly
1974 in itself enacted the view of mass communication often articulated
in theory by a lot of its adherents,Ideas to do with démocratisation of
radio, diversification and access were made actual. By comparison with
the bloc that set out to restrict and confound it, the commercial radio
industry, it was quintessentially a democratic force, One group was
highly institutionalised, exclusive, concentrated, wanting continued
privileged access to rare social resources, radio frequencies, and
committed to rather narrow social goals - as represented by commercial
radio programming; the tree was well-recognised by its fruit. The other
group was very diverse, broad, dispersed, organised only loosely, wanting
frequencies, as resources, to be distributed widely, and strongly
committed to a range of broad social goals. Material considerations
were neglected in their thinking.
The comparison overstates the differences of course. Commercial
broadcasters had been surprised with, potentially, a novel threat to
their prosperity, and reacted defensively as businesses would. The social
importance of the particular kind of business had been little thought of
2
during the preceding decade, but quickly enough came to be agreed on
virtually by all parties, as the first item for the agenda in the public
radio debate of the 1970s. When the roles of public radio became more
apparent, as a force "complementing and supplementing" the established
3
broadcasters, reconciliation was to follow.
Such a comparison however identifies the issues that were raised 
and fought over in the political arena. The public radio movement, put
2 See Section 2, Chapter 2.
3 See Section 4, Chapter 3.
in the spotlight and aggrandised by the unease of its detractors, 
placed in contention the questions of who should use scarce, publicly 
owned broadcasting resources (the station frequencies), to what purpose 
should those resources be exploited, and how should that be brought 
about? As new technologies and new social forces matured, revived 
activity in the "demand patterns" sector of the political system sur- 
planted the pre-existing set of crude interest-group demands that had 
prevailed till that time. The initiative was passed into the decisional 
area of government, where, by an erratic process the ideas put into play 
were thrashed out, alignments were made and consolidated, and eventually 
a material settlement was reached. The history of that process is well 
known but should be reviewed briefly here, in its highlights, to open 
the way for further discussion.
Law as Executive Director of the P.B.A.A. was intimately involved 
in events as they unfolded. In an interview with the writer he gave an 
historical overview and explained the relative importance of the 
different events, particularly as they applied to the new public broad­
casting sector. His account, as well as giving emphases, dwells on 
certain principles that were evolved along the way. It is a theme that 
the public stations were seen to be becoming "legitimised", as more 
parties reached an understanding as to their role, and accepted it. An 
extensive extract from the interview is given below, in which Law 
covers these points, and recaps much of the history dealt with in 
preceding chapters.
The P.B.A.A. grew out of efforts by the Music Broadcasting Societies 
in Victoria (formed in 1968) and New South Wales (1970) to obtain radio 
licences, so as to make up for what they saw as deficiencies in the 
service offered by the A.B.C. It therefore stemmed from an interest in 
music rather than broadcasting. The N.S.W. group saw its chance in 1971,
when the P.M.G. "out of the blue" announced the A.B.C.B. inquiry into FM.
The cause of public broadcasting from that time was to be married to that
of the opening of the FM band, at many levels of activity.
M.B.S. really dropped everything in order to fight the FM 
battle and as soon as it got into that it found itself 
advancing a double case. One was for FM and the other was 
the case for alternative broadcasting. The history of 
previous inquiries was that there was almost no public 
input, and it was quite likely there would be very few if 
any organisations coming along and presenting a point of 
view that was oriented towards the needs of the listener 
rather than the needs of the broadcasters. We decided then 
and there that our submission would not be narrowly confined 
to the needs of music broadcasting, that it was legitimate 
to broaden our scope, as we'd have more chance of success.
We certainly stimulated a lively debate...
[Question] You provided public input that Wright has claimed 
was always missing.
I guess we did. We persisted with that and our next major 
success of course was putting forward the proposition which 
led to the reversal of the decision in favour of UHF FM.
It was an M.B.S. operation, to the Senate Standing Committee 
on Education, Science and the Arts. July 1973. We had a 
submission that there was serious reason to believe this was 
a faulty decision, on technical as well as general grounds.
It's all history now. The committee recommended an 
independent inquiry; the government accepted that, and the 
result was McLean. I'm told they tried to get corroborative 
evidence for the evidence we'd put forward, but couldn't get 
much, so they really went in very largely on our evidence.
Among a number that was probably public broadcasting's finest 
hour, because we did deflect the history of Australian 
broadcasting.
The P.B.A.A. was further down the track. It was formed one 
year later in fact. It's always struck me too as an 
interesting example of the fact that if the ordinary citizen 
is prepared to work hard and stick with it year after year, 
after year, you can have an influence on the way things go.
But the precondition is that you've got to be prepared to 
devote an enormous amount of time and effort to it, and be 
doggedly persistent. This was 3 years after we began and 
there was still no sign of any licence.
The Labor government was disappointing up until its last 
six months in the lack of energy and lack of clarity about 
what it ought to be doing. The 2 MBS licences were issued, 
and 5UV...Then Moss Cass by offering those 12 licences really 
expanded public broadcasting to a significant size...Then,
11th November came, and the challenge was to turn Whitlam 
promises into Fraser licences. This was achieved.
The licences were approved, Law says, at least in part because "Members
of Parliament of all sorts and colours, from areas to which the licences
had been promised, moved in", in their support.
Then of course things went very quiet for 2 years during the 
period of re-evaluation of broadcasting, of standstill. The 
government had decided it had got to abolish the Control 
Board. That meant an inquiry to legitimise this, and that 
was the Green inquiry, which turned out to be the first one 
to propose a firm and categorical way that Australian 
broadcasting should be a three-sector structure, and that 
public broadcasting was an essential part of any total broad­
casting system. It was a structured place in the system that 
we needed...
For the first time, apart from the A.B.C., commercial 
broadcasters were going to have another kind of an animal 
sitting alongside of them. On the principle that any kind of 
change is going to be for the worse, they were pretty hostile 
in those early days. That's changed I may say now. I think 
they have realised that as we were saying all along, we're 
not a threat to them. The notion that we would be complem­
entary, that we always complement and supplement what somebody 
else does, is probably true, though there can be exceptions...
There was the invention of that expression in 1978, at the 
time of the relicensing of virtually all public broadcasters:
Our role in life was to 'complement and supplement and not 
seek to compete', was the phrase. As the author of those words 
I'm perfect. It's served us fairly well, as it was not too 
restrictive. The element of intent in the competition bit was 
very important. The words found their way into the planning 
proposals which the Tribunal had before it at the licensing 
hearings. Effectively a directive to the Tribunal...This 
comes to the very important policy statement by Staley in 
April 1978 which followed passage of the legislation we now 
have, establishing public booadcasting licences. It became 
possible to issue public licences and get rid of those licences 
issued under the WT Act. It was all done with excessive speed 
which was a bit unfortunate because they were issuing 10 new 
licences at the same time. It happened when there were already 
15 stations in operation. We had the stations first and the 
policy later.
There was further licencing of stations from that point, and the
prospects at the close of 1981 were for further growth. A summary:
It's all gone slower than we would have liked. There are 
more restrictions than we'd like to see. For example, of the 
relatively small number of AM stations that we've got only 2 
of the 6 have got coverages which are adequate for their 
social purposes. The others are completely unable to get any 
improvement of their conditions. If you look back you could 
pick a whole lot of points where we would be critical of 
actions taken or not taken, rather that than of major 
decisions. On the other hand if you look at the situation 
here now you've got 34, soon to be 36, maybe 38, public 
broadcasting stations in existence, with independent licences; 
and once you've got there, it's not at all easy to get rid of 
you...When you look elsewhere I don't know of another country 
which has done what Australia has; which is, having already
fully developed national and commercial broadcasting, actually 
looked at this and decided that on their own it was not enough, 
and that as a deliberate act of government policy we will 
create a third sector, to do the things the two others either 
couldn't or wouldn't do, and possibly get into some quite 
innovative experiments into fresh things that could be done 
with the radio medium. That to a degree has been done...It's 
not at a standstill. It's still continuing. If you look at 
what we've got I suppose there's a lot in it that you can take 
satisfaction in.(4)
Bear has criticised the outcome of the public broadcasting move­
ment, expressed as services offered by its stations, as not having 
fulfilled the ideology that guided it, and as being deficient in the 
range and depth of its coverage. He has categorised the stations from 
six different perspectives, to give some coherence to what he sees as a 
"pretty thorough mess" of stations, organisations and program policies.^ 
The following is drawn from that, employing the categorisation of 
stations by mode of entry into the system, the choice of which makes 
reference to the history sketched out above by Law. One or two small 
errors have been corrected and the listing has been brought up to date, 
to the end of 1981. The preponderance of FM stations - FM being the 
mode where frequencies are more available, establishment costs are less, 
and sound quality is better for stations interested in music - is 
noteworthy.
PUBLIC STATIONS BY MODE OF ENTRY INTO THE SYSTEM
Group 1: VL2UV; VL5UV The first licences under the Wireless 
Telegraphy Act, frequencies off the 
broadcast band, 1961 and 1970.
Group 2: 2MBS; 3MBS; 5UV Experimental licences under the 
Wireless Telegraphy Act, offered after 
Cabinet decision, September 1974.
Group 3 : *2CT; 3CR Restricted commercial licences under 
the Broadcasting and Television Act, 
awarded after ABCB hearings, August
1975.
4 Interview, 14.12.81.
5 Qp.cit., Bear, Open and Closed Options..., p.6.
Group 4 :
Group 5:
Group 6 :
Group 7 :
*Group 8 :
*Group 9 :
2ARM; 2NCR; 2MCE; 
2NUR; 2XX; 3RRR; 
3GCR; 4ZZZ; 4DDB; 
6NR; 6UVS; 7CAE
The 12 'Moss Cass Specials' under the 
Wireless Telegraphy Act offered to 
educational institutions in August
1975.
2WEB
2SER; 2CBA; 3PBS; 
4EB; 4MBS; 5MMM; 
5EBI; 6NEW; 7HFC
2REM; 8CCC; 8T0P
The Bourke licence was awarded under 
the amended Broadcasting and Television 
Act after a hearing before the ABT, 
February 1978.
The 9 new licences after Australia­
wide hearings by the ABT, 1978. The 
15 yearlier Wireless Telegraphy stations 
were also relicensed under the amended 
Broadcasting and Television Act.
1980 - the first licences awarded 
after the 1978 round of hearings.
2VTR; 2AAA; 3CCC; Licences offered late 1980-1982.
4TTT; Murrayville
Bellingen; Coffs Procedures initiated for the
Harbour; Mt Gambia; commencement of licensing procedures. 
Par* , S .A.
* 2CT at Campbelltown was closed through insolvency. The station had 
been the subject of complaints that it was adopting a "commercial" 
format and style, and was presenting sponsorship announcements as 
spot commercials. A new licensing hearing was convened by the A.B.T. 
in 1980 at which the community consortium, responsible for the first 
licence, and one other organisation applied. Both were rejected. 
There is a proposal for a public community station to replace 2CT in 
the future.
** Up-dating of the initial schedule.^
By area, there are 19 capital city stations. By affiliation, a 
majority, 19, are linked in some way with educational institutions, mostly 
Colleges of Advanced Education.
In criticising the system Bear describes the distribution of 
stations as
6 Andrew Bear 
University, 
P-3.
Open and Closed Options for Public Broadcasting, Flinders 
S.A. (original for the journal article quoted at (5));
uneven and therefore unfair. A small town like Churchill 
in Victoria has a local public broadcasting station (3GCR) 
while major regional centres go without - Kalgoorlie,
Mt Gambir, Ballarat etc...The kind of minority or special 
interest groups that are catered for in one area are not 
catered for in another - Christians in Melbourne, fine music 
enthusiasts in Adelaide, educational listeners in Brisbane, 
the ethnic community in Hobart.
Those are major inadequacies, but they refer only to 
fields in which public broadcasters 'complement and 
supplement' the national and commercial services - where 
they fill some of the c^ aps. But what about the idea of 
alternative broadcasting, of genuinely different, genuinely 
challenging ideas, opinions and styles? Of those there are 
precious few, and in most places none at all. The regional 
stations are almost entirely bland or conservative, and so 
is the vast majority of fuban ones. Could any station, with 
the single exception of 3CR, be called 'radical' in any 
serious sense? Somehow, the notion of alternative broad­
casting has been lost. (7)
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
The following survey of the mixed broadcasting system formed by 
piecemeal means, over the years, gives a slight idea of the diversity of 
programming which does occur, and diversity of interests involved - and 
it offers a treatment of some of the principal problems for the operators. 
It begins with the P.B.A.A's listing of 34 stations either on air, or 
licensed and preparing to broadcast, in 1981.
PUBLIC BROADCASTING STATIONS, 1981
2XX AM Canberra Community, news, current affairs, ethnic
*2 NCR FM Lismore Community, educational, ethnic, Aboriginal
2 WEB AM Bourke Educational , community, Aboriginal
2 ARM FM Annidale Community, educational, ethnic
*2NUR FM Newcastle Educational , community, ethnic
*2MCE FM Bathurst Educational , community, ethnic
2MBS FM Sydney Music, classical, jazz, 
rock
also folk, blues,
2CBA FM Sydney Christian, MOR music, outreach
*2SER FM Sydney Educational
ethnic
, community, current affairs,
/2VTR FM Windsor Community
2AAA FM Wagga Wagga Community, ethnic
7 Op.cit. , Bear, Open and Closed Options. . ., p . 6.
2 REM FM Albury-Wodonga Community, ethnic
*3RRR FM Melbourne Educational, contemporary music, news/ 
current affairs
3CR AM Melbourne Community, ethnic, news/current affairs
3MBS FM Melbourne Music, classical
3PBS FM Melbourne Music, contemporary
/3CCC FM Bendigo Community, educational
3GCR FM Churchill Community, educational
/ ? FM Murrayville Community, educational
4MBS FM Brisbane Music, classical, some jazz
4ZZZ FM Brisbane Contemporary music, news/current affairs
4EB AM Brisbane Ethnic; access to some non-ethnic groups; 
Aboriginal
4DDB FM Toowoomba Community, classical music
4TTT FM Townsville Community, Aboriginal
*5UV AM Adelaide Educational, community, music, news/current 
affairs, ethnic
5EBI FM Adelaide Ethnic
5MMM FM Adelaide Music, contemporary/alternative, news/current 
affairs,
*6NR AM Perth Educational, community, ethnic, Aboriginal, 
news/current affairs
*6UVS FM Perth Educational, community, classical music
6NEW FM Newman Community
*7CAE FM Hobart Community, educational, ethnic, Aboriginal
7HFC FM Hobart Christian, MOR music
*8 TOP FM Darwin Community, educational, ethnic, Aboriginal
*8CCC FM Alice Springs Community, Aboriginal
* Directly licensed to an educational institution
g
/ Not yet on air
To give an impression of the great range of programming played on 
these stations - admittedly at widely differing levels of quality and 
finesse, from program to program - a selection of program notes from 
2NUR-FM is given in Appendix B. The schedules for this Community/ 
Educational Station are typical of many in their rich variety and in the 
kinds of programs broadcast.
8 P.B.A.A. Facts and Philosophy, Sydney, 1981, (brochure), p.l.
Finances
It is conceivable that public radio might wither rather than grow,
with stations closing or reducing services, if the financial standing of
the system does not improve. The first generation of public broadcasters,
who lobbied within the political system and plied a "populist,
9participatory, democratising rhetoric", found it practicable to emphasise 
the low costs of small independent stations, especially as, consistent 
with the ideology of community involvement and sharing, there would be 
no major wages bills to meet.
It has turned out to be a trap, as government has felt invited to 
take the view, which it has taken, that to provide financial guarantees 
to public radio would be against the spirit of the system. A contrib­
ution from the public purse in the form of cultural grants, from the 
Australia Council, was organised in 1975. Funding has since been taken 
over by the Communications Department but remains at the level of 
encouragement or minor seeding finance. For 1981-82 $137,000 was 
budgeted for these grants. Of that, many stations received nothing and 
certain regional stations actually being inaugurated were given no more 
than $5,000.
That need not be important if other things are progressing well, 
but financial support from any quarter is thin, and in places, 
particularly the very strategic educational institutions, it has begun to 
dry up. Apart from government finance, the major sources of revenue for 
the public stations are grants from owners, mostly C.A.E's; subscription 
fees from station supporters; sponsorship announcements on air; payments 
by users for broadcasting facilities and air-time; receipts from station 
radio guides or magazines, and additional sources including random
9 Op.cit., Bear, "Public Broadcasting in Australia...", p.6.
10 By Pockley. Interview, 23.12.75.
donations, or contributions from radiothons, concerts and other promot­
ional activities.
An idea of the relative importance of different types of funding - 
and of the minimal budgets available - is given in the following 
abbreviated table, from a survey of public stations conducted in late 
1980 by 2SER.
FUNDING FOR STATIONS, 1980-81
Station Owners Subscribers Sponsors Users Magazine Other
NCR 17,000 250 24,000 n/a n/a 13,000
NUR 40,000 10,000 18,000 n/a n/a 11,000
MCE 30,000 1,000 n/a n/a n/a 4,500
WCR n/a 3,000 9,700 5,300 n/a 10,000
SER 114,400 12,000 n/a 97,400 30,600 6,000
RRR 96,000 24,500 5,000 n/a 4,000 15,200
CR n/a 32,000 n/a 17,000 n/a 10,000
ZZZ 8,800 30,000 n/a n/a 4,000 70,000
MBS n/a 28,400 n/a n/a 4,800 n/a
EB n/a 20,000 15,000 5,000 n/a 10,000
MMM n/a 27,000 n/a n/a 13,000 98,000
NR 84,200 n/a n/a 49,500 n/a 5,000
CAE 50,000 5,000 n/a n/a 10,000 8,500
All figures are dollars for 1980 except SER1 s which are for 1981
n/a = not applicable
The P.B.A.A. recognises the tenuous financial position of a
majority of its member stations and has followed 3 lines of response. It
advises members to seek to restrict revenue from any one source to no
more than one third of all revenue, as insurance against over-dependence
and vulnerability; it has been pressing for more government support, and
it has urged the stations to take up their option as public licence
holders, of finding more commercial sponsors.
On the last point it has had scant success, although sponsorship,
11 2SER-FM, Profile of Public Radio Stations in Australia, Sydney, 1981, 
p.9.
where it can be got, can provide large resources. In a lot of cases the
stations are themselves resistant to sponsorship, not least because many
of the participants in them dislike commercial radio and want their
outlets free of commercial pressures, and on air, free of commercial
sounds. That is part of their preference for public radio as listeners,
12
and of their commitment to being station workers.
As well, the provision for sponsorship announcements on air -
evidently to mollify commercial broadcasters and assuage their fears when
the rules were being drawn up - is highly restrictive. Virtually only
the name of the sponsor, address and type of business can be given, and
then with only sparse repetition, at half-hour intervals. Given the
limited audiences on public stations at any one time, the market for
sponsorship has to be poor, and will take much effort to develop.
In its complaint over government funding the P.B.A.A. points out
that 75% of Australians are receiving at least one public station, and
that its "cost effectiveness is illustrated by the total revenue required
to achieve this: about $3.5 million currently, an average of about
$115,000 a station. These figures compare with about $40 million for
A.B.C. radio (average $140,000 per station), and $126 million for
13commercial radio ($1 million). (1978-79 figures)"
Some particular cases:
Budget pressure on members of the consortium backing 3RRR led a
14number of the colleges to withdraw from it leaving the Royal Melbourne 
Institute of Technology where it started in 1975, as the principal
12 For instance Thompson, Administrative Co-ordinator, 4ZZZ, identified 
at 4ZZZ "heavy antipathy towards commercial media and marketing of 
consumer commodities", and rejection of "fetishism with commodities" 
(interview, 7.1.82).
13 Op.cit., P.B.A.A. Facts and Philosophy..., p.3.
14 The last being Caulfield and Preston Colleges in October 1981.
sponsor. There had already been pressure on station staff to revise 
programs, to make more provision for teaching and discussion, with less 
music and public affairs. As some put it, to have more "school of the 
air". Under the additional pressure of spending cut-backs at the parent 
institutions, this course of action was ordered by the Board of the 
station, at the beginning of December/ 1981. Nine of the 12 staff 
members were retrenched, and 2 others with skills applicable to the 
station's revised purposes were engaged. It should be pointed out that 
staff members had each been getting less than $200 weekly, which is 
common for those public stations which attempt to run on a full-time 
staff. 16
At 5MMM-FM in Adelaide the staff level at one time was 7 but has
been reduced to 2 full-time and one half-time, paid at the rate of
$140 p.w. again because of a touch and go financial situation.16 The
station manager of 6UVS-FM in Perth, Mr Nicholas Partridge, resigned in
1981, making the complaint that his station was being deprived of funds
needed to pay fair remuneration to staff and to maintain program
standards. The staff was too small, he said, and obliged to work
extended upaid overtime. Despite its goals of presenting fine music and
intelligent talk, it was "struggling, amateurish and boring". Part of
the trouble was its low priority in the view of its owners, Murdoch
University and the University of Western Australia.
There is a body of people who can take the view...that any 
money spent inside a university that isn't actually 
connected with tutorials, lectures and books is a waste of 
money and they're in a position to nobble your operation 
every time they think there might be a vote of money that 
ought to go to their own purposes, rather than to the radio 
station.(17)
15 Information from Mr Rhys Lanshed, Station Manager. Interview with 
the writer on 2JJJ, 1.12.81.
16 Ms Lis Maher, Music Co-ordinator, 5MMM. Interview with the writer, 
5.1.82.
17 Interview with John Clements on 2JJJ, 3.12.81.
2*7
Another resignation in response to financial pressures: Thompson
of 4ZZZ decided that "every year was a hard year". The station needed
$130,000 annually, of which $40,000 came from subscriptions and $30,000
from the University of Queensland Union, as a grant for news and
community services. The rest had to be raised from donations, radiothons
or concerts, for which the station Co-ordinator had direct organising
responsibility. Much of this was gratifying. A radiothon had brought
in $20,000 from listeners, and there had once been a donation of $10,000,
delivered anonymously in a paper parcel. However exhaustion with the
process won out. Each of the 13 staff members on 4ZZZ was being paid 
18
$119.30 p.w.
Operational Matters/Signal Strength
On operational matters the public broadcasters have one main
complaint, that as Law pointed out, a number of stations are still unable
to meet their obligation to cover a defined service area, and want more
power as a result. The survey by 2SER already cited found that 11 of
the 17 stations responding had been seeking revised power specifications
for one reason or another. A few cases stood out. 4EB in Brisbane was
providing the city's only ethnic radio service on 0.11 kw, and was
reporting poor reception. It wanted 2 kw, a modest claim. 2NUR at
Newcastle, a university station which had had its power reduced in the
period before the 1978 review (and revival) of public broadcasting, was
19seeking up-grading from 3 to 10 kw, to improve its coverage.
18 Thompson stayed on at the station as a Producer Presenter.
19 The reason given was that the station abutted onto another station 
frequency, allocated for an adjacent area. (Osborne, 15.12.81)
There was speculation that 2NUR, as one of a number of student 
stations the then Minister, Robinson, was unhappy about, was being 
"wound down", to fill the role of a local "community" broadcaster, 
consistent with the "guidelines" current at the time. (See Section 
3, Chapter 4)
Audiences
If money is the actual threat to the survival of public radio in
the 1980s, the small audience capture of the stations so far is their
achilles heel in the political area. In the major cities none of the
stations rate more than a few percentage points in the McNair Anderson
surveys. The phenomenon has been looked at closely in surveys
20commissioned by some of the stations and is simply explained. The 
explanations so produced are ones that have to be "sold to" potential 
detractors if the installation of the "third system" of stations around 
Australia is not to be decried as a flop.
Programming on the public stations, whether in "strips" of music 
and talk covering a long sector of the day, or in consecutive blocks, is 
governed and shaped usually, by the fact of having various and separate 
contributors for each station. Programs are made by and for particular 
interest groupings in the community, and the result is that the material 
on air is specialised, and will demand "forefront" listening - as opposed 
to casual listening in which the radio remains on for a long time while 
the audience does different things around the house, shop or garden.
The result for the public stations is therefore an extremely poor
showing in the on-going share of available audiences, but off-set to a
large degree by good cumulative figures. These represent numbers who
use a particular station at one time or another, though not for too long.
It's consistent with the style of programming, as it has been described
here, that such figures will be high for public stations, with their
diversified audience groupings tuning in to diversified programs, from
time to time - and not keeping that station on in between times.
20 See B. Alati, R. Patching et al., A Regional New South Wales Radio 
Audience: A Survey of Bathurst Households, April 1981, Bathurst, 
Communication Dept, Mitchell C.A.E., 1981.
2SER-FM, Research Paper No. 2: An Audience Profile, Sydney, 1980.
The example is given of the survey carried out by the Mitchell
C.A.E. in 1981. 84.9% of listeners were found to have used one or more
commercial stations at some time in the week, 24.4% had used the A.B.C.,
21
and 36.6% had tuned to 2MCE. That strong showing by the public station
included, for instance, half a dozen casual listeners who told the
station they had chanced upon a learn to speak German program, which in
turn had been requested by a small number of aspiring German language
students. The casual listeners had become regulars for the half-hour
weekly that the program was on. Their patronage showed up in the
cumulative figure for the station, which, however, in terms of audience
share overall, was well behind the main-stream broadcasters. Presumably
the members of the German class at other times had these mainstream
22stations switched on for long periods.
A final note should be made to the effect that gross audiences 
will probably never be large in public broadcasting. For that they would 
need, to begin with, good reception throughout their service areas; a 
program philosophy such as we have seen with commercial FM, to build the 
gross audience at all costs, and also by way of following the commercial 
model sector, expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars, to back 
up program appeal with advertising campaigns in the other media.
ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE 
Regulation and Censorship
Public stations on the face of it would seem to be quite likely to 
err in keeping to the letter of every regulation set out by the A.B.T.
For one thing they are extremely diverse, and include in their personnel 
great numbers of amateur broadcasters not habituated to the canny
21 Op.cit., Alati, Patching, et al., p.l.
22 Law. Interview, 14.12.81.
restraint of professionals on air; for another - unbound by commercial or 
any other strongly compromising pressures, and acting in a liberal 
spirit - they acknowledge theoretically very few limits on what can be 
broadcast; and thirdly, they represent in many cases the opposition in 
broadcasting - the array of groups and organisations wanting to promote 
the political ideas and programs the mainstream broadcasters dismiss or 
shy away from, as being too radical, hostile, wrong or too advanced for 
the audience.
In the event there have been few confrontations over standards,
23
apart from the accusations of anti-semitism against 3CR in 1979,
settled through negotiation before it came to the "licence revocation"
hearing being proposed by the A.B.T. However in 1981 2 cases caused
interest, in the decisions of the A.B.T. to renew licences for 3MBS and
4ZZZ for a shortened term, and subject to non-repetition of their
24
offending practices.
In the first case the station had persisted with a policy of not 
identifying its musical selections on air. They were published in 
advance in a program guide available to subscribers, and it was seen that 
the open, broadcast service had become a closed circuit. The station 
was required to announce the music it was playing.
4ZZZ was taken to task over vulgarity, in the form of a program 
called "The Penis", and another on censorship which included swear words 
in its illustrative comedy segments. In the case of "The Penis" the 
station's representatives established that the program had been made
23 See A.B.T., Annual Report 1979-80, Canberra, A.G.P.S., 1981, p.27.
24 A.B.T. Re: Creative Broadcasters Ltd: Application for Licence Renewal 
Public Broadcasting Station 4ZZZ-FM Brisbane. Decision. Sydney, 
12.1.82.
A.B.T. Re: Music Broadcasting Society of Victoria Ltd: Application 
for Licence Renewal Public Broadcasting Station 3MBS-FM, Melbourne. 
Decision. Sydney, 30.9.81.
with serious intent, to make a serious argument, which had been doubted. 
It was also accepted, in discussions at the A.B.T. licence renewal 
hearing, that a factor in the tolerableness of otherwise such programs 
was the specialised audience normally on hand to listen at the particular 
time of day or night. In other words a general "community" standard 
might not always be applied. The P.B.A.A. said that principle might be 
applied in many cases - as in a case where complaints had been received 
about something broadcast on the regular "Gay Waves" program on 2SER, 
which had been put aside on similar grounds. However the association was 
pointing out to its members that such a line of thinking did not mean 
any relent from the principle that matters of taste were still subject 
to regulation. In the case of 4ZZZ, the station had its licence renewed 
for only 2 years, not the standard 3. In general, censorship issues 
rested in reserve to be revived and thrashed out further down the line.
Types of Stations
It may be useful to divide the public stations into categories of 
"big" and "small" to try to suggest future directions, or future choices 
for the development of public broadcasting.
Clearly the larger operations - which have attempted to play a 
more generalist program and engage a full-time staff - though they may 
have had more impact with audiences, are highly vulnerable to financial 
pressure.
Another factor presents itself, in connection with these stations. 
Thompson, in the interview, has concurred with the writer in character­
ising some of these stations (specifically 2XX, 3RRR, 4ZZZ, 5MMM - and 
2JJJ in one or other of its incarnations), as standing for a sub-culture 
of the general community. Definitions in such matters are hard to come 
by, but the outline attempted here by the writer may help to create the 
impression that is wanted: stations played a heavy proportion of the new
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wave music becoming available after 1976. They were mostly sponsored 
by student unions or set up to appeal to youth audiences. Their milieu 
was inner-city youth - or at least under-forties. Preoccupations and 
artifacts included a consistently alternative view of politics, usually 
left wing; black clothes; the rights of homosexuals and sexual 
politics; distrust of the police, and the benefits of soft 
drugs.
The question is related to 4ZZZ particularly as the adjacent 
commercial station, 4MMM, when it came on the band, made assiduous efforts 
to disassociate itself from a "wrong image" of FM radio, as represented 
to the public by the student station. Seymour described this as the 
"single big thing to overcome, an image of being radical, university, 
lefty, playing off-the-wall music...it was harmful". In this vision of 
4ZZZ notions of politics and the music were fused - though the station 
had some years previously rejected the idea of permitting long blocks of 
political talk on air. The new wave music, of itself, was seen to be of 
radical politics. Treatment of politics in the station's programming, 
especially if oppositionist or left-wing, was thought to be as one with 
the music format. (The writer finds this a peculiar and doubtful 
mingling of concepts, but there is no space here to investigate it.)
The response of 4MMM to this problem which it perceived^ had been
an educational campaign involving the distribution of leaflets and
brochures, describing FM in terms of its superior sound quality and
promise of "good music": the new station had itself played a "more
adventurous" program than its competitors on AM but its programmers
were "not musical snobs" and had eschewed the "hard" line followed on
4ZZZ - which, he said, had had to reply by "cleaning up its act"
25
musically, and moving to a "more accessible" selection.
25 Mr Ted Seymour, Program Director, 4MMM. Interview, 11.12.81.
Thompson said there had been an apparent shift of this kind, but 
it was to do with a change in the avialable new music. New wave music 
in 1980 and 1981 was not as demanding as the early British punk. As 
well, it had taken some years to learn how to program the new music, and 
it was only in more recent times that broadcasters at his station had 
been dispersing their esoteric material and "noise" among familiar and 
easier tracks.
This had replaced a situation in which broadcasters had been 
"following trends, and did not realise that others would not like what 
they were into". In cases like that the program had been "anathema" to 
large numbers of listeners who "if the music was unfamiliar all the time, 
would just drop off". The station's following had remained specialised 
throughout its career. Support in the market share ratings produced 
significant cumulative figures, but poor averages, mainly representing 
"loyals". While backing for such enterprise as 4ZZZ was provided by a 
"1970s sub-culture", that did not seem altogether viable, and in fact 
showed signs of "disintegrating". Stations such as his might 
ultimately come to a choice between "adapting too much, or going under", 
the alternative which many of the persons involved would prefer. It 
seemed worthwhile to continue with new music, and with presenting an 
alternative viewpoint in news and information, even though support in
numbers, in the community, was rather weak, and had the marks of further
, , . 26 decline.
The smaller public stations, which had committed less, were not 
confronted with the same pressure to find a large base of support. For 
instance the educational brief of 3RRR, a large station, was served to 
a degree by extensive news review and public affairs programs, which
26 Interview, 7.1.82.
used full-time staff and had rather a wide appeal and reputation.
Stations playing for lower stakes, as for example another Melbourne 
enterprise 3PBS-FM, got by on lesser resources.
A conundrum for public broadcasters is represented in this choice.
It is whether to make a demonstrable impact, by setting up a fairly costly 
operation and addressing yourself to quite large social groupings, such 
as Christians, or the youth sub-cultures discussed above; or be satisfied 
with a fairly obscure role for the station, playing speciality material 
to small interest groups - as people who want to learn German, 
electronics fanciers, or students enrolled in university extension 
courses.
To make the comparison plain it should be useful to sketch out the
27operations and goals of 3PBS. The station is an excellent service 
from the point of view of its subscribers, who have quite easy access to 
air to present the programs they have an interest in. It is an all­
volunteer concern, with a brief to present "progressive music". The 
program begins in the late afternoon with rock music, but only that which 
is not being played elsewhere. It then goes into a series of two-hour 
jam sessions each of a particular genre - different types of jazz, big 
bands, soul, blues and R. and B., reggae. The station is heavily used 
also by drama groups and drama students from the Melbourne State College 
and Rusden State College, who put on radio plays.
Giles concedes the station is probably more interesting to its 
subscribers than to general listeners, because the latter are accustomed 
to radio stations which play the same format across the whole day. "If 
they turn it on and hear country music, they'll think we are a country 
and Western station."
27 Most of the information on which was provided by Mr Ross Giles,
Acting Manager of 3PBS. Interview with the writer, 23.10.82.
The scale of the operation is very small. There are nearly 900 
subscribers who provide the bulk of the revenue. A core of 100 
enthusiasts form the backbone of the staff and these include a broad 
range of types - elderly people, unemployed people, engineers, students, 
a dentist, a chef. The station is located close to the central business 
district and, as its transmissions in the day-time would interfere with 
a major radio installation adjacent to its building, it is only able to 
broadcast from 4.30 p.m. to 2 a.m.
However it is well advised technically. Beginning in 1979 with a 
200 w transmitter, staff constructed the present 2.5 kw unit from second 
hand components. A costing has been done for erecting the aerial on a 
television tower at Mt Dandenong, installation of a microwave link 
($50,000) and conversion to 10 kw power ($28,000), to achieve full 
metropolitan coverage. However such funds are not on hand and the 
operators are not in a hurry to expand.
The range of possibilities in public broadcasting is represented 
by this station, with its modest goals and somewhat diffident approach,
and the large presence of 3RRR, which has cost as much as $274,000 p.a.
28to run, and up to the present has drawn a mass audience (however near 
to the lower threshold of a mass following that couple of percent may 
be). Whatever may be said about the different institutional arrangements 
and programming philosophies, each has made important contributions in 
its own way to the advancement of society and culture.
28 Budget figures for 3RR-FM, provided by Lanshed: 1980-81 $274,000; 
1981-82 $245,000; 1982-83 $150,000.
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Section 5
CONCLUSIONS SECTION
To conclude the survey of FM radio, this chapter reviews the 
political process through which the establishment of the FM stations came 
about. It then looks at 2 of the central questions which have come up 
recurrently throughout: the first of these is the political/engineering 
problem of the radio sector of the VHF band, 88-108 MHz. When it was 
decided to push ahead with FM radio, through going to VHF, it was found 
to be problematical as the band had been given over to other uses. The 
reasons for that, the far-reaching implications of it, and the 
intractable obstacles to getting the band cleared, have made an illumin­
ating story, to do with the array of interests, priorities, and processes 
of Australian politics - and also to do with the second problem to be 
looked at once more, that of commercial protectionism for Australian 
broadcasters. The advent of FM radio challenged protectionist assumptions 
in broadcasting policy, though it by no means provided a big enough lever 
to over-turn the tradition, entrenched as it remains. The chapter ends 
with some comments as to the uncertain future. It is unclear what 
direction future broadcasting policy may take, but the FM broadcasting 
system as it now is - as a model, and as an apparatus able to be augmented 
and rapidly improved - is apt to become a very significant factor in 
future growth.
FM Radio and the Political Realities 
At the introduction to this study it was asked why political 
"realities" and not a pure, systematic, rational process of policy 
formulation and implementation, had had to be studied. The field of 
inquiry, it transpired, was cluttered with extraordinary obstacles and 
complications, all of a strictly political nature. It seemed that broad­
casting was not a field in which binding plans could be made - as things 
would not be allowed to go according to the plan. Hopefully the
examination of issues and detailing of events in succeeding chapters 
helped to explain why it was that the advent of an FM broadcasting 
"system" could not be systematic as one process, but rather occurred 
piecemeal, through various processes, at different levels of intensity, 
at different rates of velocity of change, and as part of a scenario of 
shifting weights and personalities.
In attempting to sort out the main factors, reference was made to 
the categories of the Salisbury model discussed in Section 1, Chapter 2, 
in particular by noting the separation of the decisional system from the 
arena of changing demand patterns, and noting also specific events, 
issues and processes - the "substance", or substantive issues - as part 
of the interaction, or set of "links", between the two. Policies might 
be categorised, in different phases, as distributive, redistributive, 
regulatory or self-regulatory, as the battles fluctuated. The system as 
a whole was seen to be activated by outside pressures - principally a 
wave of material change putting more substantive matters into the 
political process to be dealt with. We are speaking here of "resources 
of the system" - new technologies, greater wealth, fluctuating public 
demand - which presented problems to be dealt with.
The starting point for the whole exercise was a review of these 
material changes, in broadcasting and communications generally, in the 
post-war era. In response to that, various moves ensued leading to 
augmentation and growth of the broadcasting system. Obstacles abounded, 
some transient, and some deep-rooted and endemic to the system at 
large. FM radio is an interesting case in point as it came to be fought 
over as a field of mass communications in which things could be done in 
ways that digressed from the orthodox. It was in many ways a clean slate
The new technology of FM brought excitement, and caused much 
energetic activity, as it had a place in the campaign for diversification 
and proliferation of media. This had become possible through expanding 
wealth. Groups in the community - commercial, private, or institutions - 
could afford to set up new stations and make them survive. They were 
enabled to do that through places coming available on the frequency band, 
mainly in the FM sector.
From the concept of diversification, questions of démocratisation 
of the mass media were introduced. The debate became a more generalised 
one in that aspect, entering into discussions of economic protectionism 
for example. A "distributive" process was started, with a "redistributive" 
thrust to it, by adding a more pluralised layer to the broadcasting 
apparatus of society, and in theory or rhetoric at least, by opening the 
possibility of a more inter-active, widely accessible mass media, 
conducting a vast public intercourse of ideas.
The period under review saw these dreams entertained, though not 
actually fulfilled by what was achieved. The public broadcasting 
enterprises set up, for instance, remained weak, based on stations with 
generally low coverage and insecure finances - but they could be said to 
have had an ample demonstration effect and to be offering & base, for 
future initiatives.
On the other hand, by way of a weakly perceptible drift, the 
thrust of policy moved away from the reforms envisaged when "FM" overcame 
its major hurdle, in 1972-74, toward becoming a more restrained set of 
innovations, grafted onto the mass media system as people were accustomed 
to find it. To discuss specifics, the "hurdle" in question was the 
widespread uninterest and unwillingness to move on FM, which prevailed 
up to the early 1970s. The decision to recommend a UHF system, by the
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A.B.C.B., was in many ways consistent with that state of affairs. For 
one thing, as sections of the 1972 report show, it was limiting. Public 
broadcasters for example were to be firmly contained. For another, it 
consigned the FM system to unknown territory - a new technology,
Australian made, the domain of technical experts more than social 
reformers, which might or might not provide scope for major change.
More significantly it side-stepped what came to be recognised as a central, 
rather massive problem that overshadowed and distorted more planning 
work and advocacy for the whole period; Australia's"non-standard" use 
of the frequency spectrum, in particular the internationally-recognised 
FM radio sector on the VHF band, 88-108 MHz. "Clearing the band", 
expensive, germane to vested interests of different kinds, unattractive 
by comparison with some apparently simpler alternatives,'*' was the rock 
on which moves for change would founder, but for the most concerted 
action to keep them going forward.
Some of these moves for change need mention before the central
question of the congested "FM band" is looked at again. The challenge
of McClelland's Senate Standing Committee to the UHF proposal opened the
road to quick, unfettered action, toward getting stations on air; the
cabinet decision of September 1974, to do that by expedient means,
pre-empted all manner of resistance by imposing certain firm facts (in
the form of the radio stations on the FM band); that was consolidated by
Cass, in offering 12 licences in late 1975, and in a later interlude,
by the mercurial tentatives of Staley, who as a practitioner of "add-on"
reform mindedness, avoided substantial questions of control and
standardisation in the program area (avoiding especially the situation
in the television sector^ ) f in favour of some controversial modifications
1 As putting FM radio on UHF; putting all television on the UHF band,
or Staley's idea of relying on new technologies to provide frequencies
for all uses, without the need to clear 88-108.
in the new area of FM.
The Labor Party's moves during its term of office altered the
course of developments fundamentally. To qualify that it can be suggested,
on the evidence available to us, that continuing Liberal-N.C.P. rule
through the 1970s may not have done too much differently. The 1972
report had been accepted, and as qualified engineering advice was that
2
the UHF proposal was "technically feasible", if unwise, it may well
have produced a strong FM service. In other cases, the first of the
elected Fraser governments could have refused to issue licences being
offered to the new "educational" stations at the time it came into office,
but it did not. It could have stopped all extensions to the system at
that point, but instead - although pausing from time to time - it
continued with them. Instead of letting public radio expand, it could
have given more of those frequencies to commercial operators, but
declined that option also. We can add the observation here that expanding
system resources - the means and knowledge necessary to growth of the
system - have a momentum of their own, and lead to change, irrespective
of the character of the government at any particular time.
This was a point alluded to by Westerway in discussing the pressure
for allocation of more frequencies and licences:
[Question] You were talking about eventually having to cause 
the AM operators in Sydney to change their operating standards, 
as if there's this inevitable march of progress...
It would help a great deal to find more frequencies, but it 
just may not be possible... The need itself to find more 
frequencies is kind of a social thing, nothing to do with 
politics... It wouldn't matter which government were in office, 
it would persist. (3)
However the hard fight engaged in to produce the first sets of
2 Wilkinson had given this advice to the A.B.C.B. inquiry on FM, as a 
senior engineer with the Postmaster General's Department, Interview, 
13.1.82.
3 Interview, 27.1.82.
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stations, and the contests against vested interests of various kinds 
(importantly, planners and engineers wanting FM to be on the UHF band, 
or broadcasters not wanting competition against their stations), must 
be explained as contests of will, not the outgrowth of an automatic 
process. The least that can be said is that strategic pulling and 
hauling was done on the Labor Party's part, to bring about crucial changes 
like the launching of the first stations. At the least, this difficult 
work defined the character of the system that began to eventuate. That 
system consisted of a broad range of stations, for example, instead of 
a narrow one. It was done expediently and cheaply, in VHF, instead of 
cautiously, painstakingly, and at greater cost, on UHF. It was 
pluralistic and liberal (in the sense of having various separate station 
organisations, putting many views), instead of being highly regulated 
(in the sense of having a few large operators, including government 
agencies in addition to the A.B.C., getting together on program standards, 
and splitting frequency resources among themselves only).
As well, it is entirely plausible that growth may not have occurred 
in FM at all, without the intervention of the Whitlam government, to 
get it going; or else, without that, a new system may have been assembled 
only at snail's pace (as in the edging forward of the proposal for 
suburban stations, to operate on low power in the bigger cities) - 
unrecognisable in terms of what exists in fact, at this time. Specul­
ation can be taken further, on the evidence of the undertakings given 
by government to the existing AM broadcasters under Robinson as 
Minister, or of the legislation of 1981. If that tendency had prevailed 
throughout, it can be argued fairly that the FM band soon would have 
been closed off to all but the highest bidders, providing the narrowest 
base of control and ownership, with only the most profit-orientated 
lines on sale in the programming department.
Conjecture must rule as the actual pattern of events was rather 
chaotic, and resists a clear analysis as to what might have been. The 
period from 1972, and into the 1980s, was turbulent for a political 
system known more for stability than fractious change. As noted by 
Bear: "In one six-year period, no less than 7 Ministers held the broad­
casting portfolio, which itself went through 3 changed titles. A host 
of political crises erupted over broadcasting matters... Broadcasting 
issues became politically important and therefore politically charged... 
Not much consolation could be offered to those who might complain, for 
instance, that a broadcasting system was established "irrespective of 
the policy issues and alternatives and [that] political expediency, 
compromise and pragmatism dictated the course of events".4 56 7 In a sense, 
"realities" would dictate. It had to be done by that kind of pulling 
and hauling, or it might not have been achieved at all.
Congestion of the Radio Sector, on the VHF Band 
Patient negotiations for clearance of the VHF band were continuing 
at the end of 1981, as outlined by Westerway,6 while the use of that 
band remained as ever an obstacle to resolving various problems for 
broadcasters, not least the impasse over frequency use in Sydney, also
7
already dealt with at length. It has been having that effect for sane 
time, as for example in 1978, when Wright commented: "Mt Staley's real 
problem in the matter of FM is to persuade a reluctant bureaucracy to 
get moving on plans to clear the band so that FM can develop. He is the 
fifth Minister in line since the decision was made to put FM in the VHF
4 Op.cit., Bear, Open and Closed Options..., p.2.
5 Op.cit., Griffiths, p.16.
6 See Section 3, Chapter 6.
7 See Section 2, Chapter 2.
band - So far not one of them has shown any sign of coping with the
3
stubbornness of the entrenched status quo".
It would be unsatisfactory to leave the issue without paying
attention to the origin of the problem, which for present interests lies
9
with the report of the Huxley Committee of 1961. Some observers, 
notably in the engineering area, suggest that the concept of FM broad­
casting in the UHF band goes back as far as that time at least. The 
suggestion is that the committee was given to understand that its crucial 
decision, to use the radio space on the VHF band, 88-108 MHz, for 
television, would not be destructive. According to such suggestions, a 
system of extraordinarily high standard was envisaged for FM radio on 
UHF, one that in the making would give its designers a free hand in a 
new area of technology, and which would have good support fmom one of the 
main beneficiaries, the Australian electronics industry. Three 
informants made this suggestion - that in effect a lobby for UHF existed, 
and worked at its theme for some years - but there is no documented 
evidence for it. In one instance, as an example of the character of the 
information available, I was told the explanation had been learnt, "from 
an old engineer, at a lunch". The source however, in both cases, mine 
and his, was astute.
As early as 1966, the American researcher, Barry Cole, looking 
at Australian broadcasting, made observations which add fuel to the 
above considerations:
The agitation for FM is increasing as receiver manufact­
urers realise that television sales are now dwindling and 
new manufacturing outlets must be developed. The
8 Myles Wright, "FM Broadcasting: A Matter of Clearing the Air, in 
The Age (Media Opinion), Melbourne, 4.4.78.
9 Frequency Allocation Review Committee. See Fn. 13 following.
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Electrical and Radio Development Association of New South 
Wales has been particularly active in promoting interest 
in FM, and recently Mr Allsop(lO) was retained by a 
group of 6 major electronic patents companies as a tech­
nical consultant and an unofficial publicity officer for 
UHF FM development. It has been rumoured that submissions 
for an FM inquiry will soon be tendered.(11)
There is another way of explaining the decision to co-opt the FM
band for television, one that is easier to grasp and very consistent with
12the account given of Australian frequency use in earlier chapters.
This is the view that the Huxley committee yielded to pressure to find 
a lot of additional television frequencies, without delay, The public 
report of the committee confirms the fact of such pressure, and is useful 
to recapitulate upon.
It gives its task as re-drawing Australian frequency allocations 
in line with the decisions of the international Administrative Radio 
Conference at Geneva, in 1959, and as being in response to criticism of 
the use of the frequency spectrum in Australia, before then.
The terms of reference for the inquiry had included a clause that 
it should safeguard the "reasonable interests and needs for spectrum 
space" of all users, when considering any re-arrangements. As well, it 
was required to "examine fully", "aspects of the radio frequency position" 
affecting Australian radio and television services, put to it (after 
reference to the Postmaster-General) by the A.B.C.B.
In the course of the inquiry, the report goes on, the work of 
judging the use of the spectrum, and making arrangements in the light of 
the international convention, was pre-empted by an action of the Minister 
and Board. As the report states:
10 See Section 2, Chapter 1.
11 Op.cit., Cole, p.86.
12 See Section 2, Chapter 2. Section 3, Chapters 1/2.
However, on 23rd September, 1960, just as the Committee 
was beginning to examine the spectrum, it was requested 
by the Postmaster-General to deal with allocation of 
frequency channels for television services
as a matter of urgency. This required the Committee to 
examine the practicability of accommodating 13 television 
channels in the VHF band as sought by the Australian 
Broadcasting Control Board. (13)
If this is read in conjunction with Section 3, Chapter 1, above,
where it discusses the high coverage national television system built
for Australia, using many station frequencies, it can be seen that the
pressure to find these frequencies was great. This pressure was imposed
14openly by Davidson, the Postmaster-General of the time, and as we have 
15seen, FM radio, internationally designated the occupant of 88-108 MHz,
had been passed over by 1961, and all thoughts of introducing it
explicitly discouraged at the Ministerial level. In June of that year,
for instance, in announcing termination of the A.B.C's experimental
FM broadcasting program, the Minister said this:
It is not possible to have 13 channels for television in 
the VHF band, and, at the same time, make adequate 
provision for the development of fixed and mobile radio 
services without closing down the FM broadcasting trans­
missions. . .Even were it practicable to continue operation 
of the FM stations in the FM band, it would be quite 
impracticable to expand the service throughout the 
Commonwealth in that band because of the requirements for 
television and other services.(16)
The above account is corroborated, added to, and a timetable of 
events is provided for it, by the 1972 report of the A.B.C.B. on FM, 
which begins by pointing to a decision of the Royal Commission set up 
in 1953 to investigate various aspects of television, in preparation 
for the introduction of that new system in Australia - a decision that
13 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Radio 
Frequency Allocation Review Committee, Canberra, 12.10.61, p.7.
14 Mr C.W. Davidson, Country Party, Postmaster-General, 1956-64.
15 See Section 3, Chapter 1.
16 Op.cit., A.B.C.B., Frequency Modulation Broadcasting..., p.19.
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a ll  te lev is ion  should be in the VHF band. The Royal Commissioners had 
suggested "some rearrangement of frequencies" on VHF to provide the 
channels needed. This had been called to mind by the A.B.C.B. in 1959, 
the year of the Geneva conference on international standards, but also 
the year that applications were being made for regional te lev is ion  
licences in Australia. I t  was from these¿inquiries - very wide-ranging 
investigations connected with the provision of frequencies and licences - 
that the Board produced the plan for 13 VHF channels, including 88-108 MHz, 
and had i t  sent to the Huxley Committee. The la tte r body, as we have 
seen from its  terms of reference, and the "urgency" attached to the
17particular proposal, was hardly in a position to re jec t the proposal.
Of the competing influences, a new international covenant, and 
the pragmatic need for 13 channels fo r Australian te lev is ion , the la tter 
had p o lit ic a l force behind i t  and had to prevail. The Huxley Committee 
reported, at the end of its  inquiry, that while e ffo rts  had been made to 
allocate frequencies in line with international standards (the Geneva 
Table, 1959), as the committee had been set to do by its  in it ia l  terms 
of reference, "because of particular loca l needs, i t  was found impract­
icable to conform en tire ly  with that table; some departures from i t  have
18therefore been recommended". Such an arrangement, i t  was noted, was 
permitted within the terms of regulations attached to the Geneva Table.
In summary the peculiar use of the VHF spectrum can be brought 
down to a set of p o lit ic a l and commercial considerations, f i t t in g  well 
together: (a) P o lit ic a l considerations required that te lev is ion  services 
be distributed throughout the sparsely-populated regions of the 
continent, by the economical system of using powerful transmitters, on 
clear channels, and therefore requiring a large number of individual
17 Ib id ., pp.17-18.
18 O p .c it., Report of the Frequency Allocation Review Committee, p .7.
station frequencies; (b) Pressure to find these frequencies led to the 
allocation of the FM radio band for television; (c) That was congenial 
to existing radio interests, who in the late 1950s were anxious about 
competition from television, and therefore unready to expand; (d) It was 
reassuring for them too that while they would not be occupying the FM 
band, that band had been closed off to potential radio newcomers. Other 
interests had no chance of leaping into the breach, to start FM broad­
casting. Moves in that direction would have been against the interest 
of the political forces wanting television on VHF (the Country Party in 
cabinet, the television industry), as well as of the AM radio broadcasters 
No such indpendent interests emerged to penetrate the arrangement in 
the commercial field. (The other alternative, the notion of a publicly 
owned radio service on FM, without a commercial presence, had been 
shelved well and truly upon the defeat in 1949 of the previous Labor 
government, which had the propositior^; (e) The very practical
response to the need to cover the continent for television, <sr\d use tf^ VHF 
for aircraft, fixed and mobile, and defence services, as well as 
television, apparently did not involve any awkwardness with overseas 
users, even though Australia had become "non standard" with the outside 
world. Services in our region, from country to country, apparently did 
not abut. In the 1980s however there was concern that with a 
proliferation of frequency use, and more refined standards, problems 
might soon become serious - the chickens might begin coming home to roost.
Commercial Protectionism
A further theme in broadcasting policy and administration, 
recurrent in the preceding chapters, has been the importance of commercial 
protectionism. More importantly, much of the political struggle of the
19 See comments by Wright in Section 2, Chapter 1.
decades under review has centred on efforts to change or defend a set
of circumstances highly favourable to existing commercial broadcasters.
In the case of FM radio, the situation throughout the 1950s and 1960s
was that as population expanded and available resources grew, the small
number of operators was permitted to expand the area coverage of stations
to meet this growth, while increasing the number of operators was made
difficult, and was negligible, especially in the metropolitan centres.
Two substantial comments on the question of protection are
pertinent here. In the first, Westerway gives a considered view that
protectionist practices in broadcasting are one aspect of a wider debate:
You have to see it as part of the broader pattern, don't 
you?...We are a protectionist society. We have been since 
the turn of the century and we deliberately try, lobby 
groups try, and they succeed in the main in persuading 
politicians and the public that they should have a priv­
ileged and protected role. That happened in radio just as 
it did in many other fields and the mechanism which was 
used for protectionism in broadcasting was the licensing 
concept. It's just like tariffs or any other types of 
protection - superphosphate bounties... You really must see 
it in terms of the protection versus free trade debate.
If you were a free trader you'd go to the U.S. sort of 
writ and you would be saying whatever suggestions you want 
to make me about a frequency, we'll look at them...But in 
Australia we don't do that. We say we have certain social 
goals and one of them is (we may not say that very 
articulately), to protect the industry to such an extent 
that the basic service will always be there...
It's a general Australian response to setting up any 
sort of enterprise that there should be an infrastructure 
provided by the government. All the old economic 
discussions about the government acting as the referee or 
as one of the players are very relevant and should be seen 
in terms of the whole protection tariff debate...(20)
The second comment is from Armstrong, in Broadcasting Law and
Policy in Australia, who examined the applicability of Section 92 of the
constitution, the "free trade" section, to broadcasting:
None of the decided cases clearly indicate how the guarantee 
of freedom of 'trade, commerce and intercourse' between the 
States in s.92 of the Constitution applies to the B and TV 
Act...The cases suggest that the only valid broadcast licensing
20 Interview, 27.1.82.
scheme would be a merely 'regulatory' one which did not 
impose any more restrictions than were reasonably 
necessary for ensuring social or economic objectives 
likely to be recognised by the court...In practice the 
system is based largely on economic protection of 
existing stations against competition. This is partly 
reflected in the Act: ss 81(2), 85(2). A constitutional 
justification of this protection would need to link it 
with some legitimate social objective like the ensuring 
of a supply of programmes. In Clark King and Co. Pty.
Ltd v Australian Wheat Board (1978) 21 ALR 1 the High 
Court upheld a statutory scheme for the compulsory 
acquisition of wheat...The Clark King principle might 
conceivably be extended to some aspects of broadcasting 
on the ground that the activity could scarcely be carried 
out without discretionary allocation of frequencies. But 
it would be less easily extended to the current scheme 
under which potential competitors are excluded from 
broadcasting in order to protect the profitability of 
those who already hold licences...
There are many similarities between the economic prot­
ectionism of the broadcasting policy and the two-airline 
policy...The Air Navigation Regulations are, however, 
drafted so as to allow refusal of licences only on safety 
grounds...It appears that if broadcasting is trade, 
commerce or intercourse between the States the only valid 
licensing scheme can be one which is manifestly based on 
criteria like minimising interference with frequencies and 
choosing the best of applicants for use of all available 
frequencies. The current scheme imposes no obligation to 
make any frequencies available...(21)
Following this, it appears to the writer that much that has been
done in the field of broadcasting policy has taken place without the
fullest legal sanction or informed debate. To practitioners of politics
and/or broadcasting, legal questions very often have to be dealt with
just as impediments to action - to be skirted around, or dismissed. For
one small example, there was the fairly general tendency to look the
other way, while a number of general broadcasters were operating on
licences issued under the WT Act, despite awkward questions which had
22been raised, even in the parliament.
In the ambit of the law and the debate over protection, Rowe 
refers to certain pressures encountered by Staley's administration when
21 Op.cit., Armstrong, Broadcasting Law and Policy..., pp.11-13.
22 By the Postmaster-General, Senator R. Bishop. See Section 3, Chapter 3.
making plans to make available supplementary licences to regional radio
and television operators. "This was a difficulty raised in discussions
by the then Department of Business and Consumer Affairs. They were a
bit concerned about the trade practices implications of stations securing 
23a monopoly." In response to that provision was made for "continued 
placing of independent operators" in regional areas. Westerway affirms 
that in the application procedure to be laid out for the issue of suppl­
ementary licences, the "door has been left open" to independent "stand-
24alone" operators wanting to bid for a licence.
In another case, Wright mentions certain encounters with the 
trade laws, in the first instance, his support for putting FM on the UHF 
band:
No technical man was fazed by this. The opposition was 
led (I didn't discover till much later) by the then Tariff 
Board which had a bee in its bonnet about hidden subsidies, 
for Australian manufacturers. We had one run-in with them 
about the intermediate frequency on television receivers, 
and I had thought I had convinced them that the Control 
Board wasn't interested in setting an intermediate frequency 
which was not standard with Japan for Australia, just to 
make it harder to import sets made over there. There was a 
very good reason for it. The intermediate frequency is 
where the set oscillates, and since all electrical machinery 
oscillates, you put all the rubbish together, from every 
kind of operation... It was a matter of finding the one that 
was easiest and cheapest to manufacture.(25)
The scope for regulation of this kind, in the wider context of 
laws made to guarantee free trade, is central to the direction the 
broadcasting system will take in the future. The 1981 Amendments to 
the B and TV Act, discussed in Section 3, Chapter 6, to the writer are 
protectionist in tone, and imply strengthening of oligopoly in the
23 Interview, 23.12.81.
24 Interview, 27.1.82. It appears that where there is such a bid the 
A.B.T. will decide whether to give out a supplementary licence 
irrespective of it, or commit the matter to a new and open hearing, 
later, for a stand-alone licence to be issued.
25 Interview, 22.10.81.
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television sector. The debate over protection, as it applies to mass 
media and communications industries in general, is unresolved, and 
requires further attention.
Future Possibilities
FM broadcasting, as it emerged at the end of 1981, was being 
successful at presenting itself as a significant alternative prospectus 
to the strengthening of oligopoly. It is a sector "added on" to the 
broadcasting system as a whole, and working according to principles, many 
of which are different to those of the system as a whole - as in the 
greater dispersal of ownership. Its continuity is with the liberal 
and pluralistic strain of thought and policies on broadcasting. It is 
not a great financial power, though it represents a considerable invest­
ment. It has certain resources which enhance its power, notably the 
capacity to transmit nearly perfect sound to small portable receivers - 
a monopoly area for FM radio for some time to come. As well, human 
resources are important. Large numbers of people are now involved, working 
in radio, and offering new talent. The public radio movement has 
abundant potential as the training ground for broadcasting in the future. 
Much that develops in the coming decades will be influenced by the 
extent to which these various resources of the FM broadcasting system 
are used to advantage. The large number and wide diversity of the Ftyl 
stations is another aspect of their potential, especially if public 
listening tastes should turn complicated, irascible and choosy.
An infusion of funds for public broadcasting, let us say from 
government - and a figure 100-times the present grant would still be 
realistic in terms of government budgets over-all - would be the shortest 
route to making the sector a major influence in Australian media. It 
would radically alter the status of several stations in regard to their
technical facilities and topographic reach, staff, and finance for 
(hence quality of) programs.
In the sense that FM radio now can easily be made to expand, it,
and public broadcasting in particular, has acquired the look of a very
significant institution, with many of its crises behind it - developed
beyond infancy; in place; not challenged any longer for its existence,
and able to expand, say through the application of funds and provision
of more frequencies to all three of its branches, along fairly
predictable lines. Notwithstanding the slow penetration of FM in the
car radio market, all estimates agreed with the A.B.C. survey of November
1981, which indicated that 82% of listeners had access to an FM 
26receiver. That necessary prerequisite for expansion, the ability of 
the public, physically to receive the service, was satisfied. The 
future, then, is pregnant with possibilities.
26 A.B.C. Audience Research, Sydney Radio Survey 1981, 81:27, Sydney, 
November 1981. 82.1% of households had an FM radio. More than
10% of people were using FM stations "the most" during breakfast. 
More than 30% of listeners at night were using FM the most, that 
is, in preference to stations on the AM band. Support for FM was 
stronger in the younger age groups.
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City Extra - Sydnay - Aprii
Unemployed? No money and 
nowhere to go for Easter? Well, 
stay home and listen to :
Radio Eastern Sydney
Radio Eastern Sydney will be 
broadcasting for the first time 
over *hf Easter weekend The
T*\\
v. 4  . t> A A /
r i iua> ojiJ uli
midnight on Easter Sunday. 
Frequency is 93.7 MHz in the 
V.H.F. band — (thats FM to us 
ignoramus’s ) between ABC- 
FM (92.9) and 2MBS-FM 
(102.5). The broadcast will be 
on a standby FM transmitter 
donated for the test by 2MBS^
The Chairman of Radio 
Eastern Sydney, prof Neil 
Runcie, told CITY EXTRA that 
Australian broadcasting has 
lagged 20 years behind the
«VMMTfHe« ft*
A*
f ^ l  k} i V A K «i v l .t t O l g [ •'.*
particularly suitable for 
community radio because of its 
limited coverage, its high 
quality and much simpler 
transmitter aerial. As soon as 
the Australian Broadcasting 
Tribunal has completed its 
present inquires into standards 
and self-regulation in broad­
casting, the way should be 
cleared for an enormous 
expansion of FM broadcasting 
and in particular, public or 
community radio
""Sc Jvvnw «».»«£ U'\'r. i v
.v.iu-C ' .v * r  t>t i v  X v  >. ‘.C C
x. t tu vVaveney College
on top of the Birrell St hill in 
Bondi, where the transmitter 
and studio will be located.
HERE IS THE COMPLETE 
PROGRAM BROUGHT TO 
YOU EXCLUSIVELY BY 
CITY EXTRA:—
FRIDAY 8 APRIL
6.00pm — OPENING — 2 RES—FM
6.15 Irish National Association
7.00 Prince of Wales Hospital
7.30 Vivaldi: The Seasons
8.00 A1 Grassby - No ethnic jokes please
8.30 Margaret Barry Reports
9.00 Jazz to 1930
9.30 Les Murray Talking to the Tribe
10.00 Dianne Baker Piano
10.30 Community Radio Report
11.00 Greek Music
11.20 Music from the Kirk Gallery
SATURDAY 9 APRIL
7.00am — OPENING
7.05 Paddington Village Church
7.30 Music from Europe
8.00 Woollahra Arts Centre
8.30 Music from Europe II
9.00
to RESA SCHOOL BROADCAST 
Noon
12.00 Music from the Eastern Mediterranean
12.30 Lone fathers v.
1.00 Art and Drama in Jail
1.45 The Story of Genesis
2.15 Film Review
2.45 Jazz of the 30’s
3.30 Music from the Kirk Gallery
4.30 Bondi Pavilion
5.00 Kevin Toner: Waverley Health Services
5.30 Don Giovanni, Acts I & II
6.30 Syd Einfeld
7.00 The Peoples Paper ?????
7.15 Poetry of Kenneth Slessor
7.45 Songs from Russia
8.15 Community Radio Report
3.45 French Concert Hail
9.15 Woolloomooloo Residents
9.45 Israeli Music
10.15 Housing Commission Tenancy
10.30 Jazz
11.30 Australian Humour
SUNDAY 10 APRIL
8.00am — OPENING 
8.05 Health and Nutrition
8.20 Music from the Kirk Gallery -
Songs and Songwriters
9.20 Australin Poetry
10.00
to THE ENVIRONMENT 
High Noon
12.00 Sydney University Renaissance Players
12.30 Save Sydney Hospital
1.00 Don Giovanni - Acts III & IV
2.30 Sunday play
4.00 Music from the Kirk Gallery
Female vocalists
5.00 The Guitar Hour
6.00 You and the Law
6.15 You and Local Government
7.00 The Sydney Music Scene
8.00 M.Barry reports again
8.15 Music from South America
9.00 Karinya Health Services
9.30 Greek Music
10.00 Japanese Music
10.30 Music from the Kirk Gallery- Lee Williams
11.30 Whence Commnnir»» •*
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